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Abstract Christopher William Hughes 
Japanese Economic Power and Security Policy in the Post-
Cold War Era: A Case Study of Japan-North Korea 
Security Relations 
This thesis investigates the future direction of Japanese security policy by asking 
whether Japan can contribute to international security through the use of economic 
rather than military power after the Cold War, and what are the policy-making 
obstacles to this. 
Chapter one outlines how the post-Cold War debate on security has shifted from 
military to economic conceptions of security, and how this makes it possible to 
conceive of Japan as a global civilian power which employs its economic strength 
to contribute to international security. 
Chapters two and three then go on to construct a detailed theoretical model of 
economic security policy and Japanese economic power in order to test empirically 
the concept of global civilian power in the case study. 
Chapter four introduces the case study of Japan-North Korea security relations 
and demonstrates that since the end of the Cold War the North Korean security 
threat has come to be perceived by policy-makers in Japan as generated by 
economic insecurity, and thus requiring the types of economic solutions that a 
global civilian power can provide. 
Chapter five then tests the model of Japanese economic power against the case 
of North Korea and reveals that even though Japan has the latent capacity to use 
economic power to help resolve this security problem, as yet it has not mobilised 
sufficient economic power to enable it to act a global civilian power. 
Chapter six looks at the internal security policy-making process in Japan in order 
to explain the reasons behind Japan's non-fulfillment of the role of a global civilian 
power, and argues that in fact Japan in this period has increased its military role in 
security by utilising the legitimacy of the North Korean threat. 
In the light of the preceding arguments, the conclusion reappraises the concept 
of global civilian power, Japan's security role, and the implications for global 
security. 
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Introduction 
The basic function of all states throughout history has been to ensure the security of 
their populations from threat. States that have failed in their security responsibilities 
are usually the ones that have fallen eventually by the wayside as they lose 
legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and internal institutions. Hence, security 
has always been at the centre of the policy-making agenda of individual states and 
between states. The populations and policy-makers of states have learned by harsh 
experience that the creation of a viable security policy is a complex task, is fraught 
with risk, and requires imaginative and comprehensive approaches. It is therefore 
ironic that during the Cold War,just as states and the international system faced the 
greatest destructive risks, in some ways the making of security policy became 
relatively easier. For while nuclear weapons posed the greatest and most immediate 
destructive threats in history, the bi-polarity that accompanied these weapons 
systems also gave policy-makers the confidence--whether misguided, or not--that 
they could identify clear enemies and clear strategies and procedures for dealing 
with the prevention of conflict. Of course, these conceptions of security did not 
mean global peace, as the superpowers and other major developed powers fought 
out their struggles through intervention in low-intensity conflicts in the developing 
world. 
Likewise, even for states like Japan that were not engaged directly in Cold War 
conflict, the superpower tensions of this period gave an air of certainty to security 
policy. Debate over security policy in Japan in the post-Cold War period has 
always been fierce, and, as the 1960 US-Japan security treaty crisis showed, has 
had the capacity to provoke great domestic political unrest. But after the crisis 
passed, and despite other periodic crises, Japan's earlier incorporation into the US 
alliance system ensured that in many ways it could delegate its responsibility as a 
state for security policy-making to the US, and the issue of security could be swept 
under the domestic political carpet to be largely forgotten. Even in the 1980's, as 
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Japan increased its military support for the US alliance, the incremental expansion 
of Japan's defence role meant that security could still be suppressed as a political 
issue. As long as Japan stayed beneath the US's nuclear umbrella and bilateral 
cooperation proceeded with the objective of containing the USSR as a common 
Cold War enemy, security could be kept more or less off the political agenda. 
The problems of security policy-making have also long been central to the study 
of international relations, and vice versa. International relations was established as a 
field of academic study after World War I in an attempt to solve the perennial puzzle 
of why nations continued to go to war, when, as the events of 1914-18 had clearly 
showed, the costs outweighed the gains. Moreover, the study of international 
relations was not intended as a purely academic exercise. Its findings were thought 
to contain lessons for policy-makers, and, indeed, a number of leading academics 
have been called upon to devise state security policy in countries such as the US. 
However, during the Cold War it is also clear that the fields of international 
relations and international politics often became subject to the same type of over 
self-assurance that also affected the approach of state policy-making communities to 
security matters, and which only the extraordinary circumstances of the bi-
polar/nuclear world could have afforded. Hence, the debate on security in 
international relations and international politics also became polarised between its 
opposing realist and liberal perspectives. Despite the apparent passion of the 
academic debate on security, much of it had a tendency to become ritualistic and to 
sacrifice objective evaluation of the essential truths of each school of thought in 
favour of maintaining rigid theoretical and ideological divisions. The end result of 
this polarisation was that few academics were willing to think outside their 
respective paradigms, and thus that the fields of international relations and 
international politics would be ill-equipped initially to assess the changed security 
environment after the end of the Cold War. In this way, the academic debate had 
neglected its core purpose of providing new and innovative ways to consider the 
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causes behind conflict and to provide the type of flexible thinking about security 
matters which would be of benefit to policy-makers. 
The end of the Cold War, though, has challenged policy-makers across the 
globe and in Japan, and academics in the fields of international politics and 
international relations to rethink their approach to security. For, it is clear that after 
the passing of the unique bi-polar structure, security problems and security policy 
have reverted back to an age of uncertainty and risk. Although the likelihood of 
nuclear war has been greatly reduced, the post-Cold War period has seen the 
outbreak of one full-scale conventional war in the Gulf, the spread of a number of 
low intensity conflicts in Africa and Europe, and the threat of conflict in the Asia-
Pacific region. As will be demonstrated in chapter one, many of the military 
approaches to security policy employed during the Cold War period no longer fit 
the increasingly opaque security conditions after the Cold War. Policy-makers of 
the major states now have to begin to reconsider their notions of security and to 
devise once again complex and comprehensive approaches to deal with the complex 
post-Cold War security agenda and to ensure global stability. 
Japanese policy-makers have also had a rude awakening with the end of the 
Cold War. The certainties of the Cold War and its allies and enemies have faded, 
and policy-makers in Japan have been forced, even if at times reI uctantly, to think 
about the security responsibilities which they have so long been able to avoid 
behind the shield of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Japan as an economic 
superpower and potentially a military superpower clearly matters once again in 
regional and global security in the post-Cold War period. As the experience of the 
Gulf War of 1990-91 showed, demands for a greater Japanese contribution to 
international security are bound to grow and Japan will inevitably need to fulfill 
some kind of role in global security. The kind of role that Japan eventually 
chooses, and how successfully it fulfills it, will have significant implications for 
world peace and stability after the Cold War. 
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The fields of international relations and international politics also need to change 
in response to the post-Cold War security agenda. The existing paradigms when 
used in exclusion of each other have been insufficient to explain the reasons behind 
the end of the Cold War and the changes in the security environment that have 
followed it. International relations and international politics undoubtedly have 
crucial roles to play in helping to understand post-Cold War security, not just in 
order to provide detached academic analysis of events, but also as bodies of 
thought which can assist policy-makers to think in flexible ways about how to 
tackle the post-Cold War security agenda. In this sense, the end of the Cold War is 
an opportunity for the study of international relations and international politics to 
breakaway from narrow theoretical stances, to mix the best of theories from all 
schools of thought, to use this as a way to search for new approaches to post-Cold 
War security, and to return to the essential purpose of providing theoretical models 
and insights to policy-makers to help them form security policy. 
This set of observations about the vital importance of security-policy making 
after the Cold War, Japan's role within global security policy, and the study of 
international relations and international politics for understanding security policy, 
brings us to the fundamental questions and objectives that will be explored 
throughout this dissertation. Firstly, after the Cold War, security remains as the 
most vital issue for states and the international political system. But, as chapter one 
will show, the whole issue of security policy-making has been made more complex 
in this period by the reemergence of low intensity and non-specific threats. Many of 
these threats cannot be adequately handled by means of military power alone, and 
instead require solutions involving the exercise of economic power. This reinforces 
the argument that a fresh and innovative approach is required to the issue of 
security after the Cold War. Therefore, this dissertation is concerned with 
investigating the future shape of global security policy, and, based upon the belief 
that complex and innovative approaches are necessary to deal with the post-Cold 
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War security agenda, examines the utility of economic power as the way forward in 
security policy in this period. 
Related to this first question is a second one concerned with the role of Japan in 
post-Cold War security. As noted above, Japan is clearly a vital player in regional 
and global security after the Cold War, and this dissertation analyses the policy-
making debate in Japan to reveal what is likely to be this state's future role in 
security. More specifically, the question that is asked, and which links in with the 
first question above, is whether Japanese policy-makers can create a viable security 
policy based primarily on economic rather than military power, and what are the 
implications of this for global security as a whole in the post-Cold War period. The 
intention of this question is then to go even further, and to ask what are the 
opportunities and obstacles for Japanese policy-makers in articulating a conception 
of Japan as a new type of power, or global civilian power, which uses economic 
power for security purposes. 
To help ask the first and second questions above concerned with the importance 
of economic power in post-Cold War security and Japan's role as global civilian 
power, a third question is explored, which again is linked to the observations made 
at the start of this introduction about the importance of international relations and 
international politics theory for understanding post-Cold War security policy. The 
third question asks what types of insights can be gained into post-Cold War 
security by combining different perspectives from these fields, and whether they 
can be used to provide a complete and testable model of economic power in the 
service of security policy, which can then be employed to give shape for the first 
time to the conception of the global civilian power and Japan's performance of that 
role. 
Therefore, this thesis lays out three interrelated questions and objectives 
concerned with elucidating the course of global security and the part that economic 
power plays in it; Japan's general role in global security and as a global civilian 
5 
power; and general theoretical understanding of the utility of economic power for 
security policy-making after the Cold War. 
In order to reach these overall objectives and to explore the question of Japan as 
a global civilian power both thorough theoretical and empirical approaches are 
required. For it is clear that, despite the obvious importance after the Cold War of 
the issues of security and economic power, Japan's global security role, and the 
needforinternational politics theory to aid in the understanding of security, as yet 
modem scholarship has failed to produce studies of these issues which explain 
them with sufficient and interlinking theoretical and empirical sophistication. For 
instance, in the field of international politics there are individual studies which offer 
an overarching and useful theoretical framework of economic power. However, 
whilst these frameworks do offer insights into the role of economic power in the 
post-Cold War world and will in part be incorporated into the theoretical approach 
of this dissertation, they often lack an empirical basis, untested as they are against 
specific case studies and constructed largely from anecdotal evidence. In addition, 
even though these models have implications for security problems, their analysis 
rarely is carried over to make explicit the link between economic power and 
security, or to offer models which can be used to investigate this link. 
With regard to the case of Japan and international politics theory, there have 
been a number of studies that, as will be outlined more fully in chapter one, have 
pointed to the important role that Japan could play in security based upon its 
economic power. But again, few of these studies have attempted to take this point 
to its logical conclusion and to construct a complete theoretical model of Japanese 
economic power and to investigate empirically its use in the service of security 
policy. In many ways, the impression is that for the study of international politics 
Japan remains as a source of convenient examples with which to illustrate wider 
and disparate points about economic power and security, but that the case of Japan 
has not yet been treated as one which could help to transform our understanding of 
the connection between economic power and security and, in tum, the whole field 
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of international politics. Even the concept of global civilian power highlighted in 
this dissertation, which offers a new paradigm to understand economic power and 
security after the Cold War, still remains very much in its 'prototype' stage in 
international politics theory and needs detailed expansion of its theoretical aspects to 
tum it into a model which can be tested empirically. 
The field of Japanese studies itself has not produced adequate theoretical and 
empirical work on the relation between Japanese economic power and security 
policy after the Cold War. To be sure, there has been plenty of speculation about 
Japan's security role after the Cold War, and, as chapter one will show, much of 
this has pointed to the importance of Japan's exercise of economic power for 
security purposes. There have also been many detailed and excellent empirical case 
studies of Japanese security policy-making, and some of them have focused on the 
use of economic power, and especially economic aid, for security. But, even 
though all Japan specialists are aware that the particular characteristics of Japanese 
post-War history mean that the problem of economic power is essential to 
understanding any aspect of Japanese foreign policy, it is remarkable that few 
scholars have tried to produce a comprehensive theoretical and empirical overview 
of the connections between Japan's economic power and security policy. Still 
fewer scholars have tried to bridge the gap between the study of Japan and 
international politics, and shown the significance of Japanese economic power for 
global security after the Cold War. The notable exceptions to this have been the 
proponents of the idea of global civilian power in Japan, and Reinhard Drifte's 
attempts to show how in the 1990's Japanese foreign policy has achieved its ends 
chiefly through economic power) However, as has been seen, the idea of global 
civilian power requires further theoretical and empirical elaboration, and Drifte's 
work, whilst groundbreaking in many ways by linking questions of economics to 
security in the case of Japan and inviting us to throwaway our preconceptions 
when looking at Japanese foreign policy, arguably suffers from a lack of theoretical 
1 Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy in the 1990's: From Economic Superpower to What 
Power?, London, Macmillan, 1996. 
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completeness, and when looking at Japan's economic power falls back on broad 
anecdotal examples with only limited empirical detail in relation to a specific case 
study or the problems for policy-making in mobilising economic power. 
This dissertation in seeking to answer the question of Japan's role as a global 
civilian power aims to build upon much of the existing work in international politics 
and Japanese studies outlined above but also to avoid the theoretical and empirical 
weaknesses of both. As stated above, this dissertation seeks to construct a 
theoretical model of global civilian power that can then be tested empirically against 
a specific problem in order to reveal the implications for Japanese and global 
security. To avoid the theoretical pitfalls of other studies, this model will be created 
by being one of the first studies to combine Western and Japanese scholarship to 
produce a complete, structured, and methodical framework of global civilian power 
with which to analyse the utility of Japanese economic power for security after the 
Cold War. In line with the need mentioned above to escape from overly restrictive 
theoretical divisions in the post-Cold War era, this model will borrow deliberately 
from different theoretical schools in both Japan and the West. No excuse is made 
for this lack of intellectual purity, as theory, especially after the Cold War and 
especially when concerned with the critical issue of security, should be used to 
open rather than close doors to comprehending problems of security and their 
solutions. 
However, at the same time as this dissertation aims to create a complete 
theoretical model of economic power, it will also subject the model to rigorous 
empirical tests. To do so, an extensive case study of Japan-North Korea security 
relations will be presented in the later chapters. The aim of this case study is to 
reassess the traditional interpretations of the Korean Peninsula security problem and 
to show the potential utility of economic Japanese economic power in dealing with 
it after the Cold War. This case study requires a detailed look at Japan-North Korea 
relations in the 1990's and the security policy-making process in Japan. Therefore, 
in the course of conducting the empirical testing of the model of global civilian 
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power, this dissertation will also be one of the first studies to give a comprehensive 
overview of how the main Japanese policy-making actors perceive problems of 
security after the Cold War, and to catalogue and analyse Japan-North Korea 
economic and political relations in the 1990's. 
Moreover, aside from the enhanced theoretical and empirical understanding of 
Japanese security policy that the case study aims to provide, it is also hoped that it 
will show that research into the North Korean security problem is of intrinsic 
importance in itself, as North Korea is a relatively unknown state, but one which 
could have a decisive impact on security in Northeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, 
and possibly even globally. 
Structure of the dissertation 
The scheme that the dissertation will take to examine the questions above is as 
follows. Chapter one examines the debate in the West and Japan on security after 
the Cold War, the particular problems that policy-makers face, and why economic 
conceptions of security are so important to help in dealing with the post-Cold War 
security agenda. It highlights the doubts in the West concerning the utility of 
traditional forms of military security policy to deal with post-Cold War problems 
and the contest between forms of security policy based on military and economic 
power. Chapter one then turns to look at the debate on security in Japan to ask 
whether its traditions of security policy based on economic power offer an 
alternative vision for security in the post-Cold War era. The remainder of chapter 
one is then devoted to an overview of the theory on power and international politics 
and how this has begun to argue for the conception of Japan in the post-Cold War 
period as a global civilian power. 
Chapter two expands the concept of global civilian power by combining 
theoretical literature to produce a model that can examine the utility of economic 
power in the service of security policy. The chapter lays out typologies of economic 
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security, economic power, and the components of economic power, and assesses 
the security benefits of each of them. 
Chapter three then applies this model to Japan in order to evaluate the links 
between the components of economic power, security policy, and the policy-
making process. This chapter will present for the first time a complete model of 
Japanese economic power in order to prepare for the part of the case study in 
chapter five dealing with Japan-North Korea economic relations. 
Chapter four begins the case study with an analysis of the North Korean 
security problem, and demonstrates that since the mid-1990's it has come to be 
seen as one generated by economic instability and thus capable of being resolved by 
economic power. 
Chapter five continues the case study by looking in detail at the North Korean 
economy and its links with Japan to allow an assessment of the type of economic 
power that Japan could exercise over North Korea in order to resolve its security 
problem. 
Chapter six then looks at the obstacles in the policy-making process to Japan's 
use of economic power in dealing with the North Korean security problem, and 
how this has impacted upon the balance between Japanese economic and military 
security policy after the Cold War. 
Finally, the conclusion brings together all the points in the previous chapters; 
explains the contribution of the dissertation to theoretical and empirical 
understanding of economic power and security policy globally and in Japan; 
considers the results of the research in light of the three objectives outlined above; 
and asks some general questions about the future of Japanese and global security 
policy, and the validity of the concept of global civilian power. 
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1 Global and Japanese conceptions of power and 
security policy in the post-Cold War era 
This chapter examines the debate amongst US and Japanese policy-makers over 
the future direction of security policy after the Cold War. It aims to demonstrate 
how the end of the Cold War has given rise to a number of new and reemergent 
security issues that have increased doubts in policy-making communities about 
the utility of military power as the way forward in security policy and have 
obliged them to reconsider forms of security policy in which economic power 
plays a central role. With regard to the case of Japan, this chapter shows how the 
internal policy-making debate is tom between military and economic conceptions 
of security after the Cold War; and asks whether Japan is capable of 
reinvigorating its traditions of security policy reliant on economic power, and. 
contributing in this way to global security. 
The chapter then goes on to examine Western and Japanese contemporary 
scholarship in international politics to ask if it is capable of supplying a model of 
a state which can be used to test the theoretical possibilities of Japan's use of 
economic power for security policy in the 1990's. It aims to show how much of 
contemporary scholarship points to economic power as the key form of power 
after the Cold War, and that as a result it is possible to introduce the concept of 
Japan as a global civilian power, which uses economic power to achieve its 
security ends. 
THE NATURE OF SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR 
The Gulf War, military power, and multilateral intervention 
At the end of the Cold War, the initial reaction in some quarters was that the 
collapse of the USSR and global communism represented a decisive victory for 
the military power of the US and its allies, and appeared to vindicate the decision 
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of President Ronald Reagan's administration in the early 1980's to increase 
significantly defence expenditure, and to seek strategic parity, or even superiority, 
over the USSR, by embarking on a quantitative and qualitative build-up of US 
military forces through such programmes as SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative).i 
These interpretations of the end of the Cold War were based upon the stark reality 
that the bi-polar international system had been constructed, shaped, and driven by 
military confrontation between the superpowers and their respective military 
blocs and alliance systems. 
Following on from the assumption that the Cold War had been decided by 
military power, the expectation was that the post-Cold War peace and security 
environment would also be determined to a large extent by this factor. President 
George Bush's administration was certainly conscious of the need for 
retrenchment in military spending and overseas military commitments in order to 
reap the benefits of the 'peace dividend', but in its early years continued to be 
influenced by the thinking of its predecessor, in that it too saw national security 
predominantly in military terms. The decision by Bush to intervene in Panama in 
1989 owed much to the Reagan administration's policy belief in the value of 
I For details of the Reagan administration's defence build-up, see Barry P. Posen and Stephen Van 
Evera, Reagan administration defense policy: departure from containment', in Kenneth A. Dye, 
Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild (cds.), J:.'agle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in American 
Foreign Policy, Toronto, Little Brown and Company, 1987, pp. 75-114; and Charles W. Kegley 
Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pallern and Process, London, Macmillan, 
1987, p. 584. 
The historians Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, however, counter claims that the SDI 
project forced the USSR to increase military expenditure to the point of breaking the Soviet 
economy, thereby ensuring victory for the US in the Cold War. Lebow and Stein argue that Soviet 
defence spending, although cripplingly high, did not in fact rise significantly during period of US 
military build-up under the Reagan administration. They also note that, according to USSR 
President Gorbachev's own statements, his foreign policy of pere.~1roika and pacificism towards 
the West was motivated more by domestic concerns to restructure the command economy than by 
the need to respond to US military pressure. Gorbachev was confident that the US would not 
deliberately attack the USSR, and like previous Soviet leaders had long been aware of the need to 
reform the structural problems of the economy that had been inherited from Stalin's 
industrialisation programme in the 1930's, and well before the beginnings of military rivalry with 
the US. Thus, Lebow and Stein stress that Gorbachev was determined to embark on a reform 
programme regardless of the Reagan military build-up, and that the SOl initiative, rather than 
accelerating this process, actually complicated Gorbachev's reform efforts because it strengthened 
the hand of those domestic critics in the Soviet Union that wished to see a military response to the 
US's challenge. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We Alll.ost the Cold War, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 369-76. 
12 
military intervention that had met with mixed success in the Lebanon (1982-
1983), Grenada (1983), and Libya (1986). 
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 confirmed for Bush the crucial role of military 
power in post-Cold War security.2 The result of the US's perceived success in the 
Gulf War was to encourage Bush to layout in his State of the Union address in 
1991 a vision of a 'New World Order' in which national and global security 
would be guaranteed by collective military intervention under US leadership.3 
The lessons of the Gulf War and Bush's vision of military power as the future 
of global security policy did not go unnoticed in other parts of the world. The 
perception amongst the defence communities of many middle-ranking and rising 
powers, such as China, was that military power, and especially technologically 
advanced military power, was the key to national security in the post-Cold War 
world.4 The consequence of this was that a number of regional arms races were 
generated in East Asia and the Middle East as states sought to acquire the same 
types of sophisticated weaponry that the US had employed in the Gulf War.s 
Even the thinking of the United Nations was affected by the belief in the 
primacy of military forms of security in the post-Cold War and immediate Gulf 
War periods. Spurred on by the success of military action in the Gulf War 
nominally under UN control, and President Bush's apparent enthusiasm for a 
reformed and reinvigorated UN, one of the first acts of the then new UN Secretary 
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as laid out in his June 1992 Agenda for Peace, 
2Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign PoliCY Since 1938, London, Penguin 
Books, 1993, p. 396. 
3Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order 
and America's Purpose, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp. 6-7; Asai 
Motofumi, 'Pacifism in a new international order', Japan Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 1991, p. 137. 
4S. Chu, National Security in Transition: The Asia-Pacific Strategic Balance and China's Security 
Planning in Ihe Lale 1980's and Early 1990's, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George 
Wa<;hington University, 1993, p. 189. 
5For an appraisal of the arms race in the Middle East after the Gulf War, see Anthony H. 
Cordcsman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East, Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. Descriptions of the Asia-Pacific arms race and the types of 
weaponry purchased are provided in Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian 
security', Survival: The lISS Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, 1994, pp. 8-9; Michael T. Klare, 'The next 
great arms race', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 136-52; Andrew Mack and 
Desmond Ball, 'The military buildup in the Asia-Pacific', The Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 1992, 
pp. 197-208. 
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was to seek the creation of a UN standing force to allow for rapid intervention in 
the early stages of international conflicts and civil wars.6 Boutros-Ghali's 
permanent UN force failed to materialise, but in its early operations in Somalia 
between 1992 and 1994, the UN did allow itself to be pushed towards a more 
aggressive use of its military mandate. What began ostensibly as a peacekeeping 
mission became in practice one of peace enforcement, with the UN backed by the 
US in an unsuccessful attempt to impose a settlement on the Somali factions.' In 
moving towards such a high profile military approach in Somalia, Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali and the UN departed from the traditional principles of UN 
peacekeeping, and accepted to some extent the arguments of defence strategists 
around the world that the active use of military power can provide one type of 
practical response to post-Cold War security issues. 
The conceptions of security policy and military power that emerged under the 
Bush administration also were taken up to a certain extent by President Bill 
Clinton's administration during its first year in office. During the presidential 
campaign of 1992, Clinton actually succeeded in sounding more aggressive than 
tYrhe Agenda for Peace included the provision of a UN force under the sole authority of the 
security council which was intended to participate in peacekeeping, peace building and peace 
enforcement missions. For details on Boutros Ghali's views on peacekeeping and the debate 
within the UN on the Agenda/or Peace, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda/or Peace: one 
year later', Orbis: A Journal o/World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 323-32. 
Although Boutros Ghali clearly favoured the greater exercise of UN military power he did not 
lose sight of the fact that military power was not the exclusive answer to post-Cold War security 
questions. In an interview published in 1993 he stated that: 'The concept of security, which hall 
traditionally been defined in strict military terms, has evolved to encompa'ls the economic, social, 
and environmental problems that threaten national and international security.' For this interview 
and Boutros-Ghali's other opinions on security issues, see 'Interview: setting a new agcnda for the 
United Nations', Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993, pp. 289-98. 
7The general principles under which the UN conducted peacekeeping missions up until its 
involvement in Somalia can be categorised as follows: I)Obtaining the consent of the parties in a 
conflict to the presence of UN forces; 2)Striving for impartiality in a conflict, and avoiding taking 
sides in a conl1ict; 3)Rejection of attempts to enforce a settlement and the use of force by UN 
troops for self-defence only. The UN and US operations clearly violated these principles in 
Somalia as UN forces were sent without the consent of the warring factions, and UN troops, 
especially US marines, were employed to attack and drive out certain factions, so destroying any 
pretense of impartiality. 
Of course, the UN peacekeeping and linked humanitarian operations in Somalia and Bosnia 
have also helped to save many civilian lives, and UNTAC in Cambodia (United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia) has shown how UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era 
can be successful if sufficient political energy and the traditional principles of the UN are applied. 
But at the same time, setbacks in other regions have forced the UN to rethink the strategy and 
command structure of its peacekeeping operations. Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot 
Peace: UN Interventions /947-1995, London, Penguin Books, 1995, pp. 159-66. 
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the incumbent administration in advocating US military intervention in Bosnia, 
and as President-elect he backed Bush's decision to send troops to Somalia.8 After 
taking office in 1993, Clinton continued to support and reinforce multinational 
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, and therefore looked set to build upon the Bush 
vision of US leadership in collective international military action.9 The Bush and 
Clinton administration's support for the UN operation in Somalia and the US's 
willingness to commit ground troops was largely responsible for the conversion 
of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia into a peace enforcement operation. 
However, the military reverses suffered by the US and multinational forces in 
Somalia cooled the enthusiasm of the Clinton administration towards the type of 
'muscular multilateral ism' outlined above. These doubts were reinforced by the 
initial failure of UN and then NATO operations in Bosnia. Even the success of 
later efforts by NATO to use force in Bosnia and the Deighton Peace Accord 
since late 1995 have not dispelled doubts within the Clinton administration and 
the US Congress about foreign engagement, and the problems and costs of 
military power in resolving post-Cold War security problems, especially when 
channelled through the agency of the UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations. to The Clinton administration has, therefore, backed away from the 
interventionist US-led collective security vision propounded by President Bush 
only six years previously, and chosen not to intervene militarily in areas such as 
Liberia, Haiti, and even Albania. This reversal or hesitancy in US policy has 
compelled civilian and military defence strategists in the US and elsewhere to 
carry out a general reappraisal of security policy in the post-Cold War era and to 
8Newsweek, 19 October 1992. p. 24. 
9Newsweek, 28 June 1993, p. 10. 
IO]ohn D. Isaacs points out five areas in which the US Congress has reservations about US 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations: 1) Cost and budgetary priorities for the US 
government; 2)Jurisdictional confusion; 3) Size of US peacekeeping costs; 4)The debate over the 
need for US military involvement abroad; 5) UN mismanagement of peacekeeping bUdgets; 5) UN 
command structure weaknesses; 6) US foreign policy subcontracted to the UN; 6) UN 
peacekeeping detracts from US military readiness. For details of these areas, see John D. Issacs, 
'The domestic context: American politics and UN peacekeeping', in Selig S. Harrison and 
Nishihara Masahi (eds.), UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives, Washington 
DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995, pp. 80-82. 
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question the value that can be attached to military power as always the most 
viable determinant of security. 
The problems of military power as security policy after the Cold War 
Arguably, the recent efforts at military intervention made by the UN, the US, 
NATO, and by Russia in Chechnya have revealed three major difficulties 
associated with the use of military power in dealing with the security situations 
produced by the end of the Cold War. The first major area of difficulty is that, 
even allowing for the constraints that have been placed upon it by political and 
diplomatic considerations, military power has not shown itself to be readily 
effective in controlling or resolving security situations such as Somalia and 
Bosnia.ll This is despite the fact that these situations are highly militarised, and 
that the UN, the US and NATO have been able to concentrate and employ in 
these regions the same sophisticated weaponry that crushed Iraqi resistance 
during the Gulf War. The use of helicopter gunships and massive firepower by the 
UN and US in Somalia proved impotent when employed against the Somali 
factions, which held no fixed positions or territory and were able to withdraw 
easily in the face of overwhelming odds only to regroup later. The near 
indistinguishability of one faction from another and from the civilian population, 
meant that concentrations of firepower produced the type of indiscriminate 
'collateral' damage that turned civilians against the UN forces and further 
complicated its tasks. The use of air strikes by NATO in Bosnia confirmed many 
of the lessons of Somalia and the future shape of post-Cold War conflicts. The 
'standoff weapons and 'smart bombs' of the Gulf War, developed by the US after 
the Vietnam War to avoid the need to commit US troops to another expensive 
ground war, when used in Bosnia demonstrated the technical superiority of 
NATO forces and did damage key Bosnian-Serb military installations. But as the 
NATO operations continued in Bosnia it became clear that only massive rather 
11 Adam Roberts. 'From San Francisco to Sarajevo: the UN and the use of force', Survival: The 
I1SS Quarterly. vol. 37. no. 4. Winter 1995-96. pp. 18-19. 
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than the hoped for surgical airstrikes could bring the Bosnian-Serbs to heel, and 
only at the cost of the type of collateral damage that the weapons had been 
developed to avoid in the first place. Moreover, it was only by the deployment of 
large numbers of US and NATO troops in December 1995, and by accepting the 
risks of involvement in a ground war, that the Bosnian conflict was contained and 
the Deighton Peace Accord implemented. Russian forces in Chechnya did not 
have access to all of the most sophisticated weapons that are in the West's arsenal, 
but the ignominious defeat of its forces in the ex-Soviet Republic, despite the 
commitment of large numbers of ground troops and superior firepower, has 
shown that even the unfettered use of military force can be ineffective in 
achieving the security ends of states in the post-Cold War period. As Martin Van 
Creveld has argued, much in the same way that the great powers in the 1950's and 
1960's came to realise that nuclear weapons were so powerful as to render them 
useless for dealing with low intensity conflicts, so have these same powers come 
to realise that they are still 'muscle-bound' in the 1990's when dealing with a 
resurgence of similar problems after the Cold War. 12 
These types of doubts about military power have revealed a second area of 
difficulty in its use: namely, questions about its appropriateness and applicability 
to new post-Cold War security problems. As mentioned above, the crises in 
Somalia and Bosnia have become highly militarised, but it is also clear that their 
origins lie in problems of economic dislocation, religion, ethnicity and 
nationalism, and that these types of problems are ones which cannot be solved or 
possibly even contained by the use of military power. At the same time, there has 
emerged a whole new range of low-intensity security threats, such as 
environmental disasters, economic collapse, diseases and epidemics, drug 
trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational 
12Martin Van Creveld, The Trans/ormation o/War, New York, The Free Press, 1991, p. 194. 
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terrorism, the causes of which cannot be adequately dealt with by military power 
alone. 13 
Added to these questions surrounding the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
military power, the third major area of difficulty associated with its use is the 
problem of cost. There has been a realisation in the post-Cold War period that 
although the demise of the Soviet Union has given the US and the Western 
powers greater freedom to intervene, the military and economic costs of that 
intervention remain high. The continued costs of military intervention in terms of 
numbers of civilian and military casualties have been demonstrated by the 
problems of peacekeeping in Somalia and Bosnia. As described above, the belief 
at the end of the Gulf War that future wars could be fought largely by relying on 
air power and high technology weapons with a minimal commitment of troops 
and limited casualties, as with others in the past that have stressed the potential of 
air power to win wars, has been disproved by the failure of this strategy in 
Somalia and Bosnia. The inescapable reality of the peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia and Bosnia has been that these types of post-Cold War security situations 
require major commitments of troops and that a high number of civilian and 
military casualties are inevitable if a military solution is being sought. In many 
instances, this is a military cost which the US and other developed nations--
having grown accustomed to the low casualty rates of the Gulf War--are now 
unwilling to bear. 14 
The economic costs of military intervention have also begun to convince some 
policy-makers that military power may not be the most suitable means with which 
to address new types of security problems. The huge cost of the Gulf War, 
estimated to have cost at least $50 million a day, has made clear that the financial 
costs of modem warfare have escalated to the point of almost becoming 
prohibitive. 15 That the war largely had to be paid for through the contributions of 
13Fred C. Bergsten, 'The primacy of economics', Foreign Policy. no. fn, Summer 1992, p. 24. 
14Bruce W. Nelan, 'What price glory', Time International. 27 November 1995, pp. 34-9. 
15Asai Motofumi, 'Pacifism', p. 136. 
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the US's allies also showed that the economic costs of military intervention have 
restricted the freedom of even a superpower to mount a large scale military action 
in the future. 16 
Events following the Gulf War have, then, raised doubts about the 
effectiveness, appropriateness, and costs of military power in relation to dealing 
with post-Cold War security situations. The combined effect of these doubts and 
the setbacks in Bosnia and Somalia has been to cause certain elements of the 
security-planning community to reconsider their evaluation of military power as 
the most effective tool of security policy available. Clearly no-one within the 
current US policy-making community is advocating the abandonment of military 
power as a means for ensuring national security. and in the last resort it remains 
the most powerful guarantee of national borders and the survival of states. But 
there are signs that the confidence expressed in military power by the Bush 
administration and by the Clinton administration in its early stages as the answer 
to post-Cold War problems of national and global security has now evaporated. 
The search is on to find new tools of security policy that can supplement or even 
supersede problematic military ones. The lessons of the Gulf War and the 
problems of financing it have focused the minds of policy-makers upon questions 
of economic power and its future role in security policy. 
Economic power and global security 
Growing doubts about the practicability of military power and a focus upon the 
importance and potentialities of economic power as a component of security 
policy is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the present emphasis upon problems of 
economics in the US is simply a rediscovery by policy-makers of a trend in 
security policy that has existed since the early 1970's following the decision of 
President Richard Nixon's administration to scale down military commitments 
under the Guam Doctrine of 1969, to seek withdrawal from Vietnam, and to 
16William Pfaff, 'Redefining world power', Foreign Affairs, 1990-91, vol. 70, no. 1, p. 37. 
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prioritise the revitalisation of US economic power through the NEP (New 
Economic Policy) of 1970.17 
These important beliefs about the primacy of economics were obscured rather 
than discredited during the period of the second Cold War from the late 1970s 
until the late 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and limited success for 
the use of conventional military power by the Reagan administration in Grenada 
and Libya, distracted the attention of policy-makers away from questions of 
economic security and back to military ones. IS However, the renewed Cold War 
did not halt the economic trends that had been set in motion in the 1970's and did 
not affect the fundamental importance of economic power to the establishment of 
national power. Given these conclusions, it is then possible to argue that the 
conceptions of US security policy which were premised upon military power and 
articulated by the Reagan and Bush administrations in the 1980's and early 
1990's, were actually radical departures from the long term trends of security 
policy thinking that had been established in the 1970's following the Vietnam 
War, and which were based upon economic conceptions of power. Thus, viewed 
from this perspective, President Bush in his 'New World Order' speech may in 
fact have been outlining a conception of security policy which belonged to the 
past rather than to the future. In tum, perhaps the Gulf War can be seen not as the 
shape of future military conflicts to come, but as the last of the old-style 
conflicts.19 
If the Reagan and Bush military-dominated conceptions of power and security 
can be regarded as movements away from the longer term and economic 
dominated trends of thinking about security issues, then it is only natural that with 
the end of the Cold War policy-makers should have rediscovered the importance 
of economics as security policy. Even the Bush administration, which had won 
17Marian D. Irish, US Foreign Policy: Context. Conduct, Context, New York, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1975, p. 420. 
lSJoseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature oj American Power, New York, Basic 
Books, 1990, p. 176. 
19Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush foreign policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1,1991, p. 12. 
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the Gulf War and proclaimed a security vision based on military power, began to 
accept the primacy of economics amongst the components of national power, and 
started to grope for a policy to restore US economic power in the run-up to the 
1993 Presidential elections. Evidence of the Bush administration's 
acknowledgement of the importance of economics was provided by its more 
aggressive stance on trade policy towards Japan with threats to apply the Super 
301 clause of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Acts, the SII (Structural Impediments 
Initiative) of 1989; and in other areas, the rushing to complete the signing of the 
NAFfA free trade agreement in 1992.20 
But it is the Clinton administration which has recognised fully the primacy of 
economics and articulated national interests and security in terms of national 
economic goals. The importance that Clinton attaches to economic conceptions of 
power was first revealed by his campaign pledge, 'to elevate economics in foreign 
policy, [to] create an economic security council similar to the National Security 
Council.'21 The intention of the Clinton presidency to honour this pledge was 
subsequently shown by the presence in the first administration of Robert Reich as 
Labour Secretary, one of the chief proponents of industrial policy, and by its 
determined manoeuvring to place the US at the head of the two NAFf A and 
APEC trading blocs and thereby reposition the US as the leader of the global 
economy.22 Moreover, in a major speech in January 1995, the then US Secretary 
of State, Warren Christopher. stated that: 
A core premise of our domestic and foreign policies is that our 
economic strength at home and abroad are mutually reinforcing. I 
believe that history will judge this emphasis to be a distinctive imprint 
and a lasting legacy of the Clinton administration. 23 
20william R. Nester. Power Across the Pacific: A DiplomatiC History 0/ American Relations with 
Japan, London, Macmillan, 1996, pp. 354-5. 
21Emily S. Rosenberg, 'Economic interest and the United States foreign policy', in Gordon Martel 
(cd.), American Foreign Relations Reconsidered. 1890-1993, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 37. 
22For examples of Reich's work, see Robert Reich, 'Making industrial policy', Foreign A//airs, 
vol. 60. no. 4. Spring 1982, pp. 852-81; 'Why the US needs an industrial policy', Harvard 
Business Review, vol. 60, 1982, pp. 74-81. The US's pursuit of a greater role in APEC and 
NAFf A is noted in Akaha Tsuneo and Frank Langdon, 'Conclusion: the post hegemonic world 
and Japan,' in Akaha Tsuneo and Frank Langdon (eds.), Japan in the Post-Hegemonic World, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 270. 
23 Vital Speeches, 1995, vol. 61. no. 10, p. 293. 
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In fact, it may even be possible to talk of the rise in Clinton's America of a new 
type of 'neo-mercantilism', which aggressively pursues free trade and market 
opening initiatives, whilst at the same time promoting US economic interests 
within its associated trading blocs. 
The view which has emerged under the Clinton administration of economics as 
the foundation of national strength and security contrasts strongly with that of the 
Reagan and early Bush administrations which saw military power as primarily 
fulfilling that role. In part it also helps to explain why the Clinton administration 
at first backed away from military engagement in areas such as Bosnia, in which 
it has no immediate national security or economic interest. The diplomatic and 
political effort that the Clinton administration invested in trade policy during the 
early years of its first term contrasted strongly with its attempts to avoid 
involvement in the problem of Bosnia, and illustrated clearly the administration's 
priorities and interest in national economic security. The emphasis that has been 
placed upon economics by the Clinton administration, though, has not only served 
to confirm the view that economics is the foundation of national power and 
security, but also has renewed interest in economics as a direct instrument of 
security policy in its own right. 
The US has a long tradition of using economic power as an instrument with 
which to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Amongst the various economic 
instruments of foreign and security policy it has employed are trade, tariffs, 
embargoes and boycotts, quotas, and aid, and US administrations have continued 
to use these instruments with mixed success.24 However, under the Clinton 
administration there are signs that the US may be growing more reliant than in the 
past upon economic instruments of power to supplement and even act as a 
substitute for military power in an era when the costs and effectiveness of military 
power have come into doubt. 
240raham P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past. Present and Future, London, Prentice HaIl, 
1991, pp. 239-47. 
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The Clinton administration has appeared more willing to invoke economic 
sanctions against those competitor nations that it feels will not reciprocate with it 
on free trade. To some extent threats of trade wars against Japan and China can be 
dismissed as political rhetoric or as unrealistic appraisals of the US's ability to 
damage its competitor's economy without damaging its own. But at the same 
time, these threats do demonstrate the Clinton administration's awareness of the 
power that can be derived from the manipUlation of the conditions of trade and 
the primacy of national economic interests. 
On a lower micro-economic level, the Clinton administration also seems to be 
more willing than its predecessor to rely heavily or wholly upon economic 
instruments of power to deal with specific security problems. Hence, where 
perhaps Bush and Reagan might have seen political advantage and military 
practicability in intervening in a situation such as Haiti, the Clinton administration 
chose ultimately to rely upon economic sanctions rather than military action in 
order to obtain a favourable outcome. Clearly, Haiti is a relatively minor security 
problem, but even with regard to larger security issues the instinct of the Clinton 
administration seems to be to avoid reliance upon military force in favour of 
economic power. Although the administration has periodically taken limited 
military action against Iraq such as attacks with conventional explosive Cruise 
missiles, its overall preference has been to persist with economic sanctions. With 
regard to Bosnia there was also an initial desire to use economic sanctions to 
pressure the Serbian side in the conflict, and the embargo on Cuba has remained 
firmly in place and even intensified in the 1990's with the Helms-Burton Act. 25 
As will be examined in chapter four, the Clinton administration has also used 
economic power to both pressure and open up North Korea in the mid-1990's. 
The accusation could be made, with some justification, that the Clinton 
administration's preference for economic sanctions is really only a sign of a lack 
of political resolve, and the attempt to be seen to be taking at least some kind of 
25Edward N. Luttwark, 'Towards post-heroic warfare', Foreign Affairs. vol. 74. no. 3, May-June 
1995. p. 117. 
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action in addressing post-Cold War security problems. But while this may be a 
valid criticism in part, it is equally true also that the administration is attempting 
to articulate a new vision of security policy which ascribes an equal role to 
military power and economic power. This type of vision of security policy is 
consistent with the Clinton administration's preoccupation in seeing economics as 
the main foundation and manifestation of US national power. 
These lessons have begun to influence the security policies of medium and 
small ranking powers. In much the same way that the US's exercise and attraction 
to military power during the Gulf War pushed powers in the Asia-Pacific towards 
a military buildup, so the move away from exclusively military based conceptions 
of security policy by the US has encouraged other powers to refocus their 
attention on matters of economic security. The nations of Southeast Asia have 
long viewed economic power and strength as essential to the maintenance of both 
internal and external security. 26 Chinese policy-makers also seem to have adopted 
this type of thinking with regard to security policy.27 
The aim of this first section has been to examine how in the post-Cold War era 
conceptions of security amongst policy-makers in the US and other states have 
begun to change. The chief characteristic of change identified so far is a move 
away from military to economic conceptions of security. The aim of the following 
section is to look at Japan, the other economic global superpower, and to trace the 
ways in which policy-makers have also changed their views of security in the 
post-Cold War period. 
26Pauline Kerr, 1'he security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific', 17le Pacific Review, vol. 17, no. 4, 
1994, p. 406. 
27 As Chinese President Jiang Zemin argued in March 1991, 'In t<xJay's world, security is an 
economic and political issue as much as it is a military issue. A security strategy should be a 
comprehensive national strategy, not simply a military strategy. No country can achieve its 
security interests solely through military means.' Cited in S. Chu, National Security in Transition', 
p. 195. Reflecting Jiang Zemin's conviction, it now seems China is more willing to safeguard its 
political and security interests through the exercise of economic power, as shown by its threaten to 
boycott French goods if it went ahead with arms sales to Taiwan. Weixing Hu, 'China's security 
agenda after the Cold War', The Pacific Review, vol. 18, no. 1. 1995, pp. 128-30. 
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MILITARY POWER AND JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY AFtER THE 
COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War and the impact of the Gulf War 
During the 1980's and early 1990's, Japanese security policy was perceived by 
many domestic and international commentators to be moving broadly in line with 
its alliance partner, the US. Despite the 1947 'peace' constitution and government 
prohibitions on the use of its military forces, and despite its tradition of seeking to 
articulate alternative forms of security policy, Japan seemed to be creeping 
towards a highly militarised security posture similar and, indeed, complementary 
to that of the US. 28 The Reagan era in the US of increased defence budgets and 
28Article 9 of the 1947 'peace' constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of or use 
of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the proceeding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the 
belligerency of the state will not be recognised. 
From the mid-1950's onwards, Article 9 has been interpreted by successive Japanese 
government'! as prohibiting the right to maintain forces to wage offensive war, but allowing the 
maintenance of forces for self defence. The result of this interpretation has been that Japan has 
avoided the acquisition of the types of offensive weaponry that would provide it with an obvious 
power projection capacity in the region, such as aircraft carriers and in-flight refueling 
capabilities. However, the flexibility of interpretation that the constitution has allowed for in the 
pa"t, means that it" role as an obstacle to the expansion by Japan of it" security responsibilities in 
the future is dependent upon the prevailing political will and how far political parties are willing to 
stretch the limits of interpretation. 
In addition to Article 9, the following constitutional interpretations and anti-militaristic 
principles have limited the extent of Japan's defence contribution to international security. I) 
Collective self-defence. The government has maintained that, in accordance with international law 
and the UN Charter, Japan does possess the right of collective self-defence. But despite the 
acknowledgement of the possession of this right and the statement of this in the preamble to the 
1960 US-Japan security treaty, the government has argued that it cannot exercise the right due to 
its interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution which only allows for the exercise of the right of 
individual self-defence. 2) Overseas despatch of the SDF. A 1980 cabinet decision by an LDP 
government interpreted Article 9 of the constitution as prohibiting the despatch of the SOF 
overseas only on operations that would require the use of force. But it also noted that the SDF law 
does not provide for this function. Thus, until the PKO Bill of 1992, the position of the 
government was that SOPs overseas despatch was not unconstitutional but illegal. 3) The three 
non-nuclear principles--not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan--were 
established in 1967. The first two principles have been maintaincd, and strengthened additionally 
by Japan's ratification of the NPf (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1976. But, according to some 
interpretations, the third principle has been breached by the introduction into or transit through 
Japanese ports of nuclear weapons on US naval vessels. 4) Bans on the export of arms and defence 
technology were introduced by the administrations of Sat6 Eisaku in 1967 and Miki Takeo in 
1976. The 1967 measures prohibited the export of arms to communist countries, and the 1976 
measures ordered restraint in the case of other countries and prohibited the export of all weapons 
related technology. In 1983, though, the administration of Nakasone Yasuhiro made an exception 
to these prohibitions by signing The Exchange of Technology Agreement Betwecn Japan and the 
United States, which allows for the export of defence related technology from Japan to the US. 5) 
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military build-up, was paralleled to some extent by the Nakasone era in Japan. 
Pressure from the US for Japan to end its 'free rider' status and to assume a greater 
military role in the containment of the USSR following its invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 provided the legitimisation for Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro's administration to scrap the one per cent of GNP ceiling on defence 
spending in 1987, to increase burden sharing and financial support for US forces 
stationed in Japan, and to embark on a quantitative and qualitative improvement 
of Japan's armed forces. 29 In addition, these moves by Japan towards a more pro-
active security policy were reinforced by the agreement of the Zenko Suzuki 
administration to assume responsibility for the protection of 1,000 nautical miles 
of sea-lanes in 1981, which resulted in the even greater integration of Japanese 
forces into the US's alliance system and strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
growing technological and military linkages with the US following the signing of 
the Exchange and Technology Agreement Between Japan and the United States in 
1988. It was felt by many commentators that the outcome of these actions would 
be the further remilitarisation of Japanese security policy and society. 30 
At the same time, these fears were moderated by the acknowledgement of the 
fact that Japan's spending still remained low by comparison with most other 
industrialised nations, that Japan did not attempt to acquire offensive weaponry, 
such as aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, or nuclear weapons, and that the 
constitutional restrictions on the overseas despatch of the SDF (Self Defence 
The one per cent GNP limit on defence spending established by the Miki administration in 1976. 
In effect, this prohibition was scrapped by the Nakasone administration which pushed defence 
ex.penditure above the 1 % limit for the first time in 19t5l. 
For further details of these constitutional constraints and government inlerprctalions: Asakumo 
Shimbunsha, ROe; Handobukku 1995, Tt>kyt>, Asakumo Shimbunsha, 1995, pp. 388-456. 
29pattems of recent Japanese defence expenditure are outlined in Peter J. Katzenstein and 
Okawara Nobuo, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a 
Changing World, East Asia Program, Cornell University: Ithaca, 1993, p. 159; Yamamoto 
Yoshinobu and Et6 Shinkichi, Soogo Anpo to Mira; no Sentaku, Tt>kyb, KMansha, 1991, p. 414. 
30aernard K. Gordon, 'Loose cannon on a rolling deck? Japan's changing security policies', Orbis: 
A Journal oJ World Affairs, 1979, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 967-1005; Maeda Tetsuo, 'A dangerous shift 
in defence policy', Japan F..cho, vol. 13, no. 1, Spring 1986, pp. 76-80; Maeda Hisao, 'Opening the 
door to a military buildup', Japan Echo, vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 66; Glenn D. Hook, 
'The erosion of anti-militaristic principles in contemporary Japan', Journal oj Peace Research, 
1988, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 381-94; Peter J. Katzenstein and Okawara Nobuo, 'Japanese security 
issues', in Craig G. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds.), Japan: A New Kind oj Superpower? 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 53-76. 
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Force) remained in place. However, what events of the 1980's did show was that 
under Nakasone and Suzuki, many policy-makers in the governing LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party) were increasingly and more openly coming to associate 
national security with an expansion of Japan's own military power. 
The events of the Gulf War pushed Japanese policy-makers further towards 
conceptions of security dominated by military power. Under pressure from the US 
and its allies to participate in the multinational effort in the Persian Gulf in some 
way other than by the provision of economic assistance, the government of Prime 
Minister Kaifu Toshiki began to look for ways to make a 'human' contribution to 
the allied forces. In practice this meant the despatch of the SDF and acceptance of 
the argument that military power was the most effectiv~ contribution that Japan 
could make to international security.31 The main attempt during the Gulf War to 
despatch the SDF was the United Nations Peace Cooperation bill (Kokuren lIeiwa 
Kyoryoku Hoan), sponsored by Ozawa Ichiro, the then Secretary General of the 
LDP, and submitted to the Japanese Diet in October 1990, and which if passed 
would have allowed the limited despatch of the Japanese Self Defence Forces 
overseas in UN operations.32 Although this bill was defeated, and during the Gulf 
War the government was frustrated in attempts to send the Japanese SDF (Self 
31 The government's first attempt to send the SDF overseas was the use of Article 100, Section 5 
of the SDF Law to send ASDF (Air Self Defence Force) aircraft to assist in the transport of 
refugees. This article had been adopted originally in 1986 to allow the SDF to transport VIPs 
overseas. By a Special Cabinet Order on 29 January 1991, five ASDF C-130 transports were put 
on standby. Although the Order was eventually annulled in April of the same year after no 
requests for the planes were forthcoming, the use of the Special Cabinet Order hac; been viewed ac; 
another attempt to send the SDF overseas without the consultation of the Diet and despite its 
rejection of the United Nations Cooperation bill the previous October. Glenn D. Hook, 
Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 88-89. 
For general descriptions of Japanese policy-making in this period, see Inoguchi Takashi, 
'Japan's response to the Gulf crisis: an analytic overview', The Journal 0/ Japonese Studies, vol. 
17, no. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 257-73, and Courtney Purrington and A. K., T(,)ky(')'s policy 
responses during the Gulf War', Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 4, April 1991, pp. 307-23. 
32The United Nations Peace Cooperation bill proposed that Japan should create a UN Peace 
Cooperation Corps to support UN peacekeeping operations ba'ied on resolutions of the Security 
Council. The Peace Cooperation Corps was to composed of volunteers from various agencies, 
including the SDF. The responsibilities of the Corps were to monitor truces; to provide 
administrative assistance to governments after conflict; to help manage and monitor elections; to 
provide transport, communications and medical support; to rescue refugees; and to help in 
reconstruction. The bill was rejected after opposition in the Diet by the opposition parties and poor 
preparation by the government. 
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Defence Forces) overseas, later on and after the end of hostilities in the Persian 
Gulf the government was able to despatch minesweepers to the Gulf. 33 
The failure to pass the bill and the international criticism that Japan had been 
subject to over its purely financial contribution to the war effort, strengthened the 
determination of sections of the LDP to amend the constitution and the SDF Law 
in order to allow the despatch of the SDF on UN peacekeeping missions.34 The 
government established a committee under Ozawa (known as the Ozawa 
Committee) which concluded that it was possible for Japan to participate in 
multilateral and UN forces by adoption of the concept of 'international security', 
or kokusai anzen hosh8--really coded language for the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defence.35 However, as international debate shifted to focus on UN 
peacekeeping, the issue of collective security and the constitution were shelved. 
Instead, the government's energies were concentrated on the SDF Law, and in 
June 1992 the PKO Bill (Peacekeeping Operations) was subsequently passed. 
This lead to the overseas despatch for the first time of the SDF to participate non-
combat peacekeeping operations in Cambodia between October 1992 and 
September 1993. Although the PKO Bill placed more restrictions upon the 
despatch of the SDF than certain factions of the LDP may have hoped for, it did 
mark progress in Japan's development of a more prominent military role, and 
demonstrated that certain LDP politicians were in accord with Bush's vision of 
future international security based upon collective military intervention.36 Thus, 
as Yamaguchi Jira comments with regard to the United Nations Peace 
33For the background and execution of the minesweeping operation, see Peter J. Woolley, 'Japan's 
1991 minesweeping operation: an organizational response.' Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 8, August 
1996, pp. 804-17. 
34PeterJ. Herzog, Japan' s Pseudo Democracy, Folkestone. Japan Li brary, 1993, p. 234. 
35ranaka Akihiko, 'The domestic context: Japanese politics and UN peacekeeping', in Selig S. 
Harrison and Nishihara Masahi, UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives, p. 95. 
3tYrhe conditions of the PKO Bill for Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations are as 
follows: 1) agreement on a ceasefire should have been reached by all parties in the conflict; 2) the 
parties involved in the conflict should give their consent to the deployment of peacekeeping forces 
and the participation of Japan in the operation; 3) the peacekeeping force shall remain impartial, 
and not favour any party in the conflict; 4) should any of the proceeding guidclines be broken, 
Japan may withdraw its contingent; S) the use of weapons is limited to that necessary to protect 
directly the lives of personnel. Hence, the SDF troops despatched to Cambodia were engaged in 
non-combat operations such as road repair and construction. 
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Cooperation bill, '[it] implanted in the realm of public debate the concept that 
Japan's contribution to international security could be linked to the despatching of 
the Self Defence Forces in one form or another.t37 
The continuing debate on security in Japan in the mid and late-1990's 
The trauma of the Gulf War and the changing realities of post-Cold War security 
environment that it revealed have continued to impact upon the security debate 
. 
amongst Japanese policy-makers during the 1990's. In Japan, the strategic 
certainties of the Cold War period have been replaced by the same series of non-
specific and low intensity threats that have troubled the US.38 A series of 
potentially threatening phenomena, including environmental disasters, economic 
crises, narcotics, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
transnational terrorism have also been identified by the Japanese MOFA 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the post-Cold War period.39 With the collapse of 
the USSR, the actors likely to threaten Japan's security have also become unclear. 
The still highly militarised Russian Far East remains a concern, and the 
modernisation of China's military has generated the same types of discussion in 
Japan as in the other countries of the Asia-Pacific region about the potential threat 
from China. The rise of the North Korean nuclear crisis, as will be seen in 
chapters four to six, has also had an important influence on the Japanese security 
debate. Finally, added to all this, the debate on security in Japan has been 
complicated by the questions about the future of the US-Japan alliance. The 
alliance's value has come to be questioned from various perspectives, as specific 
threats to Japan's security have become fewer, as US-Japan trade friction has 
grown, and as some policy-makers have sought for Japan a new role in security 
free of what they see as the outdated domination of the US. This dissertation will 
37Yamaguchi JiTO, 'The Gulf War and the transformation of Japanese constitutional politics', 1he 
Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 18, no. I, Winter 1992, p. 166. 
38sakanaka Tomohisa, 'Japan's changing defence policy', in Ron Matthews and Matsuyama 
Keisuke (eds.>, Japan's Military Renaissance?, London, St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 76. 
39Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook. Tl'>kyl'>, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, 
pp. 108,110-11,118. 
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in fact argue that the US-Japan military-alliance system has been strengthened in 
the post-Cold War period, but at this point it is important to note that the debate 
on how to, or indeed whether to, preserve the alliance has shaped the overall 
debate on security in Japan.40 Triggered by the Gulf War and given further 
momentum by the unfolding events of the post-Cold War period, this debate has 
produced concrete changes in military security policy of the Japanese government 
and the domestic political environment that underpins it. 
Changes in the domestic political environment have occurred because of the 
collapse of the 1955 political system and LDP one-party rule brought about by the 
defection in 1992 and 1993 of groups of LDP members to form a number smaller 
conservative political parties.41 The fragmentation of the conservative parties was 
~amples of commentators who see Japan fulfilling a greater security role alongside the US in 
the post-Cold War period are Akaha Tsuneo, 'Japan's security policy in the post-hegemonic 
world', in Akaha Tsuneo and Frank Langdon, Japan in the Post-Hegemonic World, p. 103; 
Norman O. Levin. 'Prospects for US-Japanese security cooperation', in Danny Unger and Paul 
Blackburn (eds.), Japan's Emerging Global Ro/e, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 8:!, 
and Yamamoto Yoshinobu and Etfi Shinkichi, Sogo Anpo, p. 5R6. For an example of a view which 
sees Japan as searching for a security policy increa'iingly independent of the US, see Valerie 
Shimizu-Niquet, 'Japan's new strategy: a new menace?', 17,e Pacific Review. vol. 7. no. 2,1994. 
pp.163-70. 
4lThe LOP's monopoly on power wa'l broken first by the splitting off from it of three new parties 
in 1992 and 1993--the Japan New Party (Nihon Shintfi) under the leadership of Hosokawa 
Morihiro (formed 22 May 1992); the Sakigake (Harbinger Party) under the leadership of 
Takemura Masayoshi (formed 2 June 1992); the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitt'l) under the 
leadership of Hata Tsutomu and Ozawa Ichir~ (formed 23 June 1993)--and then by the LOP's 
subsequent defeat in the House of Representatives Diet elections in July 1993. The LOP's failure 
to gain a majority allowed the creation on 9 August 1993 of a coalition of the LOP splinter parties 
and the JSP, engineered by Olawa and under the premiership of Hosokawa. Rumours of financial 
scandal forced Hosokawa to step down in April 1994, to be replaced by Hata later in the same 
month. But the coalition proved impossible to sustain due to differences between the SOP and the 
other parties over tax reforms and the possible imposition of sanctions on North Korea. The SOP's 
abandonment of the coalition before the formation of the Hata government meant that the new 
government collapsed by June of the same year. In the same month a replacement coalition was 
fonned. this time consisting of the rather unlikely bedfellows of the LOP. SDP. and the Sakigake. 
This coalition la'ited until the House of Representatives Oiet elections of October 1996. and was 
lead from June 1994 until January 1996 by the SOP's leader Murayama Tomiichi. and from 
January 1996 until the October elections of the same year by the LOP's Hashimoto RyQtaf{\. 
During the period of the LOP-SOP-Sakigake coalition. the opposition parties attempted to 
restructure. On 10 December 1994, the Japan New Party. Japan Renewal Party, and the Clean 
Government Party (K(')meitfi) merged to form the New Frontier Party. led initially by the former 
LOP prime minister Kaifu Toshiki. and then from December 1995 by 07awa. In September 1996, 
as the House of Representatives elections approached, a number of Diet members split from the 
SOP and Sakigake to form the new centrist Japan Democratic Party under the joint leadership of 
Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto. 
The LOP came close to winning a majority in the House of Representatives elections of 1996, 
and for the first time since 1993 the LOP was able to form a single party government The SOP 
and Sakigake already hit by defections to the OPJ, suffered heavy losses in the elections, to be left 
with only fifteen and two seats respectively, compared with seventy and thirty five seats after the 
1993 elections. The NFPdid not make the gains that it had hoped for before the elections. actually 
dropping from 160 to 156 seats. but it did consolidate its position a'l the main opposition party, so 
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ostensibly the result of dissatisfaction over the LDP's handling of domestic issues 
such as the political corruption revealed by the Sagawa KyObin scandal and the 
related need for electoral reform. But the break-up of the LDP was also motivated 
to some extent by the desire of some former LDP members, the most notable of 
which was again Ozawa Ichiro, to create the domestic political conditions which 
would allow Japan to make a greater contribution to international security than 
was possible at the time of the Gulf War. For Ozawa this has meant the 
investigation of constitutional change to allow for an expanded military role for 
Japan in UN peacekeeping operations, the despatch of the SDF overseas, and its 
possible involvement in combat operations. The splinter conservative parties, 
with cooperation from the JSP (Japan Socialist Party; later to become the Social 
Democratic Party) and the smaller parties were able to form a short-lived 
coalition between August 1993 and April 1994. This coalition succeeded in 
passing measures on electoral reform, but collapsed before the issues of Japan's 
international contribution could be addressed. The JSP then entered into a 
coalition with the LDP in June 1994, whilst the conservative parties regrouped 
and merged to form eventually the NFP (New Frontier Party, or in Japanese the 
Shinshinto), which came under the leadership of Ozawa in January 1996. The 
LDP-JSP coalition lasted until the elections of October 1996, and then was 
replaced by a LDP single-party government. 
As a result of these changes in the domestic political situation the security 
debate in Japan has reached an important new stage. The degree of support within 
the NFP opposition for Ozawa's vision of an enhanced military role for Japan as 
its contribution to international security is uncertain, and following the elections 
confinning the move towards a conservative two-party system in Japan. However, soon after the 
elections the NFP was damaged by Hata's decision in December 1996 to leave to form his own 
party. The DPJ meanwhile managed to hold its position after the elections, with a respectable 
figure of fifty two seats in the House of Representatives, and one of the most interesting features 
of the election was a resurgence in support for the JCP which captured twenty six seat<;. 
For an excellent account in Japanese of the end of the 1955 political system in Japan and LOP 
rule, see Kitaoka Shinichi, Jiminto: Seikenlo no 38nen,T6ky6, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1995, pp. 
228-73. For an account in English: Neil Renwick, Japan's Alliance Politics and Defence 
Production,l..ondon, Macmillan, 1995, pp. 151-9. 
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of October 1996 the NFP has also shown signs of fracturing on the issue of 
security. Some commentators have seen Ozawa as a false internationalist, bent on 
the remilitarisation of Japan, and manipulating the domestic political scene to 
achieve this end over the long-term.42 Others, including Ozawa himself, portray 
NFP policy in a less radical light. They argue that it is only natural that Japan as 
an important global power and developed democracy should act to support the 
international community by the commitment of men as well as money to any 
future military crisis. Ozawa, setting the example of other Western nations as the 
criteria to judge by, defines this new military role for Japan as a 'normal' one.43 
In order to carry out this role without intimidating its neighbours, it is argued, 
Japan should debate openly matters of security and establish firm constitutional 
rules to both free-up and set limits to the use of Japan's military power. The policy 
of Ozawa and the NFP on security policy is, then, both controversial and at times 
opaque. But what is clear is that, similar to the period of the Gulf War and the 
United Nations Peace Cooperation bill, even though many of Ozawa's policies 
have not been directly put into action or become government policy, they have 
influenced the parameters of the debate on security in Japan in the 1990's. Ozawa 
has indeed been able to influence the debate by his role in the restructuring of the 
Japanese political scene. For despite being unable maintain the coalition 
government in 1993 to 1994, and the NFP failing to improve on the number of its 
Diet seats in the 1996 elections, the rise of a new conservative party in the shape 
of the NFP, and the subsequent drop in support for the SDP, coupled with the 
42For these types of arguments that see Ozawa's brand of conservatism as leading to a dangerous 
remilitarisation of Japan, see Asai Motofumi, Shinhoshushugi: Ozawa Shinto wa Nihon 0 Doko e 
Michibiku ka, Tf>ky6, Kashiwashob6, 1993, pp. 67-162; 'Sckai josei 0 do miru ka', in Maeda 
Tctsuo (ed.), Jieitai 0 Do Suru Ka, T6kyo, Iwanami Shinsho, 1995, pp. 52-3. For a more positive 
evaluation of OLawa's vision on security: Edward W. Desmond, 'IchirO 07.aWa: reformer at bay', 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5, September-October 1995, pp. 117-31. 
430zawa IchirO, Nihon Kaizo Keikaku, TOkyO, KOdansha, 1993, pp. 127-37. For concise 
examinations in English of Ozawa's political vision and impact on domestic politics, see David 
Williams, 07awa IchirO: The Making of a Japanese Kingmaker, February 1996, East Asian 
Research Centre, School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield; Otake Hideo, 'Forces for 
political reform: the Liberal Democratic Party's young reformers and Ozawa IchirO', Journal of 
Japanese Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 269-94. In Japanese, an examination of 
OLawa's career and thinking, and a lengthy interview with the man himself, can be found in Asahi 
Shimbunsha Seijibu, Ozawa lchiro Tanken, Tl'>kyO, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1993. 
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continued power of the LDP, has ensured the move towards the creation of a two 
party conservative political system to replace the 1955 system. Hence, as a result 
of Ozawa's dealings, Japan now has two parties committed to the overseas 
despatch of the SDF and which increasingly equate Japan's international 
contribution with some kind of military power, although the extent and speed of 
the move towards this policy differs between the two parties. Ozawa's part in the 
break-up of the 1955 political system has also meant that the traditional guardian 
against the SDFs overseas despatch and the remilitarisation of Japan, the SDP, 
has been forced to abandon its principles on security, and then has been 
eliminated from its role as the main opposition party. After joining the coalition 
government with the LDP, on 20 July 1994 the SDP broke its own post-war 
'taboo' on security by acknowledging for the first time the constitutionality of the 
SDF, and has since become coopted into LDP policy on many defence issues. The 
catastrophic defeat of the SDP in the October 1996 elections may not spell the 
complete end of SDP influence on the security debate as it restructures and 
readheres to its traditional policies, but for the time being the defeat of its 
ideology and the reduction in its political strength has removed one more obstacle 
towards an increased military role for Japan in the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile 
the other smaller opposition parties that have emerged in the wake of the collapse 
of the SDP, such as the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), although more 
moderate on issues of security, look set to support an expanded role for the SDF 
in the US-Japan alliance and regional security. 
Ozawa has also been able to influence LDP policy and the wider debate on 
security in the mass media. While the LDP is far more cautious than the NFP in 
its pronouncements on security policy and highly sensitive to the domestic and 
international criticism engendered by any attempt to expand the role of the SDF, 
it is clear that certain elements of the LDP are sympathetic to their former 
Secretary General's view and are not above helping to propagate further the 
debates on security that the NFP initiates, with the aim of preparing and 
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conditioning public opinion for the incremental expansion in the SDFs military 
role that is the hallmark of LDP policy on security. The most notable examples of 
this type of situation whereby the LDP and NFP debates on security feed off and 
mutually reinforce each other has been the discussion on collective security and a 
Far East contingency in 1996, which will be explored in detail in chapter six. 
Finally, the ability of Ozawa and his supporters to shake up the debate on security 
in Japan has bee demonstrated by the debates on constitutional revision that have 
periodically hit Japan since the Gulf Crisis and the Ozawa Committee, and which 
have been promoted by Ozawa's book laying out his vision for Japan, Nihon 
Kaizo Keikaku (Blueprint for a New Japan). Thus, the Yomiuri Shimbun. a leading 
Japanese newspaper reputedly close to Ozawa, produced in 1992 and 1994 a 
controversial proposal for a revision the constitution, which affirmed the 
existence of the SDF and contained an article on 'International Cooperation' to 
allow the despatch of the SDF overseas.44 Both the debate on collective security 
and constitutional revision look set to end in stalemate, but again the very 
existence of these debates has shown that among certain sections of policy-
makers the political will may be growing to legitimise a greater military role for 
the SDF. 
Apart from the effect on the debate on security between the political parties 
and mass media, the continued shock of the Gulf War and the changing post-Cold 
War security situation have also fed through into official government policy. 
Japanese policy was generally slow to react to the end of the Cold War. and even 
as late as 1991 the USSR was still designated as the main threat for Japanese 
security in the Defence Agency's Defense of Japan white paper. However. 
changes in Japanese military security policy were put in train with the publication 
in August 1994 of the report of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defence, 
or Higuchi Report, which will be examined more fully in chapter six. The 
44A brief description of the Yomiuri Shimbun's report and its main points are contained in: 
Yominr; Shimbun Constitutional Studies Group, 'A proposal for a sweeping revision of the 
constitution', Japan Echo, vol. 22, no. I, Spring 1995, pp. 26-29. 
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Higuchi report was significant because it called for Japan to readapt its traditional 
defence policy to the post-Cold War security situation. It was to do this not only 
by strengthening cooperation with the US, but also by rationalising the SDF to 
make it more flexible to deal with new low intensity conflicts, by the taking of 
initiatives to increase support for UN peacekeeping operations and by promoting 
multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region. 45 
Security planners in the government, represented by the MOFA (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) and the Defence Agency, have responded to these demands for 
new defence and security initiatives by authorising the participation of the SDF in 
peacekeeping operations in Mozambique from March 1993 to December 1994, in 
Kenya and Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees from October to December 1994, 
and in the Golan Heights since early 1996. Demands for greater Japanese 
participation in peacekeeping missions may also grow as it seeks a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council. The MOFA, supported by politicians from all 
parties, has also emerged as an important sponsor of multilateral security dialogue 
with its proposal in 1991 that the ASEAN-PMC (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations-Post Ministerial Conference) should become a 'forum for political 
dialogue' leading to the setting up in 1993 of the ARF (A SEAN Regional Forum) 
as the first multilateral governmental body in the Asia-Pacific to discuss security 
concerns.46 Evidence of the expanded range and scope of Japanese military 
activity has also been provided by the SDF's continued participation in RIMPAC 
(Rim of the Pacific) exercises with the US and South Korea, and the Japanese 
government's steady promotion at the lower sub-regional level of security 
dialogue with the ASEAN nations, South Korea, and China.47 
This brief overview of developments in Japanese security policy in the late 
Cold War and post-Cold War period demonstrates, then, that its military aspects 
45Advisory Group on Defense Issues, The Modality 0/ tile Security alld De/elise Capability 0/ 
Japall: Tile Outlook/or tile 21st Century, T6ky6, Ckur.lsh(} Insatsukyoku, 1994, pp. 43-5. 
46Inten'iew with MOFA official, T(}ky6, 3 December 1996. 
47For details, see Christopher W. Hughes, 'Japan's subregional security and defence linkages with 
ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 19908', 11le Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 2,1996, pp. 229-
50. 
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have come increasingly to the fore. The emphasis on a military contribution to 
security evident under the Nakasone administration has been accelerated by the 
end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. The political and public debate on security 
has come to sanction a greater military role for Japan, and even though Ozawa's 
supporters look unlikely to gain power in the immediate future, his vision of 
Japan as a 'nonnal' country in its watered-down version has set the agenda for 
much of the thinking about security in post-Cold War Japan. Changes in policy-
making opinion in Japan have produced government backing for new security 
role for Japan in UN peacekeeping operations, in multilateral security, and, as will 
be seen, the US-Japan alliance. The extent of the changes in Japan's security 
policy should not be overstated, given that Japanese defence budgets in the post-
Cold War, in contrast to many other Asia-Pacific countries, have continued to rise 
at a slower rate, and that most of the constitutional restrictions on Japan's military 
activity remain in place.48 The PKO Bill was a radical change, but the natural 
caution of most policy-makers in Japan and the culture of anti-militarism among 
the general population means that any more changes in Japan's defence role, 
barring another major global or regional security crisis, are likely to remain 
incremental.49 Nevertheless, it is clear that since the end of the Cold War, the 
strongest trend to emerge in Japanese security policy-making is one which has 
mirrored to some extent the conceptions of security in the US following the Gulf 
War, and has thus looked to carve out a greater role for Japan in national and 
global security based on the exercise of military power, either independently by 
the despatch overseas of the SOP or in cooperative security arrangements with the 
US and other regional powers. 
48Fiscal restraints have meant that the government's 1991 Midtenn Defence Buildup Plan and the 
general defence budget has been under pressure from all political parties. backed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance. For details of these budget battles. see Eugene Brown. 'Japanese security in 
the post-Cold War era: threat perceptions and strategic options'. Asian Survey. vol. 34. no. 5. May 
1994. pp. 438-40. The declining trend in Japanese defence expenditures is described in Hartwig 
Hummel, 'Japanese military expenditures after the Cold War. the 'Realism' of the peace dividend', 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 2, 1996, pp. 135-55. 
4~homas U. Berger. 'From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan's culture of anti-militarism'. 
International Security. vol. 17, no. 4. Spring 1993. pp. 119-50. 
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This trend emphasising the gradual remilitarisation of Japanese security policy 
has at times seemed relentless and unstoppable. However, it is also clear that, just 
as in the US under the Clinton administration, there exists in Japan a counter-
trend in security policy which stresses alternative conceptions of security 
revolving around notions of economic power. The next section will examine these 
traditions of alternative security policy in Japan, and how they have reacted to the 
end of the Cold War and sought to outline another path to security reliant chiefly 
not upon military power, but on economic power. 
ECONOMIC POWER AND JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY 
Economic security poHcy during the Cold War 
The tradition in Japan of seeing economic power as the foundation of national 
power and as an instrument of security policy is a relatively old one. The long 
held conception of Japan as resource-poor country and an economically 
vulnerable country has meant that Japan's security policy from the Meiji period 
until the modern era has been driven by the search for economic security.50 
In the immediate post-war period, Japanese policy-makers were quick to 
realise that future Japanese power would have to be expressed though economic 
rather than through military power. Japan's crushing defeat and the experience of 
the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki left the general Japanese 
population, Japanese intellectuals, and Japanese politicians with a suspicion of the 
utility of military power as a means of ensuring national security. The intellectual 
and political debate over pacifism was one expression of this suspicion of military 
power, and the socialist party's opposition to the SDF and US-Japan alliance 
during the Cold War meant that it was supportive of alternative forms of security 
policy, including pacifism, neutralism and the use of economic power.51 LDP 
5OJohn Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy. 1930-1938, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. xvi. 
51J. A. A. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political PaTty 
and its Foreign Policy, London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
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conservative politicians during this period exhibited a wide variety of views on 
the utility of military power, but also paid great attention to the possibilities of 
economic power in the service of security policy. For instance, the Yoshida 
doctrine did not deny the utility of military power, and merely intended to entrust 
the role of exercising military power for security purposes to the US.52 But its 
concentration upon rebuilding the Japanese economy and economic growth set in 
a motion a train of thought concerning the primacy of economic power that has 
persisted into the 1990's. The 'economism' policies of Ikeda Hayato were partly 
an attempt to escape from the uncomfortable problems of military security and 
alliance politics brought about by the Security Treaty crisis of 1960, but also an 
attempt to reformulate notions of national power in the language of economics. 53 
Arguably, both the Yoshida doctrine and the discourse of economism led to the 
strengthening of Japanese conceptions of security that attempt to give primacy to 
economic power and to minimise military power. The development of this type of 
thinking in Japan about security matters can be seen by the comments of the then 
Japanese Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda, in 1 tn2, when he stated that: 
We wish to employ our own economic strength to gain an increasing 
voice in the international community. The tradition was that a nation used 
52The so-called Yoshida doctrine refers to the long-tenn vision of two-time Prime Minister 
Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1947. 1948-1954) for Japan's reemergence as a independent power after 
the Occupation period. In essence. Yoshida proposed that the emperor system should be 
preserved. communism contained in Japan. and the energies of the country concentrated upon the 
reconstruction of the economy. Although not overly fearful of communist China and wary of 
becoming dragged into continental involvement in the Korean War, Yoshida realised that the only 
way for Japanese sovereignty to be reestablished was to cooperate with the US and to conclude the 
US-Japan Security Treaty in September 1951. even if was to be at the cost of a partial peace with 
the other World War II combatants. For an explanation of Yoshida's views on security, see John 
Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London, 
Athlone Press, 1988, pp. 37-41. For an examination of the differing interpretations of the 
background to the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, see Toshishita Narahiko, Anpo JIJyaku no 
Seiritsu, Ttlkytl, Iwanami Shinsho, 1996. 
53The mass protests over the signing of the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between the United States and Japan in 1960 rocked the illP government and forced the eventual 
resignation of Ikeda's predecessor as prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke. In order to restore 
confidence in the government and to escape from what Masumi Junnosuke has called the 
'nightmare of the security treaty crisis', Ikeda embarked on an income doubling plan to raise the 
annual economic growth rate to nine per cent The concept of this plan and the subsequent 
National Comprehensive Development Plan were to lay the foundations for Japan's rapid 
economic growth in the 1960's. Masumi Junnosuke, Contemporary Politics in Japan, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995, pp. 64-8. 
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its economic power to become a military power. but this is not the case 
with us today.' 54 
To a certain extent. the comments of Fukuda and the type of thinking about 
security policy that he represents could be criticised as vague and containing an 
element of reality-denial, given the fact that such thinking only had been made 
possible in the first place by the luxury of having entrusted to the US the role of 
protecting Japan from the military realities of the Cold War. However. it is also 
arguable that Japanese policy-makers when formulating these conceptions of 
security were really only recognising the same realities of the international 
situation that their US counterparts were beginning to recognise in the 1970's, or, 
as William Nester comments. 'Tokyo's was the first government to understand 
that military power was becoming increasingly irrelevant in an increasingly 
interdependent world.'55 
Moreover, from these early beginnings. Japanese policy-makers went on to 
formulate more detailed conceptions of the role of economic power within 
security policy. The concept of Comprehensive National Security Policy (Sago 
Anzen Hosha) emerged during the administration of 6hira Masayoshi (1978-
1980). and was adopted as national policy in December 1980 under his successor 
Suzuki Zenko with the establishment of a new Comprehensive National Security 
Council. Comprehensive National Security Policy was the first conscious attempt 
to attach a specific security function to economic power. Under the original 
concept economics was to assume an equal role in national security alongside 
diplomatic and military policy.56 The early conceptions of Comprehensive 
National Security focused mainly on economic security as related to ensuring the 
supply of vital metals, energy and food.57 But the identification of economics as 
54cited in Frank Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, Vancouver, University of British Columbia 
Press, 1973, p. 2. 
55William R. Nester, American Power, The New World Order and Ihe Japanese Challenge, New 
York, St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 10 . 
.56Akaha Tsuneo, 'Japan's comprehensive security policy: a new East Asian environment', Asian 
Survey, vol. 21, no. 4, April 1991, p. 325; Sogo Anzen Hosho GurOpu, Sogo Anzen Hosluj 
Senryaku, Tokyo, OkurnshO Insatsukyoku, 1980, pp. 65-78. 
57J. M. W. Chapman, R. Drifte and I. Gow, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security, London, 
Pinter Publishers, 1983, pp. 151-217. 
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one of the key components in security policy led to its assumption of an even 
greater role in security thinking. 
Comprehensive National Security and the placing of economics within it was 
criticised by many inside and outside Japan as simply being a means to further 
Japan's own economic interests and to evade international military 
responsibilities. For example, the late Kosaka Masataka, an eminent scholar of 
international relations and an original member of the study group that devised the 
concept under government direction, later claimed that, 'Though excellent in 
theory, it [a comprehensive security capability] has actually been an excuse, even 
a lie, to avoid greater defence efforts.'58 Others have taken an alternative tack, and 
have criticised the concept of comprehensive national security for its lack of 
conceptual clarity and as a pretext for the extension of Japan's military power. 
Comprehensive National Security has been seen as making the remilitarisation of 
Japanese security policy more palatable for the Japanese public by cloaking this 
process in the appealing language of economic security.59 Critics point out that 
the presence of such 'realist' thinkers as Kosaka Masataka and Inoki Masamichi in 
the study group undermines its credentials as a truly alternative look at security, 
note that the Comprehensive National Security Council has never really 
functioned effectively, and are suspicious of the enthusiastic adoption of the 
concept by politicians regarded as 'hawkish' on defence matters, such as 
Nakasone.60 
But it is apparent that despite these criticisms the concept of Comprehensive 
National Security and the importance of economic power has taken root in much 
.58cited in Kenneth B. Pyle, 'The burden of Japanese history and the politics of burden sharing', 
in John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellmann (cds.), Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for 
America and Japan, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1989,p.62. 
59watanabe Osamu. for instance. argues that the report on Comprehensive Security's emphasis on 
the procurement of economic resources demonstrates the attempt to expand Japan's security role 
beyond its own territory, and, therefore, the continuity of pre-War and post-War Japanese 
imperialism. Watanabe Osamu, Gent/a; Nihon no Teikokllshugika: Keise; to Kozo, Tl'>ky8, (nuki 
Shoten, 1996, pp. 245-9. 
600ennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Givillg: Strategic Aid alld JapOIlese Foreigll Policy. 
Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986. pp. 35-6. 
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of mainstream Japanese thinking about security. Even as late as 1994 the Prime 
Minister's Advisory Group on Defence Issues was still advising that Japan should 
layout a vision of security, 'making full use of all policy means, such as 
diplomacy, economy and defence. That is to say it is necessary to build a coherent 
and comprehensive security policy.t61 Moreover, despite attempts by some policy-
makers in the 1980's and early 1990's to raise the profile of Japan's military 
contribution to international security, economic conceptions of security have 
continued to develop and remain prominent in Japanese security policy.62 In 
particular, the possibility that economic power may be used for security purposes 
has been made clear by Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies. 
As will be discussed in chapter three, Prime Minister Suzuki, the first Japanese 
premier to approve the concept of Comprehensive Security, was also the first to 
link explicitly Japan's economic aid to its security policy, by stating in 1981 that 
in future Japanese aid would be provided to those regions which were, 'important 
to the maintenance of peace and stability in the world.t63 Successive Japanese 
governments followed these guidelines by directing economic aid during the Cold 
War to those countries considered vital by the US to Japan and the West's 
security, such as Pakistan, Turkey and Somalia.64 Under Prime Minister 
Takeshita Noboru's 1988 International Cooperation Initiative, the size of 
Japanese ODA was increased and tied more closely to Japan's security interests. 65 
By 1989 Japan had achieved the status of being the largest contributor of aDA in 
the world, and the awareness of its policy-makers was that Japan had now 
61Advisory Group on Defense Issues, 17,e Modality oj tile Security and DeJense Capability oj 
Japan,p.7. 
62For views of a prominent journalist and how the concept of comprehensive security has taken 
hold on the conceptualisation of security in Japan, see Kishida Junnosuke, 'Sl\g6 Anzen HosM', in 
Kishida Junnosuke (ed.>, Nilwn no Amen HosM. TOkyO, Asahi KarucM Sentil, 1982, pp. 6-45. A 
broad overview of the concept of Comprehensive Security and the attitudes of a wide range of 
government officials, scholars, journalisLo;, and foreign commentators is contained in: Robert W. 
Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Concept oj Comprellensive National Security, New York, 
Pergamon-Bra.o;sey's International Defense Publishers, 1984. 
63Akaha Tsuneo, <Japan's Comprehensive Security', p. 333. 
64Inada JOji, 'Japan's aid diplomacy: economic, political or strategic?', in Kathleen Newland 
(ed), The International Relations oj Japan, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 103. 
65Akaha Tsuneo, 'Japan's security policy after US hegemony', in Kathleen Newland, The 
International Relations oj Japan, p. 155. 
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acquired a powerful economic instrument of security policy. This was confirmed 
by the new ODA Charter, or ODA Taiko, laid down by the Kaifu government in 
1992, and which among other things stated that Japanese policy in future would 
consider prior to disbursement of aid the trends in military spending and 
development of weapons of mass destruction by the recipient country. 66 
Post-Cold War economic security policy 
Post-Cold War and post-Gulf War, policy-makers have continued to view 
economics as one of the key components of security policy. Even Ozawa Ichira, 
at present the most vocal advocate of an enhanced military role for Japan, 
acknowledges the importance of economic power. Ozawa sees economic power 
functioning in the service of Japanese security in two ways.67 Firstly, a 
contribution is made to Japan's and the international community's security by 
Japan's full participation in the global economy and efforts it makes to stabilise it. 
Thus, Japan's participation in economic summits and the coordination of its 
economic policies with the other major international economic powers is seen to 
contribute to the creation of a stable security environment. Secondly, economic 
power is viewed as giving Japan policy instruments with which to deal with 
specific security problems that may arise in the post-Cold War world. These 
instruments of economic power are considered to be DDA, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FOI), capital, energy supplies, technology, education, and trade. 
Yamazaki Taku and Kata Kaichi, senior LDP members, whose role in the making 
of security policy towards North Korea will be examined later, have in the past 
both pointed to growing importance of the financial power of Japan as a form of 
66Danny Unger, 'Japan's capital exports: moulding East Asia', in Danny Unger and Paul 
Blackburn, (OOs.) Japan's Emerging Global Role, p. 158; Tanaka Akihiko. 'Japan's security policy 
in the 1990's', in Funabashi Y~ichi (ed.), Japan's InlernationalAgenda, New York, New York 
University Press, 1994, p. 49. 
670zawa Ichir<'>. Nihon Kaizo Keikaku, pp. 153-155,164. 
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security in the post-Cold War world as compared to the declining importance of 
military pow er. 68 
The SDP leader Murayama Tomiichi's assumption of the premiership in 1994 
also showed that the contest between military and economic conceptions of power 
and security is still ongoing. Even though the socialist party had acknowledged 
the constitutionality of the SDP the previous year, Murayama continued to argue 
in his January 1995 Diet speech for a vision of security unreliant upon military 
power. 
The path to peace that Japan should follow is not one for its achievement 
based upon the exercise of armed force. Instead the painful experience 
of the past has taught us that the way to achieve peace and prosperity for 
the world is through technical knowledge and economic cooperation. 69 
Other politicians such as Takemura Masayoshi of the Sakigake (Harbinger 
Party) and Finance Minister from 1994 to 1995 have also sought to keep attention 
in Japan focused on alternative forms of security policy. Whilst accepting that the 
Gulf War demonstrated the need for Japan to increase its contribution to 
international security, Takemura has argued that Japan should reject the military 
option, preserve the peace constitution, and look to use its economic and 
technical power to promote stability. In particular, he has argued for increased 
assistance by Japan to developing countries, and a fonn of 'Green PKO', where 
Japan plays a major role in restoring the global natural environment.70 
THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY 
The debate on the future direction of security policy in Japan, then, seems to be as 
heavily divided and contested as it is in the US and other countries. It is clear that 
the end of the Cold War followed by the shock of the Gulf Crisis have caused 
policy-makers in Japan from all areas of the political spectrum to reconsider the 
68KatO KOichi. Oyama Shigeki. and Yamazaki Taku. 'Ima koso Pakkusu Japponika no kakuril'lu 
0: buryoku to kaku de naku. kokusai kinyO ga kimele iku jidai da,' Ekonomisulo. 19 February 
1991, p. SO. 
690aimushOhen, Gaikti Seisho 1996, TOkyO, 6kurashO Insatsukyoku. 1996, p. 150 [Author's 
translation]. 
70rakcmura Masayoshi, Chisakutomo Kirari to Hikaru Kuni Nihon, TOkyO, K6bun ShobO, 1994, 
pp. 174-200. 
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basic tenets of Japanese security policy since the end of World War II. There has 
emerged on one side of the debate conceptions of security that stress the utility of 
military power as the way forward for Japan to contribute to international security 
after the Cold War. This conception ranges from the more radical approach, as 
proposed by the likes of Ozawa Ichiro and sections of the NFP, through to the 
more incremental approach of the lDP. Either way, though, the emergence of two 
conservative parties in Japan can be taken as an indication of a strong movement 
in policy-making which is looking to expand, although at differing paces, Japan's 
independent military capabilities, its support for the UN, and most especially 
support for the US alliance. 
On the other side of the debate is the alternative tradition which emphasises 
the rejection of military power in favour of conceptions of security founded in 
economic power, and which owes much to the history of constitutional pacifism. 
In the past, in practice the split between the military and economic conceptions of 
security has not been so great, and often hard to identify as policy-makers have 
often used language to obscure deliberately their true position. But as already 
seen, many policy-makers in Japan have attempted to articulate forms of security 
policy which combine both military and economic approaches--the best known of 
which has been Comprehensive National Security. Indeed, certain commentators 
now feel that after the Gulf War Japan is closer to being able to realise this policy 
than at any other time.71 
But it also arguable that despite the opportunities after the Cold War to blend 
these approaches, in fact the trends in domestic politics and policy-making 
identified so far demonstrate that the approach to security policy based on 
military power is increasingly exerting its dominance over those based on 
economic power. The ascendancy of the conservative parties following the Gulf 
Crisis has meant that those who argue for a security policy based primarily on 
71 Peter Katzenstein and Okawara Nobuo, 'Japanese security issues', p. 54; David Arase, 'Japan in 
East Asia', in Akaha Tsunco and Frnnk Langdon (eds.), Japan in the Post-Hegemonic World, p. 
127; Yamamoto Y oshinobu and E~ Shinkichi, Sogo Anpo, p. 67. 
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economic power, or at least one which balances the elements of economic and 
military power, are really only engaged in a rearguard action to slow the onset of 
the remilitarisation of Japanese security policy. 
However, the irony of this situation is that the example of the US already 
outlined above, and the long-term trends in security thinking since the 1970's, 
have demonstrated that in an interdependent world the utility of military power 
and its contribution to international security, especially with the rise of new post-
Cold War problems, is actually declining. This irony is made even greater by the 
fact that Japanese policy-makers have been aware of this throughout the post-
Cold War period, and that as Japan moves slowly to a de facto abandonment of 
notions of comprehensive security policy, other countries, including the US, are 
moving to create their own concepts of comprehensive security, which emphasise 
the key role of economic power and which in many cases may have been inspired 
by the example of Japan in the first place. 
In tum, the above observation begs the questions that, if Japan is moving away 
from its traditions of security based on economic power, why is this so and is it 
necessary? Given Japan's traditions of constitutional pacifism, its alternative 
conceptions of security, and its undoubted possession of great economic power, it 
can be supposed that in the post-Cold War, with a reduction in military tensions 
and the rise of a number of security problems that require new and flexible 
approaches, Japanese policy-makers could at last put their long-held conceptions 
into action and articulate an effective form of security policy based on economic 
rather than military power. 
This then brings the discussion back to those fundamental questions about the 
future of Japanese security raised in the introduction. As has been seen, the aim of 
this dissertation is to examine whether it is possible to conceptualise a security 
policy based on economic power, what are the policy-making obstacles to it, and 
what this reveals about the nature of power and security after the Cold War. The 
above examination of the policy-making debate in Japan argues that these 
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conceptions do exist and that economic power as an alternative form of security 
policy to be pursued by Japan is worthy of investigation. The following chapters 
on the theory of economic security, policy-making in Japan, and the case study of 
Japan-North Korea security will test these conceptions in more detail. 
But prior to that, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an exposition 
of Western and Japanese political theory on power and security. As described in 
the introduction, this dissertation aims to search through contemporary 
scholarship and to find a model that can be used to expand our understanding of 
economic power and security after the Cold War, and which can then be tested 
against a specific security problem. The following brief discussion of political 
theory will show how theoretical orthodoxy has become hard to maintain after the 
Cold War, how much of theory points implicitly to the importance of economic 
power, and how this makes it possible to introduce the concept of a state, such as 
Japan, that can use economic power for security ends. This model has already 
been alluded to in the introduction, and is known as global civilian power. 
POLITICAL THEORY AND ECONOMIC POWER 
Realism, liberalism, Marxism 
An initial overview of the scholarship on international politics and international 
relations suggests that its main theories and their assumptions about power and 
the creation of stability are incompatible. Textbooks conventionally layout three 
separate political theories--realism, liberalism, Marxism--which are said to be 
mutually exclusive of each other. These theories are divided traditionally over the 
issues of who or what is the chief actor in international politics, and the principal 
form of power which governs the international system. However, the following 
brief review of these three schools of thought will demonstrate that there is a 
measure of unity between them in their shared emphasis on economic power. 
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According to the realist view, both historical/classical and neo-realist, the 
sovereign state is the main actor, and in the anarchic international system military 
power is the ultimate arbiter of politics and hierarchy between states.72 
International security is thus thought to be achieved by a balance of military 
power between states, or by the overwhelming military might of one hegemonic 
state.73 Consequently, for realist thinkers economic power takes second place to 
military power as a determinant of order among states and the stability of the 
international political system. Nevertheless, both classical realists and neo-realists 
regard economic power as one of the essential foundations of a state's power due 
to the intimate connection between a state's war potential and its economic 
prosperity.74 Realist thinkers have also acknowledged the utility of economic 
power as a tool in its own right for exerting power over other states, in the form of 
sanctions or the control of foreign markets.7S Moreover, Robert Gilpin's version 
of neo-realist thought produced in the early to mid-1980's is significant because it 
indicated that states, in what seemed at the time to be an increasingly multi-polar 
world, were competing to augment their power not by increasing their military 
resources, but by economic nationalism, the undermining of the liberal economic 
order, and the pursuit of markets and economic growth.76 Hence for Gilpin, the 
relationship between economics and politics, or political economy, is now 
becoming the future determinant of international relations. By taking this view, it 
can be seen that Gilpin, although starting from some very different assumptions, 
72For examples of classic realist thought which emphasises military power as the determinant of 
hierarchy and stability in the international system, see A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in 
Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. xxiv; E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 
1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of IlIIertlntionnl Relations, London, Macmillan, 1951, p. 
109. 
73Hans J. Morgcnthau: Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966 (fourth edition), p. 37; Kenneth N. Waltz, A Theory of International 
Politics, London, Addisson Wesley, 1979, p. 118; Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: More May Be Bener, Adelphi Papers no. 171, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1981, p. 7. 
74E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years Crisis 19/9-1939. p. 113; Kenneth N. Waltz. A Theory of 
International Politics, p. 131. 
75E, H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 19/9-1939, pp. 119-27; Robert Gilpin, 1'he richness of the 
tradition of political realism', International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 293-95. 
7~obert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 88. 
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has now edged the realist debate on power and stability closer towards that of the 
liberal thinkers. 
In contrast to realism, liberalism has long emphasised the importance of 
economic power as a determinant of stability in the international system.77 Since 
the time of Immanuel Kant, liberal thinkers have ranked economic 
interdependency alongside the growth of democracy and international institutions 
as one of the key elements in achieving peace and order amongst individuals and 
states.78 In the contemporary era, the link between economic interdependence and 
stability has been reformulated by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. in the 
1970's with Power and Interdependence, and after the Cold War by Bruce Russett 
with Grasping the DemocraJic Peace.79 In addition, political economy, long a key 
principle of liberal economic theorists since the time of Adam Smith, has also 
been rearticulated by liberal political scientists such as Susan Strange, and, as will 
be seen later in this chapter, been used in much the same way as Gilpin's theories 
to explain political and hegemonic change after the Cold War.so 
Economic power is clearly central to the Marxist view of international politics, 
dominated as it is by theories of conflict among economic classes and the 
competition among states for capital accumulation. The World System theory, as 
propounded by Immanuel Wallerstein, is one example of a derivative of Marxist 
thought which attempts to show how order, although not necessarily stability, is 
given to the international system by the economic relations between the 
developed 'core' of capitalist countries and the 'periphery' of developing 
77Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and 
Policies, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatshcaf, 1988, p. 26. 
78Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, tmnslated by M. Campbell Smith. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1917 (third edition), p. 157. The classic English liberal statement on 
the importance of economic interdependency for peace can be found in: Norman Angell, 17/e 
Great Illusion: A Study oj the Relation oj Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social 
Advantage, New York and London, Garland, 1972. 
7%obert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, Boston, Little Brown, 1977; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: 
Principles/or a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
SOSusan Stmnge, States and Markets, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994 (second edition). 
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countries.81 Likewise, a second derivative of Marxist thought, Gramscian theory, 
although designed as a corrective to the historical determinism of classical 
Marixsm, also shares the same basic emphasis on economic power as shaping the 
international system. As put forward by its most enthusiastic advocates Robert 
Cox, Stephen Gill, and David Law, Gramscian theory does increase the 
sophistication of our understanding of international politics by showing that 
hegemony is based not simply on coercion, but also that the ideology created by 
dominant transnational classes gives a consensual aspect to hegemony.82 The 
value of the argument that ideas can often have a force in international relations 
equivalent to material resources should not be underestimated, and is explored 
further in chapters two and three. But it is also clear that Gramscian theory cannot 
avoid concentration upon economic power as the chief force in the international 
system. For in any derivative of Marxist thought the view of production as the 
basis of social and political power also means that it is the generator of the 
ideology of the dominant international economic class. 83 
This brief account of the three traditions of international politics theory has 
shown there is common ground between them in the implicit--if not always 
explicit--attention that they devote to economic power as a key determinant of the 
international order. Arguably, this tendency to focus on the role of economic 
power has become even greater in the post-Cold War period and can be seen in 
the debate on hegemony. By examining this debate in brief, it should then be 
possible to reveal how theories have come to concentrate on economic power and 
the areas of convergence between them. The aim is not to engage directly in the 
81Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics 0/ the World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987; John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy, London, Routledge, 1995. p. 104. 
82Robert W. Cox. Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 0/ History. 
New York. Columbia University Press. 1987. p. 253; Stephen Gill and David Law. The Global 
Political Economy. p. 65; Stephen Gill. American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 33; Stephen Gill and David Law, rile Global Political 
F..conomy. p. 63. 
83Robert W. Cox, Production Power and World Order. p. 253; Susan Strange. States and 
Markets. p. 26. 
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debate on hegemony, but to use the debate to illustrate how the view of power and 
of the key states in the international system has changed, how it is possible to 
combine theoretical approaches, and how this has fed through into the concept of 
the global civilian power. 
The debate on hegemonic decline and power 
The debate in Western scholarship over whether the US can maintain its position 
as the provider of global public goods, or whether it faces challenges from other 
competitor states for that role, first came to prominence in the mid 1980's with 
Robert Keohane's After Jlegemony.84 The debate has involved scholars from all 
the theoretical traditions outlined above, and has shown itself as capable of 
cutting across ideological boundaries. Scholars often regarded as sharing the same 
theoretical outlook have found themselves on different sides of the debate, and 
thus the debate on hegemony is a good illustration of how in recent years views 
have begun to change on power and what sort of states can become dominant in 
the international system in the future. In particular, it is clear that, whether in 
support or against arguments of US hegemonic decline, all theories point to 
economic power as the crucial determinant of stability in the international system. 
Hence, the most popularised version of 'declinist' theory, as contained in Paul 
Kennedy's 1988 bestseller The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, attributes the 
end of US hegemony to the fundamental inability of the US to maintain the 
economic strength to match its foreign military commitments.85 Robert Gilpin 
puts forward another version of this type of 'imperial overstretch' theory. In the 
same way as Kennedy, he sees hegemony as having an inherent tendency to 
undermine itself as it is unable to keep up with the incessant rise in costs involved 
in providing the public goods of a liberal economic system, and falls victim to the 
84Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
,Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
85Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o/the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 
From 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1988. 
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rise of economic competitors, or 'free riders'.86 Adopting Charles Kindleberger's 
theory of hegemonic stability, Gilpin also argues that the loss of the control of the 
key economic component of finance has caused in succession the decline of the 
hegemony of Great Britain and then the US.87 Meanwhile, Robert Cox chooses to 
explain US hegemonic decline by focusing on the loss of its position as a 
consensual leader in the international system. However, as has been seen in the 
previous review of Gramscian literature, Cox's views on the power of ideas are 
derived from the belief that the dominant ideology is generated by the dominant 
economic state. Thus, ultimately he ascribes the loss of the US's consensual 
hegemony, or the period of 'non-hegemony', to the loss of its economic leadership 
in the global economy since the 1960's.88 
Directly opposed to these 'declinist' arguments is a 'revivalist' school of 
thought, which contends that the accounts of US decline have been exaggerated, 
and that US hegemony, whilst it may be experiencing difficulties, is still sound, 
will continue for the foreseeable future, and may become even stronger. The 
'revivalist' school includes a number of leading scholars from different 
ideological camps, such as the realist Samuel Huntington; the liberal scholars 
Joseph Nye Jr., Susan Strange, and Bruce Russett; and those who have often 
pushed the Gramscian line, Stephen Gill and David Law. 
These scholars tend to take two lines of argument in defence of US hegemony, 
both of which use economic criteria to show that US hegemony is intact. The first 
is to take direct issue with and to deny the validity of the arguments put forward 
by the 'declinists' in regard to the US's weakness in certain power resources. For 
example, Nye and Huntington refuse to accept that the US may have fallen behind 
any other power in terms of the 'hard' power, both military and economic, that it 
86Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1981, p. 162. 
87Robert Gilpin, The Political EcolUJmy oj International Relations, p. 147. 
88Robert W. Cox., Production Power and World Order, p. 273. 
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commands.89 The second and more persuasive line of defence used by the 
'revivalists' is to claim that the 'declinists' have failed to see that the true nature 
of US hegemonic power is changing and that it can no longer be measured purely 
in terms of direct control over tangible power resources. The 'revivalists' argue 
that power has now become 'multi-dimensional' and consists of a range of 'soft', 
structural, and intangible components. The result of this is that the most important 
indicators of hegemonic power are now not only the ability to accumulate certain 
types of power resources, but also whether or not the international system is 
designed and works in accordance with the interests of the hegemon, or, as 
Russett argues, whether or not a state has control over 'outcomes'.90 Judged by 
these criteria, then, the 'revivalists' claim that the US's hegemonic power has not 
only been maintained, but may have even increased. 
Nye argues that the US has actually boosted its hegemony by the growth of its 
'soft' power expressed through the universality of its culture.91 Strange concurs 
with Nye by putting forward the idea that the US has maintained its influence 
through the acquisition of structural economic power which is derived from the 
sheer weight of the US economy in the international system. In direct contrast to 
the arguments of Gilpin, she claims that the US's structural power has allowed it 
effectively to retain control of production and finance, and that its ability to run a 
deficit over the long term is proof of the US's financial strength and the centrality 
of its position within the international financial system.92 
Gill and Law seem to take a different line from their mentor Cox with regard 
to their Gramscian approach to the question of US decline, and support the 
'revivalist' school of thought. They note that the US has declined in many aspects 
of economic power, but follow Strange's arguments in positing that the US still 
89]oseph S. Nye Jr., 'Soft Power', Foreign Policy, no. 80, Fall 1990, p. 155; Samuel P. 
Huntington, 'The US-decline or renewal?' Foreign Affairs, vol. 67, no. 2, Winter 1988-89, p. 82. 
90sruce Russett, 'The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony or is Mark Twain really dead?', 
International Organization, vol. 39, no. 2, Spring 1985, p. 228. 
91Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, p. 191. 
92Susan Strange, 'The persistent myth of lost hegemony', International Organization, vol. 41, no. 
4, Autumn 1987, p. 565. 
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retains a powerful economic and hegemonic position due to its position at the 
centre of the global economy.93 Moreover, they agree with Nye in seeing US 
power as having been extended and diversified through the establishment of a 
dominant universal culture. 
The above review has demonstrated that, despite the apparent divisions in the 
debate on hegemony, there are broad areas of unity which provide the basic 
parameters for the framework and issues of the debate. and which underlie many 
of its basic conclusions. As has already been described, realist, liberal, and 
Marxist analyses all point to the importance of economic power and integrate it 
into their most basic theoretical assumptions about the nature of international 
politics. The debate on hegemony further illustrates this point due the fact that all 
the participants in the debate agree that the key to understanding power and 
hegemony is to be found in the study of economic factors. Thus, the 'declinists' in 
their attempts to prove the failure of US hegemony focus mainly on the economic 
aspects of US decline. The theories of 'imperial overstretch' and loss of 
consensual leadership are designed to show that the origin of the US's impending 
or already actualised hegemonic decline can be traced back to issues of 
fundamental economic weakness. 
In tum, the 'revivalists' base their defence of US hegemony on economic 
arguments. Those who refuse to acknowledge US decline point to its continued 
superiority with regard to certain economic indicators, and in doing so accept the 
'dec1inist' proposition that hegemony and power can be gauged by economic 
indicators such as shares of world trade and levels of GNP. Furthermore, 
'revivalists' may claim that the nature of power has shifted to being 'soft' and 
structural, but it is also clear that these types of power are still products of 
economic influence and cannot be separated from them. Structural power is 
initially acquired through the size and weight of a country's economy, and 'soft' 
93Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Eco"omy, p. 357. 
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power. such as a universal culture. is produced in the first instance by a 
production structure capable of penetrating international markets with consumer 
goods that have a strong commercial as well as cultural appeal to consumers. 
Up until this point. then. the review of Western literature on international 
politics has shown that all schools of thought are increasingly united in seeing 
economics as the crucial form of power in the international system and in 
dictating the degree of its stability. The next section on theory will go on to show 
how as a result of this emphasis on economic power. Japan has now been 
indicated as a possible hegemon. and how this has then created the type of 
intellectual environment where it is possible to think of Japan as a global civilian 
power. 
JAPAN AS A NEW TYPE OF GREAT POWER 
The debate on hegemony and the focus on the importance of economic power in 
moulding the post-Cold War international political system. reveals another area of 
unity in contemporary scholarship with regard to the rise of new hegemons and 
new types of great powers capable of challenging the dominant hegemon. 
Acceptance amongst scholars that hegemony is based on economic power means 
that new hegemons are seen inevitably as being those states which have 
accumulated economic power. These potential new hegemons are typically 
identified in the modem era as Japan. Germany, and possibly new trading blocs 
such as the EU.94 
With respect to Japan, opinion is still divided over whether, based on its 
economic power, it has reached the status of a fully fledged hegemon. Ezra Vogel 
and William Nester claim that Japan has, or is very near to acquiring, hegemonic 
status. But Robert Gilpin, Barry Gills, Hans W. Maull, Joesph Nye Jr., Robert 
Cox, Deborah L. Haber, and John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge are more hesitant, 
doubting whether Japan has managed to yet gather sufficient economic power, 
94John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 106; Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, 
pp.142-54. 
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ideological leadership. and political will to make the transformation to hegemonic 
status.95 But even allowing for this split in opinion, the most significant point is 
that the scholarship has reached an agreement that at the very least Japan's 
possession of economic power gives it the potential to become a hegemonic state. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, Japan's assumption of a position as a 
hegemon is not a key question. and in recent years, as Japan's economic miracle is 
seen to have slowed and the US economy to have recovered. it has become a less 
popular subject for debate. However. what is significant for the argument of this 
chapter, is that the debate on hegemony illustrates that much of the scholarship on 
international relations has reached the point where it can countenance serious 
discussion on Japan's role as a hegemon, or at least as a great power, due to its 
possession of economic power. 
The consideration of Japan as a hegemon and the provider of public goods and 
stability to the world based on its economic power is instructive in a number of 
ways. Firstly, it confirms the growing conception outlined earlier that economics 
is now the major form of power in international politics, and in certain situations 
can supersede military power in importance. Thus, the commentator William 
Pfaff argues that there has been a 'redefinition of power' in the post-Cold War 
world, marked by a fundamental shift away from traditional forms of power to 
ones based more upon economics and technology.96 Reflecting the debate on 
hegemony and economic power, a new consensus seems to be emerging amongst 
scholars that the nature of power has indeed shifted. Akaha Tsuneo and Frank 
Langdon argue that in the post-hegemonic world: 'Perhaps the most important 
question ..... is whether or not it has move into a period when economic power is 
95John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space, p. 149; Robert W. Cox, 
'Middlepowennanship, Japan, and the future world order',lnternational Journal, no. 44, Autumn 
1989, p. 843; Barry Gills, 'The hegemonic transition in East Asia: a historical perspective,' in 
Stephen Gill (cd.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 211; Robert Gilpin, War and Political Change, p. 239; 
Joseph S. Nye Jr .• Round to CLad, p. 166, Hans W. Maull, 'Gennany and Japan: the new civilian 
powers,' Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 5, Winter 1990-91, p. 91; Ezra Vogel, 'Pax Nipponica7', 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 4, Spring 1986, p. 767; William R. Nester, American Power, p. 125. 
%william Pfaff, 'Redefining world power', p. 36; Deborah L Haber, '"The death of hegemony" 
Why Pax Nipponica is impossible', Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 9, September 1990, pp. 892-907. 
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more important than military power.'97 Susan Strange supports this view by 
stating that economic power, and especially economic structural power, is now 
more important than political power.98 William Nester contends that, 'global 
economic power means global political power,' and Robert Gilpin comments that 
the pursuit of economic rather than military power has now become the chief 
activity for a state's foreign and security policy.99 
Secondly, the association of Japan with hegemonic status due to its apparent 
mastery of various components of economic power argues that these components, 
such as capital, finance, investment, trade and energy, can now be seen as 
manifestations and tools of a state's power. Since the 1970's scholars have argued 
that economic power on its own can be used for the security interests of states. As 
Klauss Knorr stresses: 'The ability to shut off valuable markets, to preempt 
sources of supply, to stop investments and to reduce economic aid, would 
constitute national strength equivalent to military power.' 100 Recent scholarship 
has begun once more to concentrate on the potential of economic power to 
directly shape the activities and politics of a state. In particular, studies have dealt 
with the role of the economic component of capital, and the work of Cox, and Gill 
and Law has emphasised how state policy can be controlled by international 
capital, with capital even acquiring hegemonic status in its own right.101 
Thirdly, the importance attached to Japan's possession of economic power in 
the debate on hegemony, and the possibilities of the use of this for security 
purposes, reveals the final objective of this investigation of contemporary debate 
on political theory-a conceptual model of Japan as a new type of great power 
employing economic power to achieve its security ends, rather than resorting to 
military power. 
97 Akaha Tsuneo and Frank Langdon, ' The post hegemonic world and Japan', p. 265. 
98Susan Strange, 'The persistent myth of lost American hegemony', p. 553. 
99william R. Nester, American Power, p. 125; Robert Gilpin, 'The debate about the new world 
economic order', in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, Japan's Emerging Global Role, p. 25. 
l00J<lauss Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power, London, 
Macmillan, 1973. p. 20. 
10lSlephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 205. 
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Japan as a Global Civilian Power 
As noted above, scholars have long been aware that states can achieve their 
objectives by means other than by military power, and most usually this means by 
the manipulation of economic power. One of the first Western scholars to 
articulate this idea in a coherent model and to link it to the case of Japan was 
Richard Rosecrance. In The Rise of the Trading State, Rosecrance postulated that 
states according to their power resources historically have followed different 
paths to enrichment: that of the military-political world and that of the trading 
world. The military-political world has typically involved the use of force by a 
state to increase its material resources and territory. In contrast, the trading state 
has concentrated on economic exchange to survive with only a minimal 
importance attached to territorial expansion. In the post-War period, with the 
growth of interdependence and the declining utility of modern weapons, 
Rosecrance has seen a transformation of many nations to become trading states, 
and that they have successfully achieved their national aims. In particular, he 
identifies Germany and Japan as two examples of trading states that can achieve 
their interests without the use of military power.t02 Russia, the United States, and 
some Third World countries, however, are classified by Rosecrance as recalcitrant 
nations because of their refusal to downgrade their emphasis on the military path 
to power and security. 
Rosecrance pointed, therefore, to the possibility of Japan playing a full role in 
international politics and achieving its security ends by the use of economic 
means and without following the path of other states traditionally regarded as 
great powers. The ability of Japan to express its power in a different way from 
others and to function as a different kind of model of a great power has since been 
reexamined by other scholars. David Williams has argued that Japan is a society 
which is capable of demonstrating a new model of a great power to the rest of the 
I02Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o/the Trading Stale: Commerce and Co"quest in the Modern 
World, New Y orle. Basic Books. 1986, p. xi. 
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world. He notes that when looking at the unusual characteristics of Japanese 
foreign policy: 
The suggestion would be that economics as a discipline and a way of 
looking at the world has become the new focus of concern in foreign 
policy analysis, and thus has ended the old, and all too exclusive, stress 
on diplomacy, military tactics and geo-politics. Post-war Japan, 
particularly in its effective and total substitution of economic 
competition for military expansion, exemplifies in an unrivalled way the 
forces that would sweep away the Cold War world order. As no other 
polity, Japan has forced the world to rewrite the diplomacy of 
guidebooks and manuals of strategic thinking that formed the 
intellectual underpinnings of the post-war global order. 103 
Reinhard Drifte has also taken up the theme of Japan's role as a new type of 
power in the post-Cold War world and argues that to understand its influence it is 
necessary to think of new models and paradigms. For Drifte, the influence of 
Japan is not seen so much in the power indicators of other states such as military 
power, but more in its economic and 'soft' power resources. He argues that Japan 
conducts a different type of foreign policy that serves its national interests without 
necessarily adopting the same leadership style as other developed powers. Japan's 
influence is made felt simply by the fact that its weight in the global economy 
means its can do nothing and still affect an outcome which is beneficial to its 
national interests. Drifte refers to this as 1eadership by stealth'.I04 
Hans Maull. though. is the Western researcher who has articulated most 
clearly in Western scholarship a model of Japan as a different kind of global 
power which can achieve its foreign and security poticy ends by the use of 
economic power. Maull argues for a new type of power which is characterised by 
active cooperation with other powers to achieve international objectives. and 'the 
concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national 
goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to 
safeguard other means of international interaction.tJ05 Maull does not reject the 
I03David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End oj History, London, Routledge. 1994, p. 9. 
I04Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy in the /990's: From Economic Superpower to What 
Power? London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 167. 
105Hans W. MaUll, 'Germany and Japan', p. 92. 
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use of military power altogether, and sees the need sometimes to use this in the 
last resort to 'civilise' relations between nations. But he sees the civilian power as 
able to exercise force only with a clear international mandate, and approaching 
the use of military power with a healthy diffidence. Above all, the global civilian 
power looks actively to make a contribution to international security by the use of 
economic power. In tum, Maull argues that it is Japan with its unique pacifist 
constitution and high level of economic resources which is most suited to perform 
the role of this global civilian power. HXi 
Hence, the examination of the debate on hegemony in Western scholarship 
and the importance it attaches to economic power in shaping the post-Cold War 
system, has now brought forward the concept of global civilian power. This is one 
possible theoretical model with which to test the continued utility of the traditions 
of economic security policy in Japan against the newer military-based 
conceptions in the post-Cold War world. But before examining the validity of the 
model it is first necessary to see if it also accepted in Japanese scholarship and its 
applicability to the Japanese case. 
JAPANESE SCHOLARSIDP ON POWER AND HEGEMONY 
The large number of universities in Japan, all with their own independent 
traditions of scholarship, makes it hard to generalise about the overall state of the 
debate on international politics, power, and security.ta7 However, much as in the 
West, there have been two vigorous and conflicting traditions of realism and 
liberalism. This debate, although often given a distinct Japanese feel due to the 
historical and political circumstances of the country, has been closely related to 
the course of overseas events and the trends in contemporary Western 
scholarship. The similarities between the debate on power in Japan and the West 
106J.Ians W. Maull, 'Gennany and Japan', p. 105. 
lO7en this point, see Mika Mervio, Cultural Representations of the Japanese in International 
Relalions and Politics, Tampere, Acta Universitatis Tamperensis, 1995, pp. 152-54. 
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are also likely to become greater as the number of those Japanese scholars who 
have obtained higher degrees abroad increases. 
Realism and liberalism 
The Japanese realist perspective on international politics during the Cold War is 
perhaps best represented by the works of Nagai Yonosuke, Inoki Masamichi, and 
Kosaka Masataka. These realist thinkers largely accepted the inevitably of the bi-
polar balance of power during the Cold War, and the need for military power as 
the ultimate protection from communist aggression. In the 1960's, Kosaka and 
other realists were especially critical of the pacifist and neutralist principles of 
many of their liberalist counterparts, and argued that Japan should maintain the 
US-Japan alliance and a measure of its own military strength.l~ But at the same 
time as the realist logic of these theorists accepted the role of military power as 
the final determinant of international politics during the Cold War, they also 
argued that it was not desirable for Japan to pursue exclusively the path of 
military power towards peace. For instance, Inoki, whilst criticising the 
'hollowness' of Japanese pacifist thought and the refusal of the Japanese to discuss 
the 'taboo' of defence, also warned against Japan's pursuit of the status of a great 
military power. This refusal to advocate Japanese military efforts commensurate 
with its economic power was based in part on the knowledge that it was 
politically unacceptable to neighbouring Asian countries and that Japan did not 
possess the resources to compete with the other major powers. But also it 
reflected the belief, already seen in the description of the report on 
Comprehensive Security (of which Inoki was a part), that economic power in 
itself was beneficial to Japan's security. 100 
Diametrically opposed to the realist school during the Cold War was the 
liberal strain of political science in Japan, much of which stressed concepts of 
l~For an example of KOsan's thinking during the Cold War on realism and the importance of 
power struggles and military power, see KOsaka Ma'iataka, Kokusai Seiji: Kyoju 10 Ki!JO, TOkyO, 
ChOo KOronsha, 1966, pp. 4-20. 
109Jnoki Masamichi, GUllji Taikoku e no Genso, TOkyo, TOyo Kcizai Shinhl'lsha, 1981, pp. 3-29. 
60 
pacifism and looked for alternative methods of security that avoided military 
power and the US-Japan alliance. For the political philosopher Maruyama Masao, 
the conclusion of the US-Japan alliance and the partial peace with the other 
World War II combatants that it entailed, and the alliance's renewal in the face of 
popular protests, was seen as the very antithesis of his democratic principles 
which stressed the need for social autonomy. Furthermore, Maruyama denied the 
logic of the inevitably of conflict; in his view peace was a product of the mode of 
thought, and seen in these terms the 'realism' of the Cold War had to be 
questioned. ItO Maruyama's influence was passed on to other pacifist thinkers via 
the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Problems Discussion Group), and the 
international relations specialist Sakamoto Y oshikazu has refused consistently to 
accept the theory of realism, arguing that its judgements about the unaltered 
course of human nature and conflict are simply ahistorica1.1ll During the Cold 
War, Sakamoto advocated a policy of the dissolution of the US-Japan security 
alliance--the nuclear strategy of which he saw as actually threatening rather than 
protecting Japan--and instead that Japan should ensure its security by a policy of 
neutralism and reliance on a UN force. Il2 Sakamoto was under no 
misapprehension that at the height of the Cold War Japan was in great military 
peril, but believed that neutralism was a far more realistic policy prescription than 
involvement in US military strategy and support for the perpetuation of the US-
Soviet confrontation. In this way, Sakamoto and other scholars of international 
relations opposed to the realist-military perspective saw the possibilities of Japan 
as a new type of power, able to seek an alternative form of security policy 
unre1iant on Japan's own military power or that of allies. 
11~ikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search lor 
Autonomy, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 170-1, 186-90. 
IllSakamoto Yoshikazu, fA perspective on the changing world order: a conceptual prelude.' in 
Sakamoto Yoshikazu (ed.), Global Trans/ormation: Challenges to the Slate System, T6ky<'J. 
United Nations University Press, 1994, p. 17. For a discussion of the role of the Hciwa Mondai 
Danwakai and its influence on the post-War debate in Japan on security. see Glenn D. Hook, 
Militarization and Demilitarization, pp. 2&41. 
112Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Kakujidai no Kokusai Seiji, T6ky6, Iwanami Shoten, 1967, pp. 3-27. 
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The Japanese debate on hegemony and power 
The divisive, and often at times personally acrimonious, debate between Japanese 
realist and liberal thinkers during the Cold War suggests that there was very little 
common ground between them. However, as with the debate in the West, it can 
be seen that the discussion on hegemony which arose towards the end of and after 
the Cold War in Japan reveals areas of unity in Japanese scholarship, and in 
particular the shared emphasis on the importance of economic power for the 
future of the international political system. 
As early as 1980, the report on Comprehensive Security had concluded that the 
US's global dominance had declined both militarily and economically.l13 In 1985, 
Murakami Yasusuke raised the problem of hegemony and argued that its first 
prerequisite was economic power. According to Murakami, it was the loss of the 
ability by the US to provide economic public goods which spelled the end of its 
hegemony. 114 
As in the West, the debate on hegemony in Japan was then given momentum 
by the publication of the Japanese version of Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers, speculation about Japan's own potential as a hegemon, and the end 
of the Cold War and advent of the Gulf War. llS The debate seems to have cut 
across many ideological boundaries and to have united many scholars in seeing 
economic power as the key to the maintenance of hegemony. The realist Inoguchi 
Takashi supports the view that US economic and thus US political hegemony is at 
an end. KOsaka talks of the decline of 'Pax Americana' due to the neglect of 
economic issues by the US.116 Meanwhile, the liberal theorist Kamo Takehiko 
113&'\80 An7..en HoshO GurOpu, Sago Anzen Hosh<' Senryaku, p. 29. 
114Murakami Yasusuke, 'AfutA hegemonr, Chilo Karon, November 1985, pp. 68-89. 
1 15J<ennedy's book immediately after publication became a bestseller, and Kennedy himself was 
invited to numerous speaking functions. Yamamoto Yoshinobu and Eta Shinkichi, SoglJ Anpo, p. 
398; Akaha Tsuneo, 'Japan's security after US hegemony', p. 154. 
116KOsaka Masataka(ed.), Japan's Choices: New Globalism and Cultural Orientations in a 
Cultural State, London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 26. For Inoguchi Takashi's views on the 
decline of US power, see 'The ideas and structures of foreign policy: looking ahead with caution', 
in Inoguchi Taka'ihi and Daniel I. Okimoto (cds.), Tile Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2: 
The Changing International Context, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988, pp. 
23-63; Gendai Kokusai Seiji to Nihon: Pdrululbd Gojfinen no Nilum GaikD, Tl'lkyl'J, Chikuma 
ShaM, 1991, pp. 310-315; 'Change and response in Japan's international politics and strategy', in 
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has argued that in fact US hegemony has been at an end since the 1970s following 
its defeat in Vietnam and the economic difficulties of falling GNP and 
productivity, and the end of the convertibility of the US dollar. 117 On the subject 
of Japan's assumption of a hegemonic position, liberal thinkers discount this 
possibility and the desirability of such a situation, but Taira Koji feels that Japan's 
economic strength means that it can be identified as a candidate for hegemony 
even though it does not possess military power comparable to the US. He states 
that, 'Military heroism dies with the end of history, and much less glamorous 
economics becomes the centrepiece of post-history life. Japan appears to be well 
suited for a leading role in this state of affairs.'t 18 
Hence, it can be seen that there is general agreement among scholars from all 
schools of thought that economic power is one of the essential elements of 
hegemony. In turn, it is also clear that it is economic power which is seen as one 
of the key determinants of security in the post-Cold War period. Analysts on all 
sides were unimpressed by the US's triumph in the Gulf War, and did not 
necessarily equate this use of military power with the future needs of security 
policy and post-Cold War security problems. 119 Kosaka Masataka was reluctant 
to be too hasty in doubting the continued influence of military power after the 
Gulf War, but Taira Koji argues that the main result of the Gulf War was that it, 
'successfully proved the futility of a warlike nations obsession with military 
power as an indispensable means of national security.'lW Tanaka Akihiko, a 
scholar often thought to belong to the realist school and a leading thinker on 
security matters, in his analysis of the post-Cold War order has noted that military 
power will continue to play some part in coping with security issues in areas of 
Stuart Harris and James Cotton (cds.), The End o/the Cold War in Northeast Asia, Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 292-216. 
117Kamo Takehiko, Seka; Seij; 0 DO Miru ka, TOkyO, Iwanami Shinsho, 1995, pp. 73-4. 
118-raira K6ji. 'Japan, an imminent hegemon?'. TIre Annals o/the American Academy 0/ Political 
and Social Science, Japan's E.xternal Economic Relations: Japanese Perspectives. vol. 513, 
January 1991, p. 152. 
119ranaka Akihiko, 'Japan's security policy', pp. 36-7,39. 
lWKl'>saka Masataka, Kasaka Masataka GaikO HyaronshQ, Tl'>kyO, ChaO Kl'>ronsha, 1996, p. 312. 
Taira K6ji. 'Japan as number two: new thoughts on the hegemonic theory of world governance', 
in Akaha Tsuneo and Frank Langdon (eds.), Japan in the Post-Hegemonic WorM, p. 258. 
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the world which are not yet characterised by interdependence and thus that Japan 
should maintain the US alliance. But Tanaka also recognises that the global trend 
is towards interdependence and the declining utility of military power,121 The 
pacifist scholar Asai Motofumi argues that Bush's belief in a new world order 
based in military power was mistaken, and the Asahi Shimbun 
journalist/commentator Funabashi Yoichi concludes that the Gulf War actually 
showed that military power would not be the supreme form of power in the post-
Cold War world. 122 
The rejection of military power as the sole determinant of hegemony and 
security, and the subsequent concentration on economic power, shows that there 
is a growing implicit unity between the different schools of Japanese scholarship. 
The end of the Cold War has not ended the ideological battles in Japanese 
scholarship, but it has brought about more flexibility in thinking on the nature of 
international politics, or what Sakamoto has termed as the shift from the rigid 
'absolutism' of the Cold War to the 'relativism' of the post-Cold War era.l23 The 
recognition of the importance of economic power and flexibility in thinking 
means that it has now become possible for scholars traditionally from different 
ideological camps to argue for the concept that Japan should make a contribution 
to security primarily by means of its economic power. 
Hence, Yamamoto Yoshinobu and Shinkichi Eta advocate a Japanese 
contribution to international security based on its continued integration into the 
global economy through the opening of its markets, and the increased use of 
economic instruments, such as aDA and technology transfers.t24 The US-based 
Japanese scholar Akaha Tsuneo also argues for the future primacy of economic 
power in the newly emerging international political system. He contends that: 
121Tanaka Akihiko, Alarashii ChOsei: 21seiki no Sekal Shisutemu, T~ky~, Nihon Keizai 
Shimbunsha. 1996, pp. 167-266. 
122Funabashi Yeichi, 'Introduction: Japan's international agenda for the 1990's', in Funabashi 
Y&hi (cd.), Japan's Internalimud Agenda, p. 3; Asai Motofumi, 'Pacifism', p. 139. 
lZ3Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 'SOtaika no jidai: shimin no seild 0 mczashite', Sekai, January 1997, pp. 
3~7. 
124Yamamoto Yoshinobu and EtC, Shinkichi, Saga Anpo. pp. 573-80. 
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Japan has enormous economic power with which to playa leading role, 
if not the leading role, in the construction of a non-hegemonic world 
characterised by collective, cooperative sharing of power and 
responsibilities .... Japan must also play an international security role 
commensurate with its economic power, and the most promising avenue 
is found in active and creative application of its comprehensive security 
policy, with an explicit emphasis upon economic development as a 
means of promoting political stability. 125 
Japanese views on global civilian power 
These sentiments concerning economic power and security have been most fully 
articulated by the adoption in Japan of the global civilian power model. 
Surprisingly, Kfisaka Masataka (admittedly, as he says in one of his more 
idealistic moments) has argued for Japan to follow this model. For Kfisaka the 
meaning of global civilian power, or the Bunminteki Taikoku, is somewhat 
different from that of Maull's original model as he argues for the maintenance of 
the bilateral alliance with the US and for the participation of Japan in PKO 
missions. But nevertheless he does accept one of the principal ideas of the global 
civilian power concept which is that Japan's chief contribution to international 
security should be by the use of economic power. 126 
Funabashi Yfiichi, however, as been the most faithful proponent to the 
concept of global civilian power in Japan. Funabashi argues that Japan's unusual 
'power portfolio' gives it the credentials to act as a new type of global civilian 
power, or Chikytl Minsei Taikoku, and states that: 
The widespread perception that the Gulf War actually underscored the 
supremacy of military power should not alter Japan's strategy of acting 
as a global civilian power. Japan should still search for various reasons 
to enhance its political power through economic strength, not military 
might. Such a strategy should again stimulate the perception of the 
changing nature of power in the world and the recognition and 
acceptance of Japan as a new power. l27 
Like Maull and Kosaka, Funabashi does not rule out completely Japan's 
support for UN peacekeeping operations, and he also concludes that the US-Japan 
125 Abha Tsuneo, 'Japan's security agenda in the post-cold war era', Pacific Review, vol. 8, no. I, 
1995, p. 47. 
126K6saka Masataka, Kosaka Masalaka Gaiko HyoronshQ, pp. 329, 336, 348. 
lZ7Funabashi Yl'lichi, 'Japan and the new world order', Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5, Winlcr 
1991-92, p. 67. 
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security alliance should be maintained. But unlike Kosaka, Funabashi sees the 
alliance only as a stop-gap measure to allow Japan to build a regional and UN 
centered security system. Funabashi feels that the post-Cold War security agenda 
is tailor-made for Japan's power resources. The low-intensity security problems of 
environmental destruction, refugee crises, environmental damage, economic 
dislocation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all ones 
which can be dealt with by a global civilian power.l28 
Therefore, the concept of global civilian power--defined here as the 
concentration by a state upon the use of economic tools of security policy--is 
fixed firmly in Japanese scholarship and shows that the strict divisions of theories 
in thinking about power and security are breaking down. Its acceptance in both 
Western and Japanese scholarship argues that the concept of the global civilian 
power is a suitable one to use in the investigation of the future of Japanese 
security policy and the utility of economic power. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored the course of the debates on security among policy-
makers in the West and Japan after the Cold War. It has revealed that there is a 
recognition in the US that economic power is of central importance in dealing 
with post-Cold War security problems, but that in Japan the debate is heavily 
contested between those policy-makers that wish to see an incremental expansion 
of Japan's military contribution to international security, and those who wish to 
defend the traditions of security policy based on conceptions of economic power. 
Examination of these debates reinforces the basic questions of this dissertation as 
to the future direction of global security. the role of economic power within it, 
and in what ways Japan can contribute to a stable global security environment. In 
particular. the question is raised of whether Japan can articulate a security policy 
128Funabashi ytlichi. Nihon no Taiga; Koso: Re;sengo no Bij;yon 0 Kaku. Ttlkyt.. Iwanami 
Shinsho. 1995. pp. 170-71.197-201. 
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based on economic power in the post-Cold War period and what are the policy-
making obstacles to this. 
This chapter then moved on to investigate the debate in Western and Japanese 
scholarship on the nature of power after the Cold War. The aim was to discover 
within the scholarship a conception of a state that uses economic power for 
security purposes, and which could then be used as a model to test the questions 
raised above concerning the utility of economic power as security policy and the 
future of Japan's security policy after the Cold War. By examining the basic tenets 
of realism, liberalism, and Marxism, it was found that they share an implicit 
emphasis on the importance of economic power. Discussion of the debate on 
hegemony also revealed that international politics theory after the Cold War is 
moving increasingly towards the view that economic power is now the 
determinant of great power status and international order. It was then shown how 
this realisation of the importance of economic power has produced in both the 
West and Japan the concept of the global civilian power, which uses economic 
power for security ends. Japan has been seen as a prime candidate for this type of 
security role in the post-Cold War era, and hence global civilian power provides 
the necessary concept with which to investigate the future of economic and 
Japanese security policy. In many ways, though, global civilian power still stands 
more as an ideal than as a detailed theoretical model, and in order to explore the 
full possibilities of economic power and Japanese security policy the concept of 
global civilian power needs to be refined to produce a complete model that can be 
applied to the case of Japan. This is the task of chapters two and three. 
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2 Theory of economic power and security 
The aim of the following chapter is to begin to construct a complete theoretical 
framework of economic power and security, and thus is the first step in moving 
towards giving shape to the model of global civilian power. The chapter begins by 
outlining the types of economic security policy and the key actors involved in 
formulating it. The chapter then moves on to consider the types of economic power 
and the different benefits of each to security. Next, the chapter considers the factors 
of vulnerability which govern the effectiveness of different types of economic 
power. Lastly, the chapter examines in tum each of the components of economic 
power to evaluate their relative utility for security policy. 
THE NATURE OF SECURITY 
Security can be defined as the protection of welfare from all forms of potential or 
actualised threats. As has been discussed already, military power was seen 
traditionally as the guarantor of security. However, the literature of international 
politics also makes it possible to conceptualise a security policy based upon 
economic power which fulfills the above aims, and which counters not just 
economic but also political and military threats. 
Three main types of economic security policy can be identified, but before 
describing these it is necessary to note that another dominant characteristic of the 
concept of security is that it has been and continues to be essentially the prerogative 
of the state. By this it is not meant that the discussion is concerned exclusively--as 
neo-realists thinkers would posit--with the survival and security of states 
themselves. For as Barry Buzan points out, it is necessary to take a 'holistic' view 
of security, to think of it above and below the level of the state, and to consider 
how to ensure the security of the international system and individuals as well. l 
1 Barry Buzan, People, StIles IlOd FN1/".' 71Je NlitiOt11il Si"Cun"ty Problem iJJ Inlemal:ioJJN Rellllio~ 
Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, p. 247. 
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Instead, the reason for concentrating on the state-centred concept of global civilian 
power is simply because the state has served traditionally as the main vehicle for 
mediation and adjustment between the different levels of security, and because it is 
the one actor which has been able to concentrate and wield power to form a 
consistent security policy. The provision of justice and security through the control 
of the legitimate means of violence have been the core responsibilities of states 
since the Middle Ages. Despite the gradual erosion of the state's monopoly on force 
and the 'democratisation' of the means of violence, marked most significantly by 
the phenomenon of terrorism in the contemporary period, the state still has access 
to the most powerful military weapons and retains its function as the provider of 
external military security and internal policing. Likewise. it can be argued that 
despite a corresponding erosion of the state's functions in the sphere of economics 
and the rise of competitors for influence such as transnational corporations. the 
major states continue as the largest economic actors. individually or in concert. and 
therefore will also be dominant in matters of economic security. 
The concept of global civilian power and economic power used in the service of 
security is, then, focused at the level of the state. However, even whilst 
concentrating the analysis at this level, the neo-realist trap of assuming states to be 
the sole and unitary actors in security needs to be avoided. The state can be defined 
as comprising the institutions of government, including the administration and 
legislature, and its physical base of population and wealth. But even though this 
gives the state as a global civilian power the capacity to act independently to use 
economic power for security purposes, it is also the case that it may enlist the 
support and borrow the economic strength of the types of economic actors outlined 
above which are often independent of the state's control. As will be seen in the 
discussion on the components of economic power and in chapter five, the state and 
its government institutions may do this in close partnership with other economic 
actors, or by creating the conditions whereby other economic actors participate in 
the state's security project but not with that specific intention in mind. The state is 
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thus the leader in economic security, but can also 'farm out' its security functions to 
other economic actors, such as TNCs (transnational corporations). Hence, later on 
when the idea of Japan as a global civilian power is analysed, this will refer not just 
to its government but also its other economic actors. 
Finally, it is not assumed that the state is a unitary actor in security. The global 
civilian power as a state actor is subject to checks upon the ex.ercise of economic 
power for security ends not only from the international environment, but also from 
internal domestic political factors, conflicts between government institutions, and 
interaction with non-state actors that have penetrated the state's policy-making 
procedures. Therefore, to understand the utility of the concept of global civilian 
power it is also necessary to consider the degree of control that a state can exercise 
over its economic power resources and the effect that the internal policy-making 
procedure has upon it. The importance of this idea is outlined in this chapter, and 
also dealt with in detail in chapter six when the restrictions of Japan's use of 
economic power in the case of North Korea are analysed in detail. 
TYPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC SECURITY 
The first of the three main types of economic security can be termed as economic 
security to prevent or minimise the occurrence of conflict between states. 
Essentially it consists of attempts to create a favourable security environment by the 
use of economic power. Given that general economic hardship or economic friction 
between states can generate domestic and international instability which can then 
feed through into inter-state economic and even military conflict, the basic objective 
of this type of economic security is to eliminate within and among states the sources 
of conflict that originate from economic problems. Hence, economic security to 
minimise and prevent conflicts will feature efforts to stabilise the international 
economy, and, in accordance with this, efforts to promote the stability of the 
economy of all states by policies of cooperation and wealth creation. 
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An example of this type of policy on the regional scale is the US Marshall Plan 
initiated in 1946 to provide capital for the reconstruction of the European economies 
and, in turn, to aid in the prevention of the spread of Communism.2 In the post-
Cold War period, this type of policy can be seen in the attempts by the major 
developed countries since the end of the Cold War to help in the reform of the 
economies of Eastern Europe and Russia. The aim of this policy has been to 
stabilise living standards, check political discontent in the form of the reemergence 
of communism, extreme nationalism and ethnic separatism, and to eliminate the 
attendant risks of military conflict and adventurism. On a smaller sub-regional 
scale. the extension of trading privileges to Turkey by the European Community in 
1995 is another example of preventive economic security policy. The obvious hope 
ofthe EU plan is to integrate the economy of Turkey into that of the EU. and thus 
ameliorate the causes of social, religious and ethnic conflict which threaten the 
stability of its neighbour and the security of its own borders. 
The second type of economic security policy is designed to protect a state in the 
event of a conflict with another state coming close to or actually occurring. This 
type of economic security policy can be further subdivided into two areas of policy 
aims and activities. The first of these is the role of economic security policy to 
defend against the deprivation of welfare brought about by economic. political or 
military conflict with another state. This involves efforts to withstand the economic 
and subsequent political crises that result from economic costs imposed by other 
states, such as the economic disruption that can be caused by the sudden denial of 
supply or sharp rise in price of strategic commodities necessary for a state's 
economy to function, and the types of embargoes. sanctions and blockades that 
typically accompany political confrontation and war. This subdivision of economic 
security policy is therefore concerned with the insulation of the state from external 
economic shocks, and can be observed in the attempts of states to secure supplies 
of vital goods during wartime. and more recently in the policies of collective 
2Susan Strange, Slates and Markets, London and New York, Pinter Publishers, 1994 (se<.'Ond 
edition), p. 104. 
71 
economic security put forward by developed nations in reaction to the deprivations 
of welfare threatened by the first Oil Shock of 1 cr!3 and the increasing control of 
key raw material supplies by developing nations} 
The second subdivision concerned with protecting a state's security in the event 
of a conflict reverses the position of the state as the subject of economic costs and 
makes it the imposer of economic cost. In the event of conflict, therefore, a state 
creates a policy which aims to inflict, or threatens to inflict, economic disruption on 
another state in order to force it to desist from a course of economic, political or 
military action which threatens the framer of the policy or other states. Hence, this 
policy is one of economic pressure in pursuit of security ends and usually revolves 
around the denial of essential economic resources to another state, such as access to 
key commodities, technology, trade, and capital. The resulting deprivation of 
welfare from this denial of economic resources denudes military potential and 
brings about domestic and international political repercussions which obligate the 
state to alter its behaviour. The results of this type of policy are, though, not always 
beneficial to the framer of the policy. It is arguable that economic pressure, as in the 
case of economic sanctions imposed on Japan by the US in the period preceding the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, can often produce changes in the action of 
states that merely harden their resolve to embark on the path of conflict. 
As mentioned above, the tools of economic pressure that are often employed in a 
conflict are embargoes, sanctions and blockades, all of which have a long history 
of use. In the post-Cold War period, prominent examples of these are the sanctions 
in place against the former Yugoslavia and against Iraq before and after the Gulf 
War. It is clear that these examples of economic sanctions although used in the 
service of security policy are not exclusively economic in nature, and that they have 
relied in part for their effectiveness upon military power which ensures that 
3For discussions of these problems in the 1970's, see Fred C. Bergsten, 'The threat from the Third 
World', Foreign Policy, no. II, Summer 1973, pp. 102·24; Stephen D. Krasner, 'Oil is the 
exception', Fred C. Bergsten, 'fhe threat is rcal', Foreign Policy, no. 14, Spring 1974, pp. 84-90; 
Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Collective economic security', InlerlUllional Affairs, vol. 50, no. 4, Summer 
1974. pp. 584-98; and Benison Varon and Takeuchi Kenji • 'Developing countries and non-fuel 
minerals'. Foreign Affairs. vol. 52. no. 3. April 1974. pp. 497-510. 
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sanctions concerned with the physical economic exchanges of goods and materials 
are enforced. As E. H. Carr observed, 'economic power is impotent if the military 
weapon is not held in readiness to support it. Power is indivisible.'4 But whilst it is 
true that these forms of economic pressure are often used in tandem with military 
power, it is also reasonable to argue that there may be instances where economic 
pressure on its own can produce some change in the behaviour of a state with 
resultant gains for security if the economic conditions are right. These conditions 
will be outlined later, but for the present it is suffice to note that there is moderate 
evidence to suggest that the sanctions imposed on South Africa which did not rely 
largely upon military power for their enforcement may have had an effect upon that 
state's political and military behaviour. 
The third type of economic security policy emphasises the connection between 
economic and military pressure, and can be classified as the use of economic power 
in direct support of military power which has been designated as the means with 
which to ensure security in all conflicts, potential or realised. In chapter one an 
explanation has already been given of how many political scientists from the 
classical realist school of thought have long regarded economic power as an adjunct 
to military power, and have seen its role as one of providing the necessary physical 
resources upon which to build military strength. In his exposition of economic 
power, Klaus Knorr points out that a state's economic potential can be used in 
support of its security policy by providing the base for the production of its own 
war materiel, and also by providing economic assistance in the form of military aid 
to other states in order to allow them to purchase arms or to develop their own 
weapon production capacity.5 
These common links between economic and military policy are undeniable and 
are a major feature of current thinking about security policy in many states. 
However, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether reliance 
4E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
London, Macmillan, 1951, p. 119. 
5Klauss Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power, London, 
Macmillan, 1973, pp. 163-n. 
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predominantly on economic power can provide sufficient guarantees of security. 
and consequently the intention here is to concentrate upon the first two definitions 
of economic security policy as these offer the greatest chances for a global civilian 
power of articulating a conception of security which is not dependent in the main 
upon military policy. 
TYPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC POWER 
The construction of economic security policy is based upon the existence and 
exercise of economic power. The next task is to elucidate the types of economic 
power. their nature. and their relevance to security policy. Scholarship on power in 
the fields of philosophy and social science is extensive and presents seemingly 
endless definitional permutations.6 On the other hand. scholarship in the field of 
international politics, whilst it has not entirely escaped from the tendency to put 
forward confusing definitions and redefinition's of power. does seem to have 
reached a consensus on a twofold typology of economic power. 
Indirect economic power 
The first type of power identified by scholars is a product of the growing 
interdependence witnessed in the global economy since the 1970's. and the idea 
that the very presence and weight of a state's economy provides it with what 
Funabashi Yoichi terms as senzairyoku or 'latent' power over other states.' The 
argument is that a state does not necessarily need to manipulate continuously and 
consciously its own economic resources in order for it to acquire economic power 
and its associated political benefits. Instead. simply the growth in scale and 
6For example, Kenneth Boulding presents three definitions of power: threat power. economic 
power and integrative power. John Kenneth Galbraith puts forward condign power, compensatory 
power and conditioned power. Dennis H. Wrong prefers the four categories of force, manipulation, 
persuasion and authority power. Kenneth Boulding. Three Faces 0/ Power. London. Sage 
Publications. 1989. p. 10~ John Kenneth Galbraith. The Anatomy of Power. Boston. Houghton 
and Mifflin Company. 1983, pp. 4-6; Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses. 
Oxford. Blackwell. 1979, p. 22. 
'Funabashi Y6ichi. Keizai AnzenhoshOron: Chikyfikeizaijidai no Pawd Ekollomikusu, T6ky6, 
T6y6 Keizai Shimbun, 1978. p. 189. 
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complexity of a state's economy and its growing connections with other states can 
be enough for it to accrue power and security. This type of power will often be 
expressed through a state's influence in international markets, economic regimes, 
and economic institutions. 
These types of arguments are found in the 1977 work of Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye: Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Keohane 
and Nye in their analysis of power comment that one way power can be conceived 
of is in 'terms of the control over outcomes'.8 At the time, the main concern of their 
work was to demonstrate how the growth of complex interdependence had begun 
to restrict the power of some states to resolve conflicts by force. But Keohane and 
Nye's arguments on power have also been employed in the debate over hegemony 
to support those who claim that the power of some states remains intact and 
supreme even though the nature of power itself has changed. The arguments of 
Russett outlined earlier emphasise that US power has been preserved due to its 
control over the type of outcomes described by Keohane and Nye, and are an 
attempt to show that power is increasingly dependent upon whether or not the 
international economic system works in line with a particular state's economic and 
political interests rather than upon its possession of narrower and more traditional 
indicators of economic strength.9 
Wading into the debate over hegemonic decline in his later work, Nye develops 
his own arguments about types of power accredited to a state due to the scale of its 
economic activity and interdependence with other states. 'Soft' or 'co-optive' 
power, Nye contends, is expressed indirectly by a state through the control of 
information; the setting of economic norms in the world economy, such as free 
trade and the headquartering of transnational corporations; and the production and 
dissemination of a universal culture. l 0 Nye's later ideas on soft power are, then, a 
8Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition, Boston and Toronto, Little Brown and Company, 1m, p. 11. 
9Bruce Russett, 'The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony or is Mark Twain really dead'l', 
IllternatiollalOrganizatioll, vol. 39, no. 2, 1985, p. 83. 
IOJoscph S. Nye Jr., 'Soft Power', Foreigll Policy, no. 80, Fall 1990, p. 169. 
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reaffirmation of the strain of thought which sees the power of a state as derived not 
only from the direct control of its economic resources, but also from the power that 
it receives indirectly from its penetration of other states economically, culturally, 
and ideologically. 
However, it is the arguments of Knorr and Strange that have set out the most 
coherent theoretical framework with which to describe the forms and operation of 
economic power. Knorr in his 1972 work Power and Wealth: The Political 
Economy of International Power recognised early on the importance of indirect 
forms of power and classed them as a type of 'non-coercive influence'. He defined 
'non-coercive influence' as the influence given to a state resulting from its ability to 
increase the choices of action for another state)l In other words, a certain state 
acquires influence by creating and shaping the environment in which other states 
function, with the result that states then tend to act broadly in concert with the 
interests of the creator of the environment. One of the ways in which Knorr saw 
states as able to influence the choice of others was through the extension of 
economic co-operation and linkages.12 
Susan Strange has built upon Knorr's concept of 'non-coercive influence' in her 
identification of the importance of structural power in the global political economy. 
Structural power is defined by Strange as the ability of an actor, 'to change the 
range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on 
them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others.'l3 More 
specifically, she argues that this power is the ability 'to shape and determine the 
global economy in which other states, political institutions and enterprises 
operate.'l4 It has already been seen how Strange argues that structural power is 
now the most important form of power in an interdependent world economy, and it 
is the US's exercise of it that continues to ensure its position as a global hegemon. 
1 lKlauss Knorr. Power and Wealth. p. 4. 
12KJauss Knorr. Power and Wealth. p. 7. 
13Susan Strange, States alld Markets. p. 31. 
14citcd in Eric Helleiner, 'Money and influence: Japanese power in the international monetary and 
financial system', in Kathleen Newland (cd.), The International Relations oj Japan, London, 
Macmillan. 1990, p. 23. 
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Strange's analysis is supported by the work of Gill and Law who concur that 
structural power, and particularly the structural power of capital, is preeminent. 15 
This view of power adopted in the scholarship allows the creation of a definition 
of economic power which unites the principal arguments of 'soft', 'non-coercive, 
and 'structural power', and which can be employed in the analysis of economic 
security policy. Thus, indirect economic power can be defined as the acquisition by 
a state, consciously or unconsciously, of the ability through the size and diversity 
of its economic linkages to influence indirectly the actions of another state by 
establishing the environment in which it operates and the possible ranges of its 
behaviour. In essence, as Kamo Takehiko points out, it is the ability of a state to 
establish the 'rules of the game' and norms of action for other states. 1 6 In a similar 
fashion to Knorr's analysis of non-coercive influence, the most likely outcome of a 
state's acquisition of a high degree of indirect economic power over another state is 
that it will move in line with the economic interests of that state because it does not 
generally see them as being at variance with its own. Moreover, indirect economic 
power should affect not only the economic behavior of a state, but also the social, 
political and even military action of states as the costs of non-compliance or 
independent action outside the 'rules of the game' induce conformity in behaviour. 
Clearly there is a potential for conflict with states that refuse to accede to the norms 
of economic behaviour, but it is arguable that in general this type of power 
relationship will be characterised by cooperation, integration, and interdependence. 
Direct economic power 
The second major categorisation of power that can be conceptualised and adopted 
for the aims of security policy is also present in the scholarship of Keohane and 
Nye, Knorr, and Strange. Keohane and Nye state that after the control of outcomes 
15saephen Gill and David Law, Th~ Global Political Economy: Perspl'Ctivts, Problems and 
Policies, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, p. 73; Stephen Gill, American 
Hegemony and lhe Trilateral Commission, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 63. 
16KamoTakehiko,Sekai Seij; 0 DO Miru Ka, T6ky6, Iwanami Shinsho, 1995, p. 64; Kokusai 
AnzenhosM no KosO, Tl'lky6, Iwanami Sholen, 1995, p. 157. 
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the next fonn of power is, 'the ability of an actor to get others to do something they 
would not otherwise do (at an acceptable cost to the actor)')7 Knorr highlights 
'coercive influence' or simply power, which is the ability of one state to reduce the 
choices of another, and in economic tenns saw it as the cutting off of aid and vital 
supplies by one state to another)8 Strange provides a definition of 'relational 
power' which matches that of Keohane and Nye, and Funabashi talks of 'manifest 
power' (meijiryoku»)9 This second type of power, then, involves the idea of the 
direct control of power resources by a state in order to achieve its objective of 
altering the behaviour of the subject of the power relationship to the benefit of the 
actor that wields the power. 
In economic terms, this can be defined as direct economic power, and the 
conscious manipulation by a state of its economic power resources to secure its 
own interests and to influence directly the behaviour of another state in order to 
change it to a course of action that it would nonnally not take on its own volition. 
The types of economic resources and linkages open to a state will be discussed 
later, but at this stage it is important to note that direct economic power is 
essentially a tool of persuasion, cajolement and pressure used in the service of a 
state, long or short tenn. Direct economic power works by the provision by one 
state to another of positive and negative inducements. Positive inducements, such 
as the extension by one state to another of trade and aid privileges, provide 
incentives for co-operation and compliance between states. Negative inducements, 
such as threats to remove a state's most favoured trading nation status, or, in 
extreme cases, the imposition of economic sanctions, are attempts by one state to 
force another into compliance with its interests. In a similar fashion to indirect 
forms of economic power, the exercise of direct economic power influences 
initially the economic behaviour of another state. But over time, as the impact of 
changes in economic behaviour and concomitant deprivations of welfare take effect, 
17Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., POtWrandlnlerde~nde"a, p. 11. 
18K1auss Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 4. 
19Susan Strange, Stales and Markels, p. 24; Funabashi yt'>ichi, Keiza; An:tnhmihOron, p. 189. 
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the political and military behaviour of a state may also begin to change. although the 
results of this are unpredictable. The direct manipulation of economic power 
through the offering of negative and positive inducements can be seen to involve 
the hannonisation as well as the confrontation of interests between states. But it is 
also clear that the exercise of direct economic power is more difficult and expensive 
than indirect forms over the long term. This is because for direct power to achieve 
the same magnitude of effect as indirect power a state needs to maintain and bear 
constantly the various economic and political costs of offering negative and positive 
inducements. For instance. the extension of aid by one state to another will produce 
co-operation between states as long as the policy can be maintained, or if the aid 
then generates indirect forms of power which continue the process of integration 
and harmonisation. But cessation of aid programmes over the short term may also 
terminate their security effects. diminish the influence of one state over another and 
reproduce the conditions for conflict.2o In the same way, and as the coalition 
powers have experienced since the surrender of Iraq in the Gulf War, the 
imposition of sanctions by one state on another over a long period may become 
more costly economically and politically for both sides. but the impact and degree 
of effect on the behaviour of a state can become progressively weaker as time 
passes. This is due to a number of factors governing the effectiveness of all types 
of economic power explained below. The key point here. though. is that direct 
economic power may involve greater difficulties for security policy over time 
compared with the effects of indirect power and accompanying 'norms' of 
behaviour that tend towards long term harmonisation and elimination of conflict. 
Up to this point the two forms of indirect and direct economic power and their 
chief characteristics have been identified. These findings are summarised in Table 
1. However. in many cases it is often difficult to maintain these strict theoretical 
20As Klaus Knorr points out, during the Cold War when there were competing donors of aid, 
decisions by the US not to extend economic and military aid meant that it risked incurring 
strdtegic and political costs as countries looked to alternative sources for economic assistance. One 
notable example of this is Egypt's decision from the mid-1950's onwards to seek aid from the 
Soviet Union after the US in 1956 withdrew offers to fund the Aswan High Dam Project. Klauss 
Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp. 175, 186. 
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divisions between types of power as they shade into and overlap with each other. 
One example of this is that if direct economic power to offer positive inducements 
is used over a long enough period of time, the rules of behaviour and benefits 
associated with it may become accepted as economic norms or the 'rules of the 
game' and in its effects it may become indistinguishable from indirect economic 
power. This demonstrates that the relationship between indirect and direct economic 
power is close and often interchangeable. As a consequence, indirect economic 
power is likely to be often created through the operation of direct economic power, 
and, in tum, the use of direct economic power will draw upon indirect economic 
power for its strength and the magnitude of its effect. The global civilian power, 
therefore. will have to have command of both indirect and direct forms of power if 
it is to create a truly successful security policy based on economic power. 
Table 1: Definitions and characteristics of types of economic power 
Type of economic 
power 
I ndi reel economic 
power 
Direct economic 
power 
Definition 
The acquisition by a state of the ability 
through the size and diversity of its 
economic linkages to influence indirectly 
the actions of another state by establishing 
the economic environment in which it 
operates in and the possible ranges of iLIJ 
behaviour 
The acquisition by a state of the ability to 
manipulate consciously iL'i economic power 
to secure iLIJ own interests and to influence 
directly the behaviour of another state in 
order to change it to a course of action that 
it would not normally take on itlJ own 
volition 
Chamcteristics 
Economic coopcmtion, 
integration and 
interdependence 
Provision of positive and 
negative inducements to other 
states 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND THE TYPES OF 
ECONOMIC POWER 
Having produced typologies of economic security and economic power it is 
essential to examine how they relate to each other and the utility of economic power 
for the security policy of a state. A summary of the discussion in this section is 
provided in Table 2. 
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The first category of economic security policy is intended to minimise or 
eliminate the occurrence of conflict among and between states by creating a 
favourable security environment based on a favourable economic environment. 
Both indirect and direct forms of economic power should be adaptable to the aims 
of this policy. Indirect economic power, as has been seen, is characterised by the 
acceptance of economic norms amongst states, and results in the growth of 
cooperative ties which then alleviate the sources of conflict amongst states and 
restrains them from threatening actions towards one other. Direct economic power 
can be used to reinforce and build the conflict-reducing ties between states of 
indirect economic power. In a sense, and on the grand regional scale, the whole 
project of European integration under the EU is an attempt to provide all the states 
of Europe with indirect and direct economic power over each other's behaviour in 
order to remove the economic and political origins of conflict which have been the 
partial cause of two world wars in the region. On a smaller scale, and has already 
been described, one of the rationales behind the offering of positive economic 
inducements by the EU to Turkey has been to build economic linkages between the 
two, and then to generate the necessary economic wealth within Turkey to reduce 
political instability--a clear example of direct and indirect economic power used in 
support of security policy to prevent conflict. 
The second main category of economic security policy is that designed for the 
protection of a state in the event of a conflict, either defensively or offensively. The 
first subdivision of this policy was the use of economic security for defence in the 
event of the threatened or actual deprivation of vital economic resources and 
welfare, with implications for social and political stability within a state. In order to 
counter these types of threat, direct economic power can be expected to playa 
major role in allowing a state to effectively marshal its resources, limit economic 
damage and weather any potential crises. Indirect economic power also can be 
thought to be important in providing a state with the depth and flexibility of 
economic relations through its part in establishing control of the general economic 
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environment. This type of power will allow a state to procure economic resources 
from different sources and maintain its own economic stability. Thus, it can be seen 
that although the first Oil Shock of 1973 impacted upon the US with severe effects 
initially, over the long term the US was able to use its direct and indirect economic 
power to obtain stable supplies of oil at favourable prices. 
The second subdivision of economic security policy for the protection of a state 
in the event of conflict was defined as the use of economic power to change a 
state's actions in the event of a conflict coming close to or actually occurring. In 
this case direct economic power plays the most prominent role. Direct power allows 
a state through control of economic resources to impose economic embargoes or 
sanctions on another state, while indirect economic power serves as the power 
reserve from which to mobilise this direct economic power. Examples of this type 
of use of direct economic power in attempt to dissuade a state from embarking on a 
conflict are numerous. A representative example of this type of pressure is the use 
by the US of its indirect economic power and influence within the global financial 
system which allowed it to mobilise direct economic power and impose punitive 
sanctions on Iranian capital following the anti-Shah revol ution of 1 Cf79. 
Table 2: The relationship between economic security policy and effectiveness of 
types of economic power 
Economic sccunty policy 
aims 
Ensure the security of a stale 
by the prevention of the 
outbreak of conflict 
Ensure the security of a state 
in the event of a conflict by 
the use of economic pressure 
Ensure the security of a state 
in the event of a conflict by 
limiting economic damage 
Effectiveness of Effectiveness of Factors Limiting the 
indirect direct economic effectivenes.'! of economic 
economic power power 
power 
Very high 
Low 
Low 
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High 
Very high 
High 
Vulnerability of the state upon 
which economic power is 
applied, including factors of 
resilience, adjustment, 
substitution, availability. The 
dcgree of control that an 
individual state can exert ovcr 
the component'! of economic 
power 
as above 
as above 
FACTORS DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC 
POWER 
To identify types of economic power and their likely association with types of 
economic security policy does not, though, explain all the factors which determine 
the effectiveness of economic power. In order to provide a guideline for doing so it 
is necessary again to tum to the scholarship on interdependence and power. The 
aim of this scholarship, as pointed out earlier, has been to describe the gradual 
divorce of economic power from state control and to demonstrate how the growth 
of interdependence has limited the ability of states to initiate conflicts 
independently. Hence, interdependency theory would seem to be alien to a 'state-
centred' view of power related to questions of security policy. But at the same time 
as interdependency theory professes these objectives, its elevation of 
interdependency to the position of a key factor in relations between states which 
limits the use of military power, not only points to the importance of economic 
power as an alternative form of security policy, hut also provides important insights 
into the efficacy of economic power and the factors that lie behind it. 
Vulnerability 
Keohane and Nye define dependence as 'a state of being determined or significantly 
affected by external forces', and interdependence as mutual dependence resulting 
from flows between states of money, goods, people and information. But they are 
also at pains to add that interdependency is different from interconnectedness in that 
it involves real cost if the links are cut, and that these costs are not merely economic 
but also social and political in nature--namely, the politics of interdependence.21 
The crucial point which relates here to the effectiveness of economic power is that it 
will be determined in accordance with the depth of economic links between states 
and the known b~nefits of these links, or conversely the costs of damaging these 
links. If economic power is dependent upon the actual or potential costs of 
21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Powerandlnterdependence, p. 8. 
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establishing and cutting economic linkages, then the implication is that the utility of 
economic security policy will be conditional upon the degree of costs that, firstly, 
can be imposed upon a state by another through its direct and indirect economic 
power, and, secondly, the degree of costs that can be borne by a state without 
changing its behaviour when subject to these types of economic power. 
By its delineation of the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability, 
interdependency theory also aids in understanding the degrees of cost imposed or 
borne. Keohane and Nye state that sensitivity refers to 'responses within a policy 
framework [and] how quickly [do] changes in one country bring costly changes in 
another and how great are the costly effects.'22 Consequently, the developed 
economic nations of the US, Europe and Japan can be said to have been sensitive to 
the rise in oil prices and the feared shortage of a vital economic commodity 
following the first Oil Shock of 1973. Sensitivity is, though, limited in scope and 
not necessarily sufficient to ensure changes in the behaviour of states over the long 
term. As Kenneth Waltz points out in his evaluation of interdependency theory, 
states may be sensitive to economic changes in economic conditions, but they often 
possess sufficient power to withstand them and are not truly vulnerable to 
economic shocks.23 Keohane and Nye allow for this factor by putting forward the 
concept of vulnerability which is 'an actor's ability to suffer costs imposed by 
external forces.'24 This can be re-expressed as the potential to withstand economic 
change without altering long term economic, social, political and even military 
behaviour. The developed economic states of the North, therefore, demonstrated 
sensitivity to the first Oil Shock, but only limited vulnerability over the longer term 
to the rise in oil prices, and the ability to avoid altering the fundamental course of 
their behaviour. 
22Robert o. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., POlWrandlnterdependence, p. 12. 
23Kenneth N. Waltz. Theory oj International Politics, London, Addison Wesley, 1979, pp. 140-
42. 
24Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., PowerandlnJerdependence, p. 13. 
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Determinants of vulnerability: resilience, adjustment, substitution, 
availability 
Vulnerability is, then, the key concept in explaining the effectiveness of economic 
power in pursuit of security policy. The limits of vulnerability have been elucidated 
by Funabashi yoichi. His ideas, although originally applied only to issues of 
economic defence in the event of a conflict, also are useful for understanding the 
effectiveness of economic power in all security scenarios. Funabashi identifies four 
factors which dictate the limits of vulnerability, and which provide taishino;;ei, or 
'tremor-proofing' for a state's economy.25 
The first of these is 'resilience' (danryokusei). It is the ability of an economy to 
withstand the initial shock of the curtailment of economic links and to suffer the 
consequent deprivation of welfare over the long term without changing its 
behaviour. The Iraqi government, if not the Iraqi population, has shown a 
remarkable degree of resilience in its will to endure the UN sanctions imposed since 
1990. The second factor is 'adjustment' (ch/Jseiryoku), or the ability to make up for 
the loss of economic links and welfare by the use of the state's own resources. 
Examples of this adjustment include the stockpiles of strategic commodities held by 
developed nations to cope with sudden rises in price or denial of supply. The third 
factor is 'substitution' (daisansei), and is the ability to cope with the denial of 
access to economic activity and resources by substituting them with domestically 
produced forms. An example of this is South Africa's ability to manufacture its 
own sophisticated weapons despite embargoes on the export of arms and 
technology. These first three factors indicate that a state possesses a measure of 
self-sufficiency, or jikyDsei. 26 Funabashi's concept corresponds to that of autarky 
found in the work of realist political scientists, which suggests that states seek to 
reduce vulnerability so as to be able to resist economic pressure.27 However, as 
Funabashi argues, too great a degree of jikyDsei and avoidance of dependence on 
2Spunabashi Y()ichi, Keizai AnzenhosMron, p. 211. 
26Funabashi Y()ichi, Keizai AnzenhosMron, p. 212. 
27E. H. Carr, Th~ Tw~nty Years' Crisis, p. 120; Kenneth N. Waltz, Th~ory o/Illternational 
Politics, p. 104. 
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economic relations with other states may in the end have negative results. As a state 
strives for self sufficiency, this can rob its economy of the vibrancy derived from 
external contacts and competition, weakening its economic power, and, 
paradoxically, placing the state in a position where it may have to become more 
dependent on other states.28 The case study of the North Korean economy 
presented later on illustrates clearly this type of situation. The final factor is 
'availability' (aben1biriti) and refers to a state's capability to create alternative forms 
of economic links and sources of activity when they are denied to it by certain 
states. Until the end of the 1980's, and still to some extent in the 1990's, Cuba has 
ensured this factor of availability by defying the US embargo and forging trading 
links first with the Soviet bloc and then with a variety of nations in Europe and 
Asia.29 
Therefore, although perhaps not obvious at first sight, interdependency theory 
provides important indicators for judging the likely effectiveness of direct and 
indirect economic power. A central concept in determining the efficacy of these 
forms of power is the cost that can be borne or foregone by both the exerciser and 
subject of economic power and security policy. In turn, this is dependent upon 
degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability, which are then determined by the factors of 
resilience, adjustment, substitution, and availability. 
CONTROL OF ECONOMIC POWER 
The other central concept in evaluating the effectiveness of economic power is the 
degree of control that a state can exert over the forms of direct and indirect power, 
and thus the power and security benefits that accrue to it. It can be supposed that 
direct forms of power and their components will be easier to manipulate because 
they typically involve the offering of positive and negative sanctions to other states 
and so fall within the state's control. Indirect power, whilst offering greater 
28Funabashi Yl'lichi. Keizai AnzenhosMron, p. 214. 
29por details on the US embargo and policy of economic warfare against Castro's regime in the 
1960's see, K1auss Knorr Power and Wealth, pp. 146-149. 
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security benefits, will be harder to control due to its often intangible nature, the 
difficulty of altering intentionally the 'rules of the game' which have often been 
made under conditions of interdependency, and the presence of other economic 
actors who mayor may not cooperate with a state's aims. 
In order to understand the varying degrees to which states can exert control over 
and contrive to use these forms of economic power for their security interests it is 
necessary to look inside the internal structure of the states, and in particular at the 
policy-making process. As stated earlier, the concept of global civilian power and 
state-centred security should not assume states to be unitary actors. The very 
knowledge that states may have to build indirect economic power with the support 
of other economic actors, leads to the obvious conclusion that one of the 
determinants of a state's economic security will be how it may control or work in 
partnership with a TNC, and what are the policy-making difficulties for this. 
Moreover, to control direct economic power and to offer positive and negative 
sanctions will also involve a process of bargaining inside a state's economic and 
security policy-making community. The skill of a state in manipUlating economic 
power for security will depend, then, on the characteristics of its policy-making 
process, the different actors involved, and whether they perceive security problems 
capable of being solved by economic power. 
In the following section on the components of economic power the question of 
control by states is addressed, but the only way to truly investigate the problem is 
to look at the policy-making process of individual countries. Such an investigation 
will be carried out in chapter three for the case of Japan, but in the meantime it is 
reasonable to conjecture that a centrally planned or command economy will allow a 
state the maximum measure of control over direct power resources, whereas its 
control over indirect power resources will be limited outside its own economic 
bloc. On the other hand, a free market economy will perhaps possess large amounts 
of indirect power through the liberalised and internationalised nature of its 
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economic links, but may lack the ability to control them and convert them into direct 
power. 
COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC POWER 
Mter having laid out typologies of economic security, economic power, and the 
conditions of their effectiveness, the final stage in conceptualising economic 
security policy is to categorise the economic power resources which act as the 
components of economic power. Laying out in this chapter a scheme of the 
components of economic power will provide a comprehensive overview of what 
types of power states can draw upon for security, and also the framework for 
analysing the extent of Japanese economic power in chapter three. A summary of 
the following discussion is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3: The main components of economic power and the power accruing to states 
Component of economic 
power 
Production 
Finance 
Trade 
Energy 
Communications 
Aid 
Production 
Degree of indirect power 
accruing to a state 
High 
High 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Degree of direct power 
accruing to a state 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
High 
High 
Susan Strange defines the production structure as, 'the sum of all arrangements 
determining what is produced by whom and for whom, by what method and on 
what terms.'30 Production is the source of wealth creation and the material basis for 
the formation of all societies. As such it is the foundation of political economy, 
and, historically, powerful states and ruling groups within the states themselves 
have controlled or been associated with the control of the production structure} I 
Wealth creation endows states with the resources, welfare, and public goods that 
30susan Strange, Stales and Markets, p. 64. 
31 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, 
New York. Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 18. 
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on a domestic level allow it to generate stability and support, and on the 
international level translate into economic, political and military power. Thus, any 
change in the production and wealth creation structures is likely to be accompanied 
by changes in the power relations within and between states. 
The production structure of most states since the late eighteenth century has 
undergone two major changes. The first of these was the move to industrialised 
production and market-oriented economies. This change has not been uniform, 
with some states proceeding at a slower pace, or choosing non-market oriented 
industrial production structures. The second major change in the production 
structure has been the internationalisation of production and the rise of MNCs 
(multinational corporations), or TNCs. This process of change also has been 
uneven and resisted by some states. However, its impact upon the power of states 
and economic security policy may be great, and the role of TNCs is the main 
concern of this section. 
In Robert Gilpin's words, a TNC can be defined simply as a 'firm that owns 
and manages economic units in two or more countries.t32 TNCs are of three main 
types: extractive, manufacturing and services; and the presence of a home state's 
TNC in a host state is in the form of subsidiary companies and FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment). The recent history of TNCs has seen the expansion of US based 
TNCs into Europe and the Middle East in the 1960's; followed by the rise of 
European, Japanese and developing nation TNCs in the 1970's and 1980's; and 
then a 'New Multinationalism' from the mid-1980's until the present day, marked 
by joint ventures and cooperation between these firms and the host states.33 By 
1969, American multinationals produced approximately $140 billion worth of 
goods, more than any national economy except for the US and the USSR. In 
addition, according to some estimates, by 1975 the world's fifty largest 
corporations accounted for ten to fifteen percent of the industrial output of the non-
32Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 231. 
33Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of Inlernational Relations, pp. 232, 255-60. 
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communist world, and by 19'ir7 TNCs employed thirty million of the ninety million 
manufacturing workers in OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries.34 The motivations behind the internationalisation of 
production are varied. Corporations have sought to secure markets and to avoid 
trade barriers, as in the case of the move to production inside the EU by US-based 
TNCs in the 1960's, and then by Japanese TNCs in the 1980's. Some 
corporations, such as those Japanese TNCs that have moved to offshore production 
in China and Southeast Asia in the late 1980's and early 1990's, have sought lower 
production costs. Another explanation put forward by John Kenneth Galbraith is 
the simple human desire of TNC executives to acquire international prestige and 
power.35 
Scholarly opinion and the states themselves are split over the benefits and effects 
that the internationalisation of production has had upon the interests and power of 
states. Groups within states, especially governing elites and organised labour, often 
view FDI as a threat to their vested interests. In the past, socialist states controlled 
or shut out foreign investment altogether, whilst other states, like India, tried to 
restrict the flow. The concerns of governing elites and states revolve around two 
issues. The first of these is the economic benefits that TNCs bring to a host 
country. Opinion is divided over whether TNCs deliver economic development 
over the long term, or whether they retard development through exploitation and 
mismanagement of technology. The second issue is one of power. As the case 
study in chapter five of North Korea's programme to reform its economy will 
show, the fear of host states is that TNCs can represent an invasion of sovereignty, 
and, as Raymond Vernon notes, leave the state 'naked' .36 This issue is relevant to 
the construction of security policy and will be discussed next. 
34Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 239; Stephen Gill and 
David Law, The Global Political Economy, pp. 193-4. 
35John Kenneth Galbraith and Nicole Salinger, Almost Everyone's Guide 10 Economics, Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 1978, p. 69. 
36Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of us Enterprises, New York 
and London, Basic Books, 1971, p. 3. 
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The penetration of a host state's economy by a TNC creates a dependency 
relationship between both actors. The TNC acquires a degree of influence over the 
production and wealth creation structure of the host state, and, therefore, a degree 
of influence over the economic and political behaviour of the host state and its 
governing groups. The power of the TNC is potentially very great as it possesses 
ready access to the technology, capital and foreign markets which the host states 
believes that it requires for its economy to function. Indeed, some scholars now 
argue that TNCs rival states in their ability to conduct an independent diplomatic 
policy, and should be seen as an actor equal to states in many aspects of political 
economy.37 
The impact of TNCs upon the power of states is twofold. Firstly, TNCs can 
hold indirect power over a state. The weight of their presence and the business 
practices that they employ can come to dominate vital sectors of the host state's 
economy and spread an ideology of production and wealth creation that threatens to 
displace that of the governing elite. This indirect power can be seen as particularly 
threatening if it is associated with and reinforces integration into and 
interdependency with the economic and political interests of the TNC's home state. 
In certain states one fear expressed in connection with the flow of FDI from US-
based multinationals is that it may transmit competing ideologies of free trade and 
democracy, and provide the US government with a form of indirect power. The 
attitude of ruling elites and states towards FDI tends, then, to be ambivalent. 
Preservation of domestic stability and power may be dependent upon the wealth 
creating opportunities that TNC investment offers, but the presence of a TNC can 
represent indirect power for another state and an alternative ideology that threatens 
the legitimate position of the governing elite.38 The recognition of this fact is one 
reason behind China's attempts to concentrate foreign investment in Special 
37For examples of these types of view see, John Kenneth Galbraith, Almost Everyone's Guide to 
Economics, pp. 69-70; Susan Strange, 'Rethinking structural change in the international political 
economy: states, firms and diplomacy'. in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R D. Underhill (cds.), 
Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 1 (J7. 
38Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, pp. 197-223. 
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Economic Zones, which offer the advantage of promoting economic growth whilst 
restricting the spread of foreign ideology. 
TNCs also have an impact in the area of direct economic power. Gilpin notes 
that the penetration of a host state's economy has, 'opened the possibility of home 
states utilising and manipulating [FDI and multinationals] in order to achieve 
foreign policy and other objectives.t39 If the home state can control the resources of 
a TNC then it would possess the ability to offer both negative and positive 
incentives to home states by providing and denying access to vital foreign markets, 
raw materials and technology. The outcome of this would be that the home state 
acquires the direct economic power to influence the economic and political 
behaviour of the host state. 
It is clear that the home states of TNCs recognise these corporations' potential as 
a component of economic power. Gilpin points out a number of ways in which the 
US has colluded with its TNCs with the aim of using them to exert the state's 
power abroad. The US government has looked to foster the growth of its TNCs in 
order to secure the US's supply of strategic raw materials, to maintain access of all 
US firms to foreign markets, to help with the US balance of payments, and in 
certain cases to promote its foreign policy.40 One notable example of this was the 
attempt by President Ronald Reagan's administration to pressure US multinationals 
to deny the Soviet Union technology needed for the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline 
project.41 
But it is also clear that TNCs, although potentially very powerful allies for a 
home state, may not always be willing allies, and that there are limits to the direct 
and indirect power that a home state can derive from its TNCs. The argument that a 
home state can control its TNCs really seems to hinge on the idea that the 
corporation's top management personnel are recruited from the home state and that 
when called upon to cooperate with state policy will fulfill their obligations as loyal 
3~obert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 238. 
4~obert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of 
Foreign Direct Investment, New York, Basic Books, 1975, p. 147. 
4 I Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 208. 
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citizens. More formal controls on TNC behaviour may be of limited utility due to 
the internationally mobile nature of the corporations and their ability to transfer 
operations to states more sympathetic with their business interests. But the loyalty 
of the management of a TNC to its home state is not assured. Kenneth Waltz states 
that the large number of TNCs headquartered in the US means that, 'it is reasonable 
to expect that in making corporate decisions the American perspective will be the 
dominant one.'42 In 1987, Susan Strange was confident that TNC top management 
would be loyal to the home state, but by 1995 she had reached the opinion that, 'the 
loyalty of the TNC itself to the governments is no longer something that can be 
taken for granted.'43 In most cases TNC management is likely to follow the wishes 
of the home government, but only when they coincide with their own. The loyalty 
ofTNC management is difficult to gauge and likely to vary from state to state and 
to be dependent upon differences in the strength of national identity. In cases where 
the home state policy goes against the interests of the TNC the corporation may be 
likely to grudgingly cooperate or even to ignore the wishes of the home state. 
Strange's 1995 comment probably also reflects knowledge of the fact that as the 
processes of 'globalisation' and 'glocalisation' continue then the top management 
ofTNCs will also move with these trends and will no longer be drawn exclusively 
from the 'home' state. The ties of loyalty between state and corporation will further 
be eroded and the TNC's use as an element of direct economic power restricted. In 
fact the very terms home state and host state may become a misnomer as TNCs 
break free increasingly from the restrictions of the institutions and idea of the state. 
TNCs may keep a physical presence in their original home state, but in many cases 
will be--to reverse metaphors--in a happy limbo of 'statelessness'; able to influence 
policy in the home state, but with no real responsibility to the security of it. 
The processes of 'globalisation' and 'glocalisation' may also alter the indirect 
power effects ofTNCs. As the TNC's work force becomes more internationalised 
42Kenneth N. Waltz, Theoryoflntemational Politics, p. 151. 
43Susan Strange, Pfhe persistent myth of lost American hegemony', International Organization, 
1987, vol. 41, no. 4, p. 567; StatesandMarktts, pp. 83-4. 
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and its products move towards further standardisation for world markets, so the 
ideology of the TNC may lose its distinct characteristics and association with the 
original home state. The contrast in ideologies between that of the corporation's 
home state and the host state may no longer be transmitted by the agency of the 
TNCs as its products and business cease to mirror that of the home state. In this 
instance, indirect power for the home state may be weakened, but still the 
integrative effects of a TNC's presence may remain but they will not be attributable 
to the home state. This type of problem has already been outlined in connection 
with the conception of 'soft power'. An integrative ideology or culture may be 
transmitted through the economic links and products of a TNC, but there is no 
reason to suppose that the recipients of this culture will associate it with that of the 
corporation's home state in a situation of advanced globalisation. 
The second set of limits to the power of the TNCs is the host state's 
vulnerability. Whilst TNCs often provide essential opportunities for economic 
growth and can undermine the power of states, host states still have the ability to 
moderate their influence. States may for instance display resilience and be willing to 
forgo the potential benefits of economic contacts with TNCs. To some extent this 
will depend upon the size of the host state's economy and whether TNCs account 
for a large part of its production or provide key technologies. But even in states 
where the TNC's economic role is very large their power can be curbed. It was 
discussed earlier how some states have chosen to shut out TNCs or to restrict the 
levels of their investment. In extreme cases, states have also resorted to 
nationalisation to shift the terms of power between themselves and the TNCs. After 
1969, with the aim of protecting its national interests, Libya pursued a policy of 
threatening to nationalise foreign oil companies if they did not cut production and 
raise prices.44 
If states find that they cannot go without the benefits of international production 
then they may substitute foreign-owned private TNCs for their national controlled 
44susan Strange, States and Markets, p. 200. 
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versions; Italy's state-owned ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) being one notable 
example of this.45 Host states can also exercise availability by allowing TNCs to 
compete for the right to invest in the host state. The ability of a state to negotiate 
investment conditions favourable to its interests, though, will be affected by the 
value of the host state's market or raw material reserves. 
The evidence suggests that the internationalisation of production and TNCs may 
be useful components of economic power to be used in the service of security 
policy. The spread ofTNCs and their ideology can result in integration of the host 
state into the global political-economy, with benefits for stability and security. The 
direct power to be derived from TNCs could provide a home state with a tool to aid 
in promoting stability, to secure the home state's economic interests in a conflict, 
and as a form of economic pressure to resolve conflicts. However, the limitations 
of control and vulnerability affect the utility of TNCs as a component of economic 
power. Moreover, as with all economic relations, the relation between the TNC's 
home and host states contains the potential for conflict. FDI is a particularly 
emotive issue for many states, related to concerns about 'neo-imperialism' and 
external control. Relations not only between developing and developed states, but 
also between states at the same level of development are prone to these types of 
fears and tensions. 
Finance 
The creation and flow of credit through the agency of financial institutions and 
monetary systems is essential for the functioning of an industrialised and trading 
economy. Credit enables borrowing and lending for investment and consumption, 
and capital to be moved to the most productive areas of the domestic and 
international economy. Thus, credit affects greatly the level of production and 
wealth creation possible within an economy, and its absence or abundance makes 
for major economic costs and benefits. 
45R,aymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay, p. 35. 
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In turn, the creation and flow of credit also has important distributive effects 
upon the power of states. The previous section has outlined the connection between 
production and economic and political power. If power is dependent upon wealth 
creation, and credit is a key element in this process, then it follows that a state that 
holds the power to deny or supply to other states access to credit creation and flows 
of credit, also holds the power to influence the production, wealth creation, and 
political behaviour of other states. Scholars from all schools of thought, whether of 
a Gramscian viewpoint or engaged in the debate over hegemonic decline, agree that 
finance and monetary systems are crucial in the ordering of the economic and 
political power of states. As Gilpin notes, no financial system can be judged to be 
neutral in its effects on power.46 Moreover, contemporary scholarship indicates 
that as the volume of financial transactions increases (the value of financial 
transactions already exceeds the value of world trade several times), then so will the 
importance and complexity of this component of economic power. 
The nature and growing importance of the financial structure has, therefore, two 
main consequences for states. Firstly, it can be expected that states will receive 
differing benefits and differing degrees of direct and indirect power from the 
financial and monetary systems; and, secondly, that knowledge of this will lead 
states to attempt to control these systems and to shape them to serve their interests. 
The next step is to examine what types of indirect and direct power these economic 
components confer upon a state, the extent to which states can influence them, and 
their utility for security policy. 
Susan Strange observes that the financial structure has two inseparable aspects: 
the structures of the political economy which create credit; and the monetary system 
in which credit is denominated and through which it flows.47 A brief explanation of 
both of these should reveal the types and limits of power they yield to states. The 
structures of political economy that create credit can be thought of as private banks, 
international institutions and, of course, the governments of states, which can 
46Robert Gilpin. The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 119. 
47Susan Strange. States and Markets. p. 90. 
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create credit in their own right and which regulate the functions of the first two. The 
typical instruments which they use to create credit are loans and bonds. The 
government also possesses the other instrument of aid, but this along with its loan 
functions will be dealt with in a later section devoted to this component of power. 
At this point consideration will be given to the influence of transactions on the 
private level and the power that a state can derive from them. 
The initiation of a loan or investment leads to the creation of a two-way 
dependency relationship between creditor and debtor. In theory, a loan should 
provide a creditor with direct power over a debtor, either on the private institutional 
or state level. This is because the debtor is now dependent upon the creditor for the 
necessary supply of credit, and because the creditor has the ability both to set the 
terms the loan and to terminate the loan if it deems the terms not to have been 
fulfilled. If a private bank in state A lends to the private banks or government of 
state B, it then acquires the ability to cut-off or expand the credit of state Band 
potentially influence its economic and political behaviour. The private bank of state 
A can then be said to possess a measure of direct economic power. This 
arrangement should also provide the government of state A with direct economic 
power; albeit through the agency of the private creditor based in its territory. The 
private bank or creditor is likely to some degree to be subject to the laws and 
regulations of state A, and if state A can use this regulatory power to exert control 
over the creditor, it can also influence the behaviour of state B by proxy, and 
provide itself with a tool of direct economic power. 
In practice, however, the extension of credit by one state to another through its 
private credit institutions may not provide it with such effective direct economic 
power. As with the case of the production structure, the effectiveness of the power 
of credit creation is subject to the limitations of vulnerability and control. 
Although the initiation of a loan does create a condition of dependency between 
creditor and debtor, this does not automatically lead to the control of creditor over 
debtor. As the case of North Korea will reveal in chapter five, the debtor may 
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refuse to repay the loan and exercise resilience in the face of the probable loss of 
access to further credit; or the debtor might find availability by obtaining loans from 
alternative creditors and on better terms. In extreme cases the direct power of the 
creditor might be broken or reversed completely. If the loan is of a large enough 
size and the creditor commits a large enough proportion of its resources, this may 
lead to overstretch, and expose it to threats by the debtor to refuse to pay back 
loans. The creditor's fear of its own financial collapse may persuade it to 
renegotiate the terms of the loan with the debtor, and direct power begins to shift 
from the creditor to the debtor. 
The issue of control of finance is also crucial. For a state to be able to exercise 
direct economic power it needs to be able to influence the institutions and 
mechanisms of credit creation, such as private banks and international credit 
organisations, and the tenns on which they offer credit. The extent of the control of 
banks and institutions is likely to vary from state to state, and it is apparent that 
with the increasing mobility of international capital and liberalisation of the financial 
system since the 1970's that states are finding it more and more difficult to exert 
contro1.48 The collapse of Barings Bank in early 1995 was one indication that the 
spread of new financial instruments and the global nature of banking has possibly 
exceeded the regulatory power of states as well as the banks themselves. The extent 
of direct economic power to be derived from the financial instruments of loans and 
bonds will also depend upon the terms of their provision. Some loans, for instance, 
may be made for long periods of time, and while they create a lasting dependency 
relationship, they may also be set on terms which mean that they cannot be used at 
short notice to bolster direct economic power. 
Recent evidence highlights the problematic connection between credit creation 
and direct economic power. The debt crisis of the early 1980's demonstrated how 
developing nations, by threatening to default on loans made by the banks of the 
developed nations, reversed partly the power relationship of debtor and creditor. 
48Louis W. Pauly, 'Capital mobility, state autonomy and political legitimacy', Journal of 
ImernaJionalAjfairs, vol. 48., no. 2, Winter 1995, p. 373. 
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The creditor nations have retained the power to renegotiate the terms of loans due to 
the weak collective bargaining position of the debtor nations, but the need to 
renegotiate the terms of the loans in itself shows the limits of the power of credit 
creation.49 
Reservations about the limits of direct economic power also raise questions 
about the types of indirect economic power that may accrue to a state from credit 
creation. The question of the indirect economic power of finance is similar to that 
concerning the indirect economic power of TNCs outlined in the previous section, 
in that it involves the idea that banks based in a home state also spread the state's 
values and interests through their global mobility and presence. It is arguable that 
even if a state does not control deliberately the activities of its banks and financial 
institutions, its banks do spread the financial power of the state and help to create 
the rules for the financial institutions of other states to follow. The loyalty to the 
home state of the management of a private bank is also likely to contribute to 
indirect power. This type of indirect power, as has already been seen with regard to 
TNCs, is hard to gauge. But the US may possess indirect power through the 
dominance in many financial markets of its banks and their business practices. 
The other inseparable aspect of the financial structure identified by Strange is the 
international monetary system. Scholarship on international politics and hegemony 
is at pains to point out that historically the position of the hegemon has been filled 
by the state that allows its own currency to serve as the international reserve 
currency and the denomination in which international trade is conducted. 
Hegemonic theory suggests that both indirect and direct power are possessed by the 
provider of the international currency. The benefits of seigniorage and the ability of 
the US to in effect create money, whilst they may have had deleterious effects on 
the US economy, have certainly enabled it to maintain its forward military presence 
and global hegemonic position.5o However, the direct power benefits of 
4~obert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 317-28. 
50stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 161; Robert Gilpin, The 
Political Economy of International Relations, p. 134. 
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international money now appear to be increasingly matched by those of indirect 
power. As Gilpin argues, the provision first by Great Britain and then by the US of 
the public good of the reserve currency is a stabilising force in the world economy, 
and has allowed the promotion of trade and the progress of interdependency. 51 The 
international monetary system is then integrative in nature and ties countries to a 
common standard set by the provider of the reserve currency. The successful 
management of the reserve currency should also lead to the capacity to establish the 
economic environment for other states and promote peaceful integration and 
cooperation. 
In practice, though, the management of the reserve currency and the scope of its 
indirect power is problematic, and may not lead to peaceful integration. 
Kindleberger argued that the international financial structure is prone to 'manias, 
panics and crashes', and that the severity of the Great Depression was due to the 
collapse of world leadership in the international monetary system.52 The indirect 
power of the monetary system and its integrative effects will be influenced by how 
firmly it is regulated and the will of states to ensure its stability; failure on these 
counts may produce the reverse effect of conflict between states. The US's decision 
to abandon unilaterally the Bretton Woods system and to move to the paper dollar 
standard by 1973 contained the potential to disrupt the economies of other states 
and to generate conflict between them and the US. Subsequent moves by the 
developed nations to coordinate policy on the price of the dollar have had mixed 
success, but always threaten to cause conflict. Moreover, when states choose to 
remain outside international monetary regimes, in order to exploit the advantages of 
freedom for the macro-economic management of their economies, this can produce 
friction and impact on the political designs of other states. In one sense, the UK's 
unspoken objective of remaining outside the discipline of the ERM and its ability to 
enjoy the benefits of devaluation for its economy is an example of the limited power 
of international money arrangements. Added to these considerations is the fact that 
51 Robert Gil pi n, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 118. 
52cited in Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 130. 
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not only does the failure of the will of states to cooperate on international monetary 
problems produce discord, but also it seems that states are losing the capacity to 
act. The series of near collapses of the ERM system since 1992 have been due 
partly to a combination of political indecision and lack of policy coordination. But 
the speed of currency flows and the increased capacity of private investors to shake 
the power of central banks are additional e"xplanations for the ERM's problems. 
Recent concerted efforts by central banks in 1995 to intervene and raise the price of 
the dollar against the yen and other currencies can be credited with restoring some 
confidence in the power of central banks to convince investors to reverse market 
trends. States still have, though, private competitors for influence in international 
monetary matters, and it may be the market which is now exerting indirect power 
and setting the rules of the game for states like the UK and France. 
To summarise, the creation of credit is an essential component of indirect and 
direct economic power. Credit creation institutions at the private level offer both 
forms for states to use in security policy. In particular, direct financial power offers 
a state negative and positive inducements to prevent the occurrence of conflict and 
to help resolve conflicts ifthey occur. The effects of this type of power are limited 
by questions about government control and the vulnerability of states to financial 
influence. The international monetary system offers mainly indirect economic 
power and suggests that it could be a powerful tool of integration to reduce conflict 
due to its trade and wealth promoting characteristics. But the instability of the 
international monetary financial system and the opportunities of some states to 
abuse its privileges can reduce its ability to create cooperation and peace between 
states. 
Trade 
Trade provides access to raw materials and foreign markets and is, therefore, 
another important means for the expansion of production and wealth creation. 
Academic debate is divided over the benefits and effects of trade. Liberal thinkers 
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see free trade and exchange as bringing wealth to all states, whereas the neo-realist 
camp views trade as uneven in its effects and to be managed in the interests of the 
state.53 But these schools of thought are united in seeing trade as essential to 
production and as a key component of economic power. 
As neo-realist thinkers hint, trade is an inherently political process with 
implications for the ordering or power between states. Trade is one of the oldest 
forms of state-to-state interaction and as such is never free of state intervention. 
States throughout history have enjoyed financial benefits from their right to tax 
trade, and have sought, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, to negotiate the 
terms of trade to their advantage. This process of negotiation determines the access 
of trading partner states to the resources, markets and technology of other states, 
and so their access to wealth creation. The result of this is that states that dominate 
the terms of trade will also dominate other states and gain power over them. 
The economic power of trade is both direct and indirect. Whilst liberal thinkers 
have not managed to achieve a consensus about the equal benefits of free trade, a 
convincing argument can be made for seeing trade as a means of integration and 
encouraging cooperation between states. A state that can establish the general rules 
of the trading environment also may be able to integrate other states into its 
economic and political value systems. The creation in the post-World War II period 
of the GA TI (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) system demonstrates how 
the US has acquired indirect economic power by being able to lay down the rules of 
trade. States may not agree with all of GA TI's provisions and many states such as 
those of the EU have been able to create their own trade areas ex.empt from some 
GATI rules. But at the same time, there can be little doubt that the principles of this 
essentially US-inspired trade regime have taken hold and that states have been 
prepared to prolong its existence by engaging in intense negotiations during the 
Uruguay round (1986-1993), and then to produce its successor the wro (World 
Trade Organisation). The GAIT system was essentially a US-inspired creation 
53For a general discussion of theories of trade: Susan Strange, States and Markets, pp. 178-85; 
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 172-83. 
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aimed at breaking down protected trade systems such as the British imperial 
preference system, but it has proved durable, kept markets open to US 
corporations, created an environment which serves the interests of the US and other 
industrialised states, and provided the US with indirect power. 
Direct power is given to a state through its ability to manipulate actively the 
terms of trade with other states on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Control of the 
terms of trade enables a state to offer positive and negative inducements to other 
states and to influence their economic and political behaviour. Offering favourable 
terms of trade, or as Knorr comments the 'carrot' of foreign trade, is one form of 
positive inducement.54 States may offer terms on a bilateral basis, such as a most 
favoured trading nation status. In addition, states may offer favourable terms by 
easing the access of other states into multilateral trading bodies. 
Conversely, states may use the 'stick' of foreign trade and threaten to withhold 
trade terms from other states. States have long practiced this policy which ranges in 
intensity from the addition of tariffs on key exports from other states to full scale 
economic warfare, embargoes, and sanctions. The US's embargo on Cuba is one 
example of the use of this type of economic power to try to exert influence over 
another state in a conflictual situation. Indeed, to maintain the economic 
stranglehold over Cuba, the US with the Helms-Burton Act has even resorted to 
attempts to pressure other countries to end their business dealings with Castro's 
regime. The US has used periodically both the 'carrot' and the 'stick' in its recent 
policy towards China--linking progress on human rights issues and trade practices 
to China's access to favourable trade terms provided on a bilateral basis by MFN 
status, and on a multilateral basis by the US's ability to speed the entry of China 
into the mo. Furthermore, as will be seen in chapters four and five, the US has 
also used this policy to handle the North Korean nuclear crisis since 1994. 
The effectiveness of these 'carrot' and 'stick' approaches, as with all other 
components of economic power, is determined by the factors of control and 
54Klauss Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 158. 
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vulnerability. The difficulties of controlling TNCs have already been outlined, and 
as a large proportion of trade is carried out by these corporations it may be difficult 
for a state to influence patterns of trade. The nature and importance of trade may 
also be making it more difficult for states to make convenient use of it as a tool of 
economic power. The progress of interdependence may mean that states risk 
interfering with trade at great cost to their own economies. Moreover, membership 
of international organisations restricts the freedom of some states to follow an 
independent line on trade policy. States can obtain exemptions from GATT 
provisions but the advantages of membership may mean that they are reluctant to go 
outside the guidelines and rework the terms of trade. 
The impact of trade terms will be limited by the degree of resilience that states 
show in the face of the possible costs to be imposed if they are denied access to 
better trading terms or trade altogether. States with a low rate of dependency on 
foreign trade for key resources or markets are likely to have greater resilience, and 
many states are willing to sacrifice entry into trading systems if they feel that it 
conflicts with their own economic and political interests. Other states such as South 
Africa were able in the past to demonstrate some ability to substitute and supply 
from their own resources those that were denied to them by international trade 
restrictions. Finally, states can exercise availability. Cuba in the 1950's found 
alternative markets in the Soviet Bloc, and, as the case of North Korea will again 
show in chapter five, many of the so-called 'pariah' states of the contemporary 
period have found trade between themselves to be a useful way to avoid the effects 
of sanctions. 
Trade can then be viewed as of use to security policy in promoting stability 
between nations either by its indirect integrative power or by its use as a bridgehead 
for establishing friendly links between states. In the event of a conflict direct 
economic pressure via trade restrictions offers another tool of security policy. 
However, the effectiveness of trade's economic power is tempered by problems of 
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control and vulnerability, and the knowledge that trade promotes integration but can 
also be a major source of friction between states. 
Energy 
No economy--planned, mixed, or market--can function without energy. The 
generation and supply of energy is essential for industrial production, the running 
of transport systems, and meets the demand of domestic users for heating and light. 
The absence of stable sources of energy supply, as the case of North Korea will 
demonstrate in chapters four and five, can even induce the near economic collapse 
of states with resultant problems for security. Knowledge of the importance of 
energy has lead states to try to control its supply since the beginning of the 
industrial age: beginning with coal resources and then moving on to oil and 
uranium ore. The Gulf War was one demonstration of the crucial importance of oil 
to the industrialised nations and their continued willingness to wage war to ensure 
its supply. 
Indirect power may be acquired by a state due to the size of its share of the 
energy market. A state such as the US, which is the world's largest single 
consumer of energy and particularly oil, can be expected to influence the energy 
needs and supplies of other nations.55 Increased demand in the US for oil, for 
instance, may lead to higher energy prices or other states and impact indirectly on 
their economic and political behaviour. 
Direct power is given to a state by its ability to control directly supplies and the 
generation of energy for other states. Offers to supply energy or the technology that 
will increase the efficiency of energy generation are positive inducements. Moves to 
restrict energy supplies of new energy technologies are negative inducements. Both 
forms of inducement amount to direct economic power for a state. 
551n 1992 the US was estimated to have consumed close to 8(X) million tons of oil; compared to a 
figure of around 300 million tons for the states of the former Soviet Union; and 250 million tons 
for Japan. Miyazaki lsamu, Sekai Keizai Zusetsu, TOkyO, Iwanami Shoten, 1995, p. 125. 
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The capacity of states to master these forms of indirect and direct power is 
uncertain. Strange points out that the control of the supply of oil has been 
fragmented since its rise as the key energy commodity. The control of oil supplies 
passed from states to multinationals between the end of World War I and the 
1960's, and then to the producers of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) in the late 1960's and early 1970's. This has been followed by a mixed 
form of control involving states, companies, producers and the market, beginning 
in the mid-1970's and continuing into the 199O's.56 This confused picture of 
control means that for a state to exercise power over energy supplies it needs to 
occupy a very large share of the energy market in order to influence demand. 
Furthermore, a state will need to be able to exercise control not only over the 
market, but also over the companies in the energy market. Control on the 
international level will need to be over TNCs involved in extracting and trading in 
energy resources, and on the domestic level over those energy companies that 
utilise these resources and develop technology to generate energy. The problems of 
controlling TNCs have already been touched upon in the section on the production 
structure. Control on the domestic level may be easier as many companies are 
wholly or partly state owned and regulated by the state. 
The limits of indirect and direct power will further be determined by the factor of 
vulnerability. Energy is essential to an economy but states have displayed resilience 
in instances where energy supplies have been threatened. States are also capable of 
substituting foreign supplies of energy with their own stockpile supplies or by 
creating alternative forms of energy. Lastly, states may be able to secure supplies of 
energy from different states if denied it by others. 
The most obvious application of energy policy to security policy is the efforts of 
states to protect themselves from economic shocks brought about by possible 
curtailment of energy supplies. The policies of the developed states to cope with 
rises in oil prices in the 1970's following the first Oil Shock are one example of 
56Susan Strange, States and Markets, pp. 197-202. 
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this. Energy has also been used by developed states as a component of direct 
economic power to pressure other states into changing their behaviour. The oil 
embargo imposed on Rhodesia by the United Nations in 1966 was one attempt at 
this policy.57 However, energy may also be used by developed nations to support 
efforts to reduce the economic causes of conflict. One of the chief concerns of 
development aid has been to ensure stable supplies of energy for the recipient 
countries, to stabilise their economies, and lay a foundation for economic growth. 
The example of KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organisation) presented in 
chapters four and five will illustrate in detail how the US, Japan, and South Korea 
have used the component of energy in order to moderate North Korea's security 
behaviour. 
Communications and knowledge 
Land, sea and air transport systems are vital for the movement of goods and people 
and the trade upon which much of wealth creation is dependent. The influence over 
the construction and running of transport systems provides political as well as 
economic power. In a similar way to trade, the negotiation of the terms of access of 
states to transport systems is a political process and revolves around the potential 
costs that will be imposed by one side on the other by restricting and increasing 
freedom of access. The types of economic costs that can be imposed on a state by 
its isolation, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from sources of knowledge and 
communications links will be made clear when North Korea's economic 
vulnerability is analysed in chapter five. 
Indirect power over transport systems may arise due to the size of a state's 
presence in the market for transport and its ability to set the international rules for 
its operation. The US may have acquired indirect power in air transport systems 
due the scale of its air transport market, position as a central transport node for the 
carriers of many states, and because of its near total control until recently of the 
57Klauss Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 156. 
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manufacture and standards of transport aircraft. Similarly, the UK could also be 
said to have some degree of indirect power over sea transport due to the location on 
its territory of Lloyds of London, the world leader in shipping insurance, and the 
Baltic Exchange, a major shipping market.58 
Control of transport systems brings both direct and indirect power benefits. 
States can deny or offer to other states access to their transport markets and 
systems. Isolation from world markets and foreign resources is likely to have a 
powerful influence over some states and alter their behaviour. Alternatively, states 
can promote transport links between themselves in order to promote 
interdependency and economic growth, so adding to indirect power. 
Air, sea and land transportation systems are likely to differ in the extent to which 
they can be manipulated by states to suit their interests. Sea transport is perhaps the 
least easy to control. The Flag of Convenience (Foe) system created by the US 
after World War I has lead to the weakening of the control of most states, apart 
from the US, over merchant fleets, and there are few international bodies to 
regulate shipping terms. However, states still have the option of exerting control by 
simply closing their ports to shipping traffic. 
Air transport is more easily controlled by states. States have the right to control 
their own airspace, and international bodies to regulate air transport exist only with 
the agreement of states. Also many states are major players in the commercial air 
transport business through their stakes in flag carrier airlines. Land transport is 
probably the easiest transport system for states to control. By controlling their land 
borders, states have the option to open up new land links, and to reopen and 
maintain existing ones. But even this control is not total, as the land borders of 
many states are porous and can support small scale border trade which is beyond 
the control of state governments. 
58Susan Strange, States and Markets, pp. 159-60. 
108 
The knowledge and information structure is the least well understood of the 
economic components of power, and analysis rarely moves beyond the vague 
notion that knowledge is power. Strange, however, has attempted to tackle this 
problem in depth, and relying on her analysis, the attempt here is to make some 
brief comments about the possible links between knowledge, economic power, and 
security policy. 
Strange identifies three types of knowledge. The first type is changes in the 
provision of information and communication systems. Subsequently, this produces 
a second type of knowledge concerned with changes in the use of language and 
non-verbal communication, and then a third type concerned with changes in 
perceptions and beliefs, 'which influence value judgements and through them, 
political and economic decisions and policies.'59 In addition, Strange notes that the 
knowledge structure involves both a positive and negative capacity to convey and 
deny knowledge. 
The provision and domination of communication systems can be seen to have a 
highly integrative effect in the modern world economy. The increased speed of 
financial transactions, for example, has increased the integration of financial 
markets and the economic interdependency of nations. The indirect power that a 
state can derive from this is hard to judge. But certainly with regard to the field of 
telecommunications the US seems to have benefited from the spread of this 
knowledge structure, and this is probably one explanation for its willingness to see 
the continued liberalisation of these markets. One example of the potential indirect 
power benefits of telecommunications is the Internet and the US's central position 
within the spread of this global knowledge structure. In theory, no one state is able 
to control the Internet due to its complexity and scale. But Internet systems are 
based on software often developed in the US and the use of English demanded of 
most Internet users means that they are working often in a US constructed and 
influenced environment. How far users may make the mental connection between 
59Susan Strange. States and Markets, p. 120. 
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the US and the Internet is impossible to determine, but nevertheless a degree of 
indirect power may accrue to the US. States may also acquire indirect power due to 
the cultural impact of the flow of information along communication systems. The 
importance of this type of soft power has already been discussed and is notoriously 
hard to measure. But the spread of one state's culture to another at least may have 
integrative and indirect power effects for security. 
The control of states over technology and communication systems is also an 
unknown quantity. Some commentators have seen the 'information revolution' as 
empowering the individual and undermining the power of states. This view may, 
though, be premature. States in the past have shown a ready ability to adopt new 
communication systems, such as the telegraph, telephone and satellite, and to use 
them to reinforce their power. 
Moreover, the vulnerability of states to changes in communication systems is 
hard to evaluate. Many states are prepared to try to reject new communication 
systems if they see them as a threat to their economic and political ideology. 
China's attempt to limit the types of information transmitted through the Internet is 
one example of these concerns on the part of a state. 
The security benefits of communication systems are well known for military 
power but less so for economic power. Integration caused by new technology may 
help to reduce conflict, and the ability of some states to offer others new 
telecommunications links is a useful positive inducement for cooperation between 
states. 
Economic Aid 
Foreign aid is 'the concessionary transfer of resources from one government to 
another.'6o The resources can be in the form of goods, equipment or technology. 
The transfers can be made bilaterally, directly from one government to another, or 
multilaterally through international agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian 
60J<lauss Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 165. 
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Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Both military and economic aid are common, but for the purposes of this analysis 
an attempt will be made to separate the two and the concentration will be upon 
economic aid. 
Economic aid can be divided into two categories: humanitarian aid intended to 
help over the short term for relief from natural and man-made disasters; and 
economic development aid designed to help over the long term in the promotion of 
economic stability. The conditions with which the donor state provides aid to the 
recipient state can also be divided into two categories. 'Tied' aid usually has 
conditions attached which obligate the recipient state to use the aid for a specific 
project and to procure goods and services for the project from the corporations of 
the donor state. 'Untied' aid resembles more of a gift and usually has a large grant 
element. But in some cases the distinction between tied and untied aid is hard to 
preserve. Many loans although provided with conditions are set a concessionary 
terms with low interest rates and long repayment periods. These types of 'soft' 
loans are almost untied in nature. 
The provision of aid establishes a clear dependency relationship between donor 
and recipient As Strange argues, the giving of aid usually involves, 'some kind of 
bargain, a political/economic exchange that serves as much to reinforce authority as 
it does to alleviate wants.161 The donor gains the ability to offer negative and 
positive inducements by reducing or increasing aid. At the state level, the 
opportunities and costs of aid provision are apparent to both donor and recipient 
states, and establish direct power for the former over the latter. All forms of aid 
establish this type of relationship. Even humanitarian aid which is often felt to a 
nonpolitical per se can have political effects. This type of aid can prop up unstable 
regimes whose policies are responsible in the first place for the disaster that the aid 
is intended to deal with, and food aid can increase the dependency of recipient 
6 I Susan Strange, StalesandMarkets, p. 213. 
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states on the donor state by weakening self-sufficiency in agriculture.62 The case 
study of the North Korean economy presented in chapter five is just such an 
instance of where food aid is being used to create a dependency relationship 
between the US and North Korea, with benefits for the security of both states. 
The direct power promised to states by the provision of aid to other states means 
that they are keen to employ it as a component of economic power and security 
policy. Aid can provide immediate security benefits by stabilising countries 
economically and politically in a period of crisis. Over a longer period of time the 
economic development that aid is intended to generate helps to promote cooperation 
between states. It can also produce a congenial political environment by reinforcing 
a state's indirect power. One of the rationales behind the US and USSR's provision 
of aid during the Cold War was to promote their separate ideologies. 
The power derived from aid will depend upon the conditions under which the 
aid is provided to the recipient state. Untied aid may be effective over the short term 
in enhancing friendly relations between states as there are no conditions attached 
and no pressure for the recipient state to give anything in return. But as Klaus 
Knorr points out, even the success of aid with a large grant element is not assured. 
Some states may react adversely to the offer of aid because it conveys the image of 
the state's subjugation to the stronger donor state.63 Added to this, the costs of 
untied aid can be greater over the long term. For even though it may buy the 
goodwill of the recipient, it can raise the expectations which the donor will find 
hard to satisfy on a continued basis. Tied aid with its attached conditions may be 
effective in prolonging the dependency or cooperative relationship between donor 
and recipient over the long term, but the conditions can also lead to resentment and 
conflict. 
Moreover, aid programmes are not always easily manipulated for political effect 
by a state's government. Often the provision of aid is subject to the scrutiny of 
62Hans J. Morgenthau. 'A political theory of foreign aid'. The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 56, no. 2, September 1963. pp. 301-2. 
63Klauss Knorr, Power and Weal/h, p. 180. 
112 
domestic democratic and government institutions which can veto types of aid or aid 
to states that it deems undesirable. Thus. even if a state wishes to use aid to support 
its security policy to deal with conflicts. it may be prevented from doing so by 
domestic opinion. Aid is not always a component of economic power which is easy 
to manipulate in the service of security policy due to the bureaucratic procedures 
involved in its administration. and because in many instances the rationale for aid is 
an historical connection between states--such as that between a state and its ex-
colony--which means that the direction of a state's aid resources cannot be switched 
easily. 
Another determinant of a state's degree of control over aid is its position within 
international agencies for distributing aid. The US is able to influence aid given on 
a multilateral basis by the World Bank. and to ensure that it is provided on terms 
roughly in line with the US's economic and political aims. It has even been able to 
block aid to certain states such as Allende's Chile.64 The majority of aid is made on 
a bilateral basis from government to government, but a state which can control aid 
flows through multilateral institutions also will possess an even larger degree of 
power. 
Although aid is quite clearly a major component of direct economic power, many 
states have the resilience to tum down aid and the ability to seek alternative sources. 
States can continue to function even when aid is lost to them, and Knorr suggests 
that it is only in cases where a state's economy is in serious danger of decline that 
aid can really produce major swings in a state's behaviour. He puts forward the 
example of US threats to cut-off Marshall Plan aid to the government of the 
Netherlands in 1948 if it did not agree to independence negotiations with Indonesia. 
This occurred at a time of economic crisis for the Netherlands and had the 
necessary leverage to produce the desired effect.65 In other cases, aid may be 
important for a state's economy but the effect of its loss may be limited as the state 
is prepared to put up with a certain amount of economic hardship rather than change 
64Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 298. 
65Klauss Knorr, Power and Wealth, p. 173. 
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its behaviour. Some states, as will be seen from the example of North Korea 
presented in chapter five, are even willing to forgo aid in the midst of near famine 
conditions in order to preserve their political independence. 
The other important check on the influence of aid is the ability of states to find 
alternative donors of aid if it is denied to them by a state or international agency. 
During the Cold War the number of potential donors to a state in an area of geo-
strategic importance were comparatively large, which meant that to some extent the 
state was free to negotiate advantageous terms for the aid. But in the contemporary 
period, with reduced superpower rivalry and reduced levels of aid on offer from 
some developed states, a recipient state may have less availability and be more 
exposed to the direct power of the donor states. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter by using Western and Japanese scholarship has constructed a complete 
model of economic security, economic power, the components of economic power 
and the possibilities and limitations for their usage by states. The model connects 
together for the first time much of the previously separate scholarship on economic 
power and security and gives fuller theoretical shape to the concept of global 
civilian power. The model makes clear that the security aims of the global civilian 
power will be primarily to use economic power to remove the sources of conflict 
among states, but that in certain cases it will also use economic power to impose 
costs on other states that are a threat to it. In order to create an environment 
conducive to peace, the global civilian power will need to command both direct and 
indirect economic power--subject to the factors of vulnerability--across a wide 
range of components. In particular, it will need to supplement its power by 
borrowing the economic strength of non-state actors, such as TNCs, so as to 
extend indirect economic power with all its attendant benefits for security. Having 
outlined a general framework for global civilian power in this chapter, the task of 
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the next chapter is to take this framework and apply it to Japan in order to assess its 
economic power and its capability to act as a global civilian power. 
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3 Japanese economic power and policy-making 
Having outlined in chapter two a theory of economic power and security to give 
theoretical structure to the concept of the global civilian power, this chapter will 
now transfer this theory to look at the general economic power of Japan, the types 
of direct and indirect derived from it, and the likely benefits of this for Japanese 
security. From this it will be possible to judge Japan's 'power manifesto' and 
capacity to act as a global civilian power. The detailed overview of Japan's 
economic power will also lay the foundations to make it possible in chapter five to 
examine the links between the Japanese and North Korean economies in order to 
test empirically the model of global civilian power against the specific security 
problem of North Korea. 
THE JAPANESE POLICY -MAKING PROCESS 
Before looking at the individual components of economic power, it is necessary to 
examine the policy-making system of Japan show how this may affect the extent of 
direct and indirect economic power accruing to Japan, and the ability of Japan as a 
global civilian power to mould this power to Japan's security needs. For as 
explained at the start of chapter two, although the concept of global civilian power 
is 'state-centred' in that the state and its government institutions are seen as the 
main actors" capable of coordinating economic power resources for security policy, 
the benefits of which it then passes on to the individuals in its population, it is also 
clear that the state is neither the sole actor, and nor is it a unitary actor in the field of 
economic security policy. Indeed, as has been seen, the very concept of indirect 
economic power and the links between the power of the state and the power of 
other economic actors which vary in their allegiance to the state, such as TNCs, 
argues that a global civilian power and its state institutions need to be able to control 
and enlist the support of these economic actors to create a truly effective security 
policy. The limits of Japanese global civilian power will be found in how far the 
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state can incorporate and satisfy the interests of a range of external domestic and 
foreign actors within the policy-making process. Moreover, the effectiveness of the 
global civilian power will be affected not only by the interaction between state 
institutions and other economic actors which have to be accommodated within the 
policy-making process, but also by the usual conflict of interests between the 
policy-making actors of the state itself, defined as the bureaucrats and politicians. 
Therefore, in the case of Japan it cannot be assumed that the state will be the 
sole and unitary actor, and in the next section it is necessary to examine the internal 
policy-making process in order to ask who or what are the main actors, how these 
effect the types of direct and indirect power accruing to the state, and the 
implications for security policy. Furthermore, this analysis of the policy-making 
structures in Japan will be necessary for the empirical testing of the model of global 
civilian power in chapters four to six, when it will be shown what sort of policy-
making difficulties have obstructed Japan's use of economic power for security 
policy in the case of the North Korean security problem. 
'Japan Inc.' 
Some of the earliest analyses of the Japanese state in the area of economics saw it 
essentially as a unitary actor and one unchallenged by any other actor, including 
private business. This view was based upon knowledge of the involvement of the 
Japanese state's economic bureaucracy in the rapid industrialisation of the economy 
during the Meiji era, and in cooperation with private zaibatsu industrial groups to 
gear the economy to serve the interests of Japanese imperialism prior to and during 
World War II. The obvious continuity in the post-war period of Japan's pre-war 
economic bureaucracy and zaibatsu industrial groupings, combined with stable one-
party conservative government and a remarkable record of economic growth, 
persuaded some commentators in the 1970's that there was an unbreakable bond 
between the Japanese state and the management of the Japanese economy. 1 
1 For a history of the pre-war Japanese economic bureaucracy, see Chalmers Johnson, Mm and the 
Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford California: Stanford 
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The most extreme manifestation of this type of interpretation is the corruption in 
the media and the adoption in some academic opinion of James Abegglen's term 
'Japan Incorporated'. According to this type view, the Japanese economic 
juggernaut is carefully guided by the elite of what Herman Kahn termed the 
Japanese 'superstate'.2 This elite consists of a policy-making 'triad', dominated by 
the 'mandarins' of a unified central economic bureaucracy, supported by the leaders 
of big business, and given free rein to operate under the political protection of a 
compliant conservative party in the shape of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).3 
Since the 1970's, the 'Japan Inc.' theory of policy-making has continued to be 
advanced by scholars such as William Nester and Thomas Huber. Nester prefers a 
'corporatist' model of growth to explain what he regards as Japan's neo-
mercantilist policies, whereas Huber produces a model of 'strategic economy' in 
Japan. Huber's model views the policy-making structure as akin to a military force, 
with MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) as the general staff 
handing down directives to willing subordinates in manufacturing industry, private 
commercial banks, and general trading companies.4 
The 'Japan Inc.' view, then, really sees no differentiation in the economic 
policy-making process between the interests of the state, as represented by the 
bureaucracy and politicians, and those of private business; in effect they are seen as 
one and the same in the pursuit of the goal of economic growth, with the latter fully 
incorporated into the policy-making process. In addition, the tight links between 
these three actors means that the policy-making process is isolated from external 
domestic and foreign pressures. Given the existence of this type of view, it could 
University Press, 1982, pp. 38-41; 'MIT! and Japanese international economic policy', in Robert 
Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy oj Modern Japan, Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, lcr17, p. 234. 
2Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response, Middlesex, Pelican 
Books, 1973. 
3The terms 'triad' and 'mandarin' are taken from: William R Nester, The FoulU/ations oj Japallese 
Power: Continuities, Changes and Challenges, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 30; Clyde V. 
Prestowitz Jr., Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan 10 Take the uad. New York, Basic Books, 
1988, p. 115. 
4William R Nester, Japan's Growing Power Over East Asia and the World Economy, London, 
Macmillan, 1990, p. 139; The Foundations 0/ Japanese Power, p. 16; Thomas Huber, Strategic 
Economy in Japan, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994, p. 5. 
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be imagined that if any state can wield, manipulate and shape economic power in 
the service of its security interests, then it should be Japan. The consensus between 
its major economic actors combined with the obvious size of Japan's economic 
resources implies a state able to accumulate under its control all the components of 
direct and indirect economic power and to use them to construct a viable security 
policy. Hence, if the 'Japan Inc.' view of Japanese policy~making is accepted, the 
Japanese state should have the necessary control of its economic resources for it to 
fulfill with ease the role of a global civilian power. 
However, it is also apparent that since the 1970's, and despite the continued 
touting of the 'Japan Inc.' line by some, scholars have begun to look for a more 
complex analysis of the Japanese policy-making process, and that the view of the 
Japanese state as a unitary actor and immune from the influence of other actors has 
come under attack.5 The following sections will look briefly at how this debate has 
developed and how the policy-making process and its actors in Japan have come to 
be understood. 
Business versus bureaucrats 
The first assault upon the more popularized versions of the 'Japan Inc.' and 
'superstate' concepts was made by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky in the mid-
1970's. Their liberal, or as characterised by Chalmers Johnson, 'no miracle' view 
rejected the undifferentiated state-centred 'Japan Inc.' model, and instigated instead 
an essentially market-oriented economic model, with growth lead by the private 
sector, and a secondary role for government in helping to create a favourable 
environment for private business initiatives.6 In addition to the emphasis upon the 
influence of private business and market forces as actors in economic policy, 
Patrick and Rosovsky's view was also instructive in drawing attention back to the 
5ctyde V. Prestowit1 .. Changing Places, pp. 115-6; Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japmlese 
Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, p. 394. 
6chaImers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, p. 9; Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, 
'Japan's economic performance: an overview', in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (cds.), Asia's 
New Giani: How the Japanese Economy Works, Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1976, 
pp.47-52. 
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divergence of interests between the main industrial policy actors, comprising big 
business, and, for the state, the economic bureaucracy and LOP politicians. They 
noted that the economic bureaucracy was often divided amongst itself, with MITI, 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA) stressing different policy priorities. Patrick and Rosovsky 
also highlighted the factional divisions within the LOP over industrial policy, and 
the friction generated between the bureaucracy and big business when the latter 
rejected the directives of the former, as in the case of Toyo Kogyo's refusal to 
merge with Honda in the early 1970's. 
The arguments of Patrick and Rosovsky in this period were also supported by 
Philip Trezise and Suzuki Yukio, and are important in that they provided an early 
indication of the factors which inhibit the control of the Japanese state over the 
economy, namely: the acceptance of big business as an independent actor, 
integrated into the Japanese policy-making structure but often capable of having 
interests divergent from those of the bureaucratic and political policy-making actors 
of the state; and also the conflicts inside the state between and within bureaucratic 
institutions and the political parties.' Patrick and Rosovsky to some extent were 
picking up on the earlier arguments of Fukui Haruhiro. Even though Fukui chose 
to stress the central role of the state (defined as the bureaucracy, LDP, and big 
business interests), and the autonomy of its elite from pluralistic pressures such as 
the opposition parties and the labour moment, he also acknowledged that 
antagonism between the three main economic actors could interfere with the 
decision making process.8 This theme of division between Japanese economic and 
policy-making actors identified in the work of Patrick and Rosovsky, and of Fukui. 
reoccurs in all subsequent scholarship on industrial policy. 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Chalmers Johnson, assisted at first by T. J. 
Pempel. sought to overturn the liberal market-oriented view and the conclusions 
7Philip H. Trezise and Suzuki Yukio, 'Politics. government and economic growth in Japan'. in 
Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (cds.). Asia's New GianI, pp. 757-S11. 
SFukui Haruhiro. 'Economic planning in postwar Japan: a case study in policy making', Asian 
Survey. vol. 12. no. 4. April 1972. pp. 337-3S. 
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about the influence of big business, and to reassert the central role of the state; 
which for Johnson meant MITI and the economic bureaucracy. Johnson, whilst not 
seeking to rehabilitate what he saw as overstated 'Japan Inc.' views, did offer an 
alternative state-centred concept of the 'plan-rational system' or 'developmental 
state'.9 Johnson's and Pempel's revisionist views focused on the economic 
bureaucracy's near total control of industrial and other policy, and argued for the 
general exclusion of politicians from the decision making process.t o In particular, 
Johnson saw MITI's power as supreme, and based originally upon its statutory 
rights to license and approve the operations of specific industries, to create cartels 
and industrial associations, and its domination of industrial financing through 
foreign exchange laws and the channelling of funds through the Japan Development 
Bank (IDB) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The erosion of MITI's fonnal 
powers in the late 1960's with the onset of pressures for liberalization, meant that 
in order to retain control of industrial policy MITI switched to reliance more upon 
informal tools of 'administrative guidance' (gyosei shido), and the 'colonization' of 
other sections of the bureaucracy, such as the EPA)l 
Hence, Johnson and Pempel presented a different model from Patrick and 
Rosovsky to explain Japanese economic growth, and one which stressed a large 
measure of state control as vested in the bureaucracy. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this model of policy-making which excludes the input of big business 
and politicians would suggest that the bureaucracy in Japan could mobilise at will 
direct and indirect economic powerforthe security interests of the state. 
9Chalmers Johnson, MITI and tile Japanese Miracle, p. 22-3; T. J. Pempel, 'Japanese foreign 
economic policy: the domestic bases for international behaviour.' International Organization, vol. 
31, no. 4, Autumn 1979, pp. 723-74. 
lOChalmers Johnson, 'Japan: who governs? An essay on official democracy', in Chalmers 
Johnson, Japan Wlw Governs? The Rise 0/ 'lie Developmental State, New York, W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1995, p. 123. T. J. Pempel pointed to the bureaucracy's domination over 
politicians in the policy-making process in Japan in four ways: the Diet's dcclining legislative 
control; the close links in terms of personnel between the bureaucracy, the increased use of 
administrative directives; and bureaucratic influence over advisory committees. T. J. Pempel, 'The 
bureaucratization of policy-making in post-War Japan', American Journal 0/ Political Science: 
Quarterly Journal o/the MidWest Political Science Association, vol. 18, no. 4, November 1974, 
pp.647-64. 
1 1 Chalmers Johnson, 'MITI and Japanese international economic policy', pp. 246-60. 
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But in the late 1980's and early 1990's the views of the 'arch-revisionist' 
Johnson have themselves been challenged by a new breed of 'revisionists', lead by 
Richard J. Samuels and Kent E. Calder, who have attempted to downgrade the 
influence of the state bureaucracy and to rehabilitate the influence of big business in 
the policy-making process. 12 In his 1987 work The Business o/the Japanese State, 
Samuels attempts to instigate a new model of 'reciprocal consent' to explain the 
limits of state control in the energy sector. According to Samuels' model, private 
firms have ceded control of the energy industry to the state's economic bureaucracy 
and MITI only in return for guarantees of control over the market place for private 
firms. Samuels contends that the Japanese state's limited power over the energy 
industry is not from a lack of attempts by MITI to impose control, but rather that, 
based on evidence from the coal, oil, nuclear and domestic nuclear energy 
generating industries, the state's power has been resisted by private firms in these 
sectors. The result of this struggle for control has been a compromise to allow the 
state to participate in the energy industry but on terms dictated by the private 
firms,13 Hence, Samuels presents a picture of highly fragmented control over the 
energy industry--split between private firms and MITI, with sometimes a crucial 
role for the politicians in determining the final outcome of disputes. 
The views of Calder concerning industrial policy and state control of the 
economy first developed in his 1988 work Crisis and Compensation, and then 
given in more detail in his 1993 Strategic Capitalism, support the conclusions of 
Samuels.1 4 Calder criticises the overemphasis upon the role of MITI in many 
works on Japanese industrial policy. and points out the sectoral limitations to its 
power in areas such as communications, shipping and shipbuilding, and finance 
and taxation. He also asserts that it is necessary to provide more detailed 
12Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright. The Japanese bureaucracy in the industrial policy process.' 
in Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (008.), The Promotion and Regulation oj Industry in Japan, 
p.34. 
13Richard J. Samuels, The Business OJlhe Japanese Slate, pp. xi, 2. 
14Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compt'nsalion: Public Policy and Political Slability in Japan, 1949-
1986, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988~ Strategic Capitalism: Private 
Business and Public Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance. Princeton, New Jerscy: Princeton 
University Press, 1993. 
122 
examinations of the role of private industry and politicians in the policy-making 
process. With this aim in mind, Calder broadens the discussion of policy-making to 
include more equally the three elements of the bureaucracy, private firms and 
politicians, and presents his own model of 'strategic capitalism' to explain the 
workings of the Japanese economy and the state's role within it. This model is 
described as a 'hybrid' or mix of the interaction of the public and private sectors, 
with the economy lead by the market-oriented private sector, but encouraged by the 
state to pursue 'public spirited' policies over the long term. ls 
Calder's test-bed for his model is the financial sector, often seen by 
commentators as crucial to the industrial growth of Japan and for the state's control 
of economic policy. Further discussion of Calder's arguments will be presented in 
a later section of this chapter, but at present it is sufficient to note that Calder offers 
convincing evidence of the increasing limits to the legal, technical and political 
power of the economic bureaucracy over private banks, a large section of 
manufacturing industry, and the Sogoshosha General Trading Companies. Calder 
attributes this declining power to a lack of resources, unity and long term vision on 
the part of the economic bureaucracy and also to the role of politicians in supporting 
private industry in its struggles with the bureaucracy. Added to these factors of 
bureaucratic conflict and the influential role of politicians and sections of industry, 
Calder places great importance upon the factor of external pressure (gaiatsu), and 
observes that it is often hard for the bureaucracy and politicians to take policy 
initiatives or to break policy deadlock without stimulus from the outside.16 As 
Calder states, the progress of economic liberalization combined with foreign 
pressure, 'undermines the position of the state industrial strategists still further.' 1 7 
Calder, then, while trying to articulate a new model of the Japanese economy, is 
also reemphasising the factors which limit the state's bureaucratic and political 
15J<ent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 16. 
16Kent E. Calder, 'Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state', 
World Politics, vol. 40, no. 4, July 1988, p. 519. 
17Kcnt E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 14. 
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control over the economy and which have appeared in the scholarship on industrial 
policy since the 1970's. Calder, like Patrick and Rosovsky, points to the factors of 
conflict within the economic bureaucracy, the role of the politicians, the role of big 
business and the role of outside pressures as crucial to the understanding of 
industrial policy and Japanese state's degree of control. If Calder and Samuels 
model of policy-making is accepted, this would point to a less than certain picture 
of the degree to which the Japanese state's government can control the components 
of economic power, and necessitates that the policy-making process be seen as one 
of adjustment between different policy-making actors. 
Politicians versus bureaucrats 
Calder's and Samuels' work, though, is not likely to end the debate on industrial 
policy and the links between the state's institutions and the management of the 
economy. Whilst Johnson has sought to defend his bureaucracy-centred view of 
the policy-making process from attacks by Calder and Samuels, his arguments have 
come under pressure from another quarter and from those political scientists who 
seek to give greater prominence to the politicians in policy-making. New research 
in the 1980's on the role of Japanese politicians--for so long the butt of policy-
making studies' jokes--began to question the traditional view of this actor as totally 
beholden to the expertise of the bureaucracy and the financial influence of the 
wikai. Muramatsu Michio as early as 1981 in his overview of the Japanese 
bureaucratic system had begun to argue that the policy-making process was 
becoming more pluralistic with its infiltration by interest groups other than the 
bureaucracy, and that the politicians were on an even if not superior standing to the 
bureaucrats in policy-making. This he ascribed to the LDPs dominance in the Diet 
and the need for the bureaucracy to cooperate if wished to pass the legislation that it 
proposed, the close links between the LDP and would-be politicians from the 
bureaucracy, and the increasing policy expertise of the LDP due to the fonnation by 
Diet members of unofficial zoku, or policy tribes, which took a close interest in 
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specific policy issues 18 Further research on zoku and the official research 
committees of the LOP strengthened the view of politicians as confident of being 
able not only to scrutinise the legislation generated in by the bureaucracy but also to 
reject it and to propose their own.19 
Other researchers have used Muramatsu's ideas but gone further and asserted 
confidently that it is the bureaucracy which is subservient to LDP politicians. Mark 
Ramseyer and France McCall Rosenbluth argue that the focus of Johnson and 
others on the bureaucracy as the key policy actor is incorrect because they have 
confused bureaucratic activism with bureaucratic autonomy, and that in fact the 
politicians determine the policy-making process due to their legislative veto in the 
Diet, and their control of bureaucrats' promotion and retirement to amakudari 
positions. That the politicians do not intervene more in the policy process is seen by 
Ramseyer and McCall Rosenbluth as evidence of the LDP having constructed the 
process to function in the interests of the LDP and the bureaucracy, so removing 
the need for intervention, and confirming the principal-agent relationship of their 
rational choice theory.20 Given Ramseyers and McCall Rosenbluth's and other 
political scientists theories, then, it is necessary to see the politicians as one of the 
chief, if not the chief actors in the policy-making process. 
18Muramatsu Michio, Sengo Nihon no Kanryosel, Tl'lkyl'l, Tl'lyl'l Keizai Shinhl\sha, 1981, pp. 
152-64; Muramatsu Michio and Ellis S. Krauss, 'Bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking; the 
case of Japan', The American Political Science Review, vol. 78, no. I, March 1984, p. 143; 
Muramatsu Michio and Ellis S. Krauss, The conservative policy line and the development of 
patterned pluralism', in Yamamura Kl'lzO and Yasuba Yasukichi (eds.), The Political Economy oj 
Japan Volume One: The Domestic Transformation, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1987, pp. 516-54. 
19SatO SeizaburO and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, 'JimintO chOchl'lki seiken ni kaibai', eMU) KlJron, 
November 1984, pp. 86-94; Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, 7..oku GUn no KenkyfJ: Jimintl) 
Seiken 0 gyfJjiru shuyakulachi, TOkyO, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1987, pp. 1-40; Lee W. 
Farnsworth, 'Clan politics and Japan's changing policy-making structure', The World l.conomy: A 
QuarterlyJournal on Internalional Economic Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, June 1989, pp. 163-74: 
Nakano Minoru, Nihon no Seijiryokugaku: Dare ga Seisaku 0 Kitneru ka, Tl'lkyO, Nihon Hl'lsO 
KyOkai Shuppan, 1993, pp. 85-108; Leonard J. Schoppa, 'Zoku power and LOP power: a case 
study of the zoku role in education policy', The Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 
Winter 1991, pp. 79-106. 
20J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 100-04,108-119. 
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Politicians versus bureaucrats versus big business 
The above overview of the debate on policy-making in Japan shows that there are 
deep differences over who or what is the main actor in Japan and the extent of their 
influence over the economy. The view of 'Japan Inc.' and the state as comprising a 
tight-knit triangle of bureaucracy, politicians, and big business has been overturned 
by views emphasising the importance of big business as an independent actor, and 
the divergence between the interests of the state's bureaucratic and political actors. 
Subsequently this has been replaced by one centred on the state in the guise of the 
bureaucracy, which itself has subsequently been under attack from views stressing 
the importance of big business, external pressures, and politicians. Furthermore, 
one result of Ramseyer and McCall's application of rational choice theory to Japan 
and criticism of bureaucratic dominated theories of policy-making has been to spark 
an extraordinary counter-attack from Chalmers Johnson and what looks to be 
another long running debate on policy-making which may only serve to further 
entrench positions on all sides.21 
But is clear that there is a way out of this siege mentality, and that, just as in the 
case of the debate on hegemony, and despite the reluctance of some participants to 
acknowledge it, there is an essential unity in all the views outlined above on the 
policy-making process from which a usable theory of policy-making can be 
constructed. Arguably, whilst many scholars have striven to produce a more 
complex model of policy-making to counter the 'Japan Inc.' arguments and have 
succeeded in illuminating areas of the process that had not been studied before, 
many of them have fallen into the trap of allowing their arguments to become as 
extreme as the image of 'Japan Inc.' that they have attempted to destroy. and so in 
the end have undermined their own aim of achieving a more complex model of 
policy-making. 
The irony of this is made even greater when it is noted that most of the scholars 
identified above end up identifying the same key actors, even though this is not 
21ChaImers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, 'A disaster in the making: rational choice and Asian 
studies', The Nationallnleresl, no. 36, Summer 1994, pp. 14-22. 
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their intention. Thus, Ramseyer and McCall Rosenbluth, even though they 
concentrate on politicians as the principal in the policy-making process, accept that 
the role of the bureaucracy is crucial in drafting and implementing legislation and 
that the lDP could not make policy without it; in Ramseyer's and McCall's view 
the LDP is merely the final arbiter of policy, not the only policy actor and not the 
only one with power. Likewise, even though Johnson downplays the role of the 
politicians in the policy-making process, he is forced to admit that they often playa 
crucial role in adjudicating between problems of what has been termed 'inter 
jurisdictional conflict' (nawabari arasoO.22 If Johnson cannot write off the 
politicians altogether, then he also has to acknowledge the influence of big 
business. In general Johnson sees MITI as victorious in bureaucratic disputes with 
industry. For example, he illustrated Mm's power by quoting the example of its 
forcing Sumitomo Metals into line with production targets in 1965 by reducing 
supplies of cokeing coal to the company. But still his acknowledgment of the 
existence of such types of serious disputes between the principal economic actors is 
an important corrective to the 'Japan Inc.' type of view which sees the policy actors 
as indivisible. Moreover, it seems that in recent years and with his analysis of the 
MITI-NTf disputes over deregulation, Johnson has come to accept increasing 
limitations on MITI's power imposed by big business.23 It is also clear that those 
such as Calder and Samuels who stress the influence of big business and foreign 
pressures are not looking to exclude the influence of the bureaucracy and politicians 
altogether, and their very concentration on disputes between them is recognition 
that they are all actors that count in the policy-making process. The final irony is 
that Abegglen's original idea of 'Japan Inc.' emphasised this very point, as it saw 
Japanese policy-making in terms of an interlocking directorate of competing 
interests from the bureaucracy, big business and the LDP which by institutionalized 
221. T. M. Gow, 'Re-regulation and new industries in Japanese telecommunications', in Stephen 
Wilks and Maurice Wright (eds.), The Promo/ion and Regulation of Industry in Japan, London, 
Macmillan, 1991, p. 267. 
23Chalmers Johnson, 'MITI, MPf and the tclecom wars', in Chalmcrs Johnson, Laura 0' Andrea 
Tyson, and John Zysman (cds.). Politics and Productivity. New York, Ballinger. 1989, pp. lTI-
240. 
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negotiation and consultation managed to achieve a consensus on economic 
policy.24 
Global civilian power and Japanese policy-making 
The obvious conclusion derived from this tendency in the scholarship to talk at 
cross-purposes whilst sharing an essential unity is that any model of policy-making 
in Japan and how its effect on the ability of the state to perform the role of a global 
civilian power needs to consider not just the state actors of the bureaucracy and 
politicians, but also big business and external domestic and international actors. As 
Reinhard Drifte notes: rrhere is no one theory or model for explaining the role and 
interactions of the actors in Japan's political system.t25 Instead an eclectic approach 
again is needed to explain policy-making in Japan. Arguably, the ability to take this 
type of approach is shown by the approach of scholars such as John Campbell who 
have tried to accommodate in their work both bureaucratic and political aspects of 
the policy-making process, and by Quansheng Zhao who has shown how 
bureaucratic, political and business interests have shaped informal mechanisms of 
policy-making in Japan's China policy.26 This eclectic and comprehensive 
approach has been made even more pressing by the changes in the political system 
in Japan. Even before the collapse of the 1955 political system in 1992-3, T. J. 
Pempel had recognised the need for a less strict adherence to the bureaucratically 
dominated model of policy-making, and the actual collapse of the system has 
occasioned the need for further revision of other long-standing interpretations of 
it.27 The end of the 1955 system interrupted the LDP's hold on power and may 
24Richard J. Samuels, The Business of lhe Japanese State: Energy Mamts in Comparative tn1 
HistoricalPerspeclive, Ithaca. New York: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 19. 
25Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy in Ihe /990s: From Economic Superpower 10 What 
Power?, London, Macmillan, 1996, p. 16. 
26John Creighton Campbell, 'Democracy and burcaucf'cl(:y in Japan', in Ishida Takeshi and Ellis S. 
Krauss, (cds.), Democracy in Japan, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1989, pp. 113-37; Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policy Making: The Politics Behind Politics. 
Informal Mechanisms and the Making of China Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
pp.19-40. 
27T. J. Pempel, 'The unbundling of -Japan Inc.-: the changing dynamics of Japanese policy 
formation'. The Journal oj Japanese Studies, Vol. 13. no. 1. Winter 1987, pp. 271-306. 
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have weakened its hold also on the policy-making apparatus. Moreover, the 
reorganisation of the opposition is suggestive of its possibly having acquired or lost 
influence in policy-making. Muramatsu's arguments over the increasing pluralism 
of Japanese policy-making and its penetration by other interest groups means that 
when looking at policy-making some attention also has to be given to the 
opposition parties and non-government groups to test whether they have some 
input. Moreover, even the position of the bureaucracy within the policy-making 
system needs to be reevaluated after the fall of the 1955 system as it comes under 
attack for involvement in financial scandals, economic mismanagement, and is 
subject to pressure for reform in the 1990's. 
Hence, a broad approach is required to the policy-making process in Japan and 
the advantages or obstacles it may pose to the control of economic power and 
functioning as a global civilian power. The following analysis of the power derived 
to the Japanese state from the components of economic power, and later on the case 
study in chapters four to six of Japan-North Korea economic and security relations, 
will take this broad approach. In terms ofthe main actors, this dissertation will look 
at the role of the state as the leader in economic security policy--defined as the 
bureaucracy and politicians, including the LDP and where possible the opposition 
parties. It will also consider the role of big business and foreign pressure. Big 
business, although essentially a non-state actor, has to be incorporated into any 
consideration of the economic power of the state as a facilitating or disadvantageous 
factor due to its penetration of the policy-making system of the Japanese state's 
government. Foreign pressure is also crucial, not just because of the increasing 
internationalisation of the Japanese economy, but also because when considering 
the security aspects of economic policy it is inevitable that these will be affected by 
foreign interests. None of these actors will be considered as automatically dominant 
over the others, but rather the relative importance of each will be revealed by the 
particular circumstances and issues with which the actors are involved and the 
interaction between them. In certain cases it may be that one actor can dominate due 
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to its particular expertise, so fitting the Johnson or Ramseyer and McCall models in 
their purest forms. In other cases there may be relatively high cooperation between 
the actors in a situation akin to Abeggelen's idea of 'Japan Inc.' These first two 
models may give a dynamic content to Japanese policy-making. Calder's model of 
external pressure may also at times prove the crucial factor in determining the 
policy-making process in Japan--Iending it a highly reactive content. Finally, it is 
possible that all the competing policy actors may balance or inhibit each other 
producing what J. A. A. Stockwin has termed as 'immobilist' aspects in Japanese 
policy-making. In this situation the policy-making process may become log-
jammed with the only way out being for external foreign pressure to build 
sufficiently to give politicians and bureaucrats the scope to respond with some kind 
of policy initiative.28 
PRODUCTION AND JAPANESE FDI 
In the section on production in the previous chapter three types of TNCs--raw 
materials, manufacturing industry. and financial--were identified as playing an 
important international and possible security role through their global presence and 
FDI activities. The following section will outline the investment trends of all three 
types of Japanese TNC, and will focus discussion upon the significance of the 
direct and indirect types of power accrued by the first two types of TNCs. 
Discussion of the significance of the FDI activities of Japanese financial institutions 
will be carried out in the section of finance. Once the size and scope of economic 
power derived to Japan from FDI is evaluated, it will then be possible to apply this 
knowledge to the case study in chapter five of Japan-North Korea relations in order 
to test Japan's likely role as a global civilian power. 
28J. A. A. Stockwin, 'Dynamic and immobilist aspects of Japanese politics', in J. A. A. 
stockwin (cd.), DynamiC and ImmobiJisl Politics in Japan, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 19. 
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Size and scope of Japanese FDI 
Table 4: Japanese foreign direct investment 1951-1994 (US$: million) 
Fiscal year Amount 
1951-1964 790 
1965-1971 3,646 
1972 2,338 
1973 3,493 
1974 2,395 
1975 3,280 
1976 3,462 
1977 2,806 
1978 4,598 
1979 4,995 
1980 4,693 
1981 8,906 
1982 7,703 
1983 8,145 
1984 10,155 
1985 12,217 
1986 22,321 
1987 33,364 
1988 47,022 
1989 67,500 
1990 56,900 
1991 41,600 
1992 34,100 
1993 36,000 
1994 41,500 
Sources: Koshiro Kazutoshi, 'Foreign direct investment and industrial relations: 
Japanese experience after the oil crisis', in Takamiya Susumu and Keith Thurley 
(eds.), Japan's Emerging Multinationals: An International Comparison of Policies 
andPractices, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1985, p. 206; A. E. Safarian, 
Multinational Enterprises and Public Policy: A Study of Industrial Countries, 
Aldershot, Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1993, p. 238; Ezra Vogel, 'Japan as number 
one in Asia', in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), The United States, Japan, and Asia, New 
York and London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1994, p. 182; Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, OEeD Economic Surveys: Japan 1993-
1994, Paris, OECD, 1994, p. 21; Asahi Shimbun, Asahi Shim bun Japan Almanac 
1996, Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun Publishing Company, 1995, p. 85. 
The sheer size of Japanese FDI since the mid-1980's has been impressive and 
suggests that Japanese corporations should have accumulated direct and indirect 
power. The financial journalist Bill Emmott estimates that by 1989 Japan had 
assumed the position of the number one provider of FDI, with FDI totalling 
US$310,808 from 1951-1990.29 Susan Strange points out the calculation of FDI 
levels is difficult as the figures generally only include actual capital exchanges 
across borders to a host state, and may exclude major investments made in the 
29am Emmott, Japan's Global Reach: The Influences, Strategies and Weaknesses 0/ Japan's 
Multinational Companies, London, Century, 1992, pp. 5-13. 
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TNC's home state in fields such as technology research and development which are 
then later transferred but only at the face value of a technology's purchase price.30 
But even allowing for these difficulties in calculations, it is clear that Japanese FDI 
increased massively from the 1980's onwards. Table 4 demonstrates that in the 
twenty seven year period between 1951 and 1978, Japanese FDI totalled only 
US$26.8 billion. From 1979 to 1985 Japanese FDI grew steadily in value to reach 
an annual level of US$12.2 billion by 1985. In 1986, however, Japanese FDI 
nearly doubled to US$22.3 billion annually, and continued to climb steeply, 
reaching an historical high of US$67.5 billion in 1989. Following this, Japanese 
fDI has declined, but by 1993 still remained at an annual level of US$36 billion, 
thus exceeding in one year the total levels of investment from 1951 to 1978. 
There have also been changes in the sectoral composition of Japanese FDI. 
Table 5 shows that between 1951 and 1978 around 25 per cent of Japanese PDI 
was in resource development, around 35 per cent in manufacturing. and around 40 
per cent in services. By 1985 the level of investment in resource development and 
manufacturing had fallen to 16 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. and the level 
of investment in services has risen to 54 per cent. The rise in investment in service 
industries is confirmed by 1994 OECD figures which show that between 1989 and 
1993, around 25 per cent of Japanese FDI was in manufacturing and 75 per cent in 
non-manufacturing (comprising resource extraction and services). and it is probable 
that a large proportion of this can be accounted for by increases in investment in 
finance. 
The geographical distribution of Japan's total FDI between 1951 and 1994 is 
shown in Table 6. It can be seen that North America and Europe together have 
accounted for around 63 per cent of total investment. and Asia around 16 per cent. 
But these figures disguise changes in investment patterns over time. A more 
detailed breakdown of figures for North America. Europe and Asia between 1951 
and 1990 as given in Table 7, reveals that North America and Europe doubled their 
30Susan Strange, States and Markets, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 218. 
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annual shares of investment to 47.5 per cent and 19.8 per cent respectively by 
1988, but that Asia's share had declined by around a half to 11.8 per cent of total 
FDI in the same period. In contrast to this, though, OECD figures show that Asia's 
share of investment had increased to around 19 per cent annuall yin 1992. 
Table 5: The changing sectoral composition of Japanese foreign direct investment 
(percentage) . 
Year Non- Manufacturing Services 
manufacturing 
1951-78 23.6 34.2 42.2 
1981 24.5 34.2 41.3 
1985 16.1 30.2 53.7 
Sources: Koshiro Kazutoshi, 'Foreign direct investment and industrial relations: 
Japanese experience after the oil crisis', in Takamiya Susumu and Keith Thurley 
(eds.), Japan's Emerging Multinationals: An International Comparison of Policies 
andPractices, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1985, p. 207; Peter Dicken, 
'The changing geography of Japanese foreign direct investment in manufacturing 
industry', in Jonathan Morris (ed.), Japan and the Global Economy: Issues and 
Trends in the 1990's, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 19. 
Table 6: Cumulative totals of Japanese foreign direct investment by region 1951-
1994. 
Region Percentale 
North America 43.7 
Europe 19.4 
A. 1M 
Latin America 11.9 
M~~~t 1~ 
Africa 1.7 
Oceania 5.9 
Source: Asahi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun Japan Almanac 1996, Tokyo, Asahi 
Shimbun Publishing Company, 1995, p. 85. 
Table 7: Regional distribution of Japanese foreign direct investment 1951-1990 
Region 1951-78 1987 1988 1989 1990 
North 25.3 46.0 47.5 50.2 43.8 
America 
Europe 12.7 19.7 19.4 21.9 25.1 
Asia 28.6 14.6 11.8 12.2 12.4 
Latin America 16.4 14.4 13.7 7.8 6.4 
Middle~t 7.4 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Africa 4.2 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.0 
Oceania 5.6 4.2 5.7 6.R 7.3 
Sources: Koshiro Kazutoshi, 'Foreign direct investment and industrial relations: 
Japanese experience after the oil crisis', in Takamiya Susumu and Keith Thurley 
(eds.), Japan's Emerging Multinationals: An International Comparison of Policies 
andPractices, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1985, p. 206; Bela Balassa and 
Marcus Noland, Japan in the World Economy, Washington DC, Institute for 
International Economics, 1988, p. 119; Ezra Vogel, 'Japan as number one in Asia', 
in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), The United States, Japan, and Asia, New York and 
London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1994, pp. 178-82. 
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Variations in the sectoral distribution of investment by geographical region also 
exist. Table 8 shows that between 1981 and 1985, services were the dominant fonn 
of Japanese investment in North America and Europe, occupying between 62 to 65 
per cent and 63-72 per cent of the totals for their respective regions, with 
manufacturing investment occupying around 30 per cent of totals in North America 
and 20 per cent in Europe. In Asia the majority of investment between 1981 to 
1985 was in resources and manufacturing, accounting for around 40 per cent each, 
with investment in services low at around 18 per cent to 27 per cent. 
Table 8: Sectoral composition of Japanese foreign direct investment by region 1981 
and 1985 (percentage) 
Region Resource-based Manufat'turlng Servlt'es 
North America 
1981 8.6 29.1 62.3 
1985 5.8 29.5 64.7 
Europe 
1981 16.8 20.4 62.8 
1985 8.2 19.8 72.0 
Asia 
1981 41.7 40.4 17.9 
1985 34.1 39.1 26.8 
Latin America 
1981 19.9 41.6 38.5 
1985 10.9 29.3 59.8 
Middle East 
1981 11.0 85.7 3.3 
1985 11.4 74.3 14.3 
Africa 
1981 28.7 7.6 63.7 
1985 19.7 6.4 73.9 
Oceania 
1981 42.9 29.3 27.8 
1985 35.6 25.0 39.4 
Source: Peter Dicken, 'The changing geography of Japanese foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing industry', in Jonathan Morris (ed.), Japan and the 
Global Economy: Issues and Trends in the 1990's, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 
22. 
Other statistics illustrate the changing scope of Japan's FDI. Japan External 
Trade Organisation (JEfRO) figures claimed that in 1986 around 4 per cent of total 
Japanese production was conducted overseas, and this figure has been forecast by 
the OECD to rise to 12 per cent by 1995-1996.31 The OECD also calculates that by 
31peter Dicken, 'The changing geography of Japanese foreign direct investment in manufacturing 
industry: a global perspective', in Jonathan Morris (ed.), Japan and lhe Global Economy: Issues 
and Trends in the 1990's, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 22; A. E. Safarian, Mllltiluzlional 
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1993,6.4 per cent of Japanese total manufacturing was carried out overseas.32 In 
1990 Japanese corporations operating in the US were said to account for 1.5 per 
cent of that country's GOP, and Japanese corporations ran a total of 9,560 affiliates 
in the US and Canada in 1990; 2,998 in Europe in the same year; and 3,191 in 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1989. Emmott has estimated 
that there may be up to 300,000 Japanese managers operating enterprises abroad, 
and that these enterprises could employ between 2-8 million people. The DECO 
puts forward a more conservative figure of 1.1 million employees of Japanese 
firms abroad in 1993,33 At the same time, though, it is necessary to put these 
figures in perspective by noting that in 1986 the US and Germany produced around 
20 per cent of their total GNP overseas, and that in 1992 UK investment accounted 
for 2 per cent of US GOP, and that in 1992 US investment overseas accounted for 
6.7 per cent of the UK's GOP and 0.7 per cent of Japan's GOP.34 
These comparisons help to moderate the picture of Japanese FDI, but it cannot 
be denied that it has increased by massive margins since the 1980's and that its 
influence is felt globally. Before analysing the possible power and security 
implications of Japanese FDI, though, it is important to consider what factors have 
lain behind the patterns of increases and changes, and the long term structural 
stability of investment patterns. 
Until the 1980's, the chief characteristic of Japanese FDI was its use in the 
sourcing of cheap and diverse supplies of raw materials for domestic industry.35 
Much of this early investment was carried out by the general trading companies, 
Enterprises and Public Policy: A Study of Industrial Countries, Aldershot, Hampshire: Edward 
Elgar, 1993, p. 271; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OEeV Economic 
Surveys: Japan 1993-94, Paris, OECD, 1994, p. 22. 
32Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 
1993-94, p. 21. 
33BiIl Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, pp. 5, 23; Organil.ation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, DECD Economic Surveys: Japan 1993-94, p. 21. 
34peter Dicken, 'The changing geography of Japanese foreign direct investment', p. 22, A. E. 
Safarian. Multinational Enterprises and Public Policy: A Study of Industrial Countries, p. 271, 
Bill Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, p. 23. 
35]-. J. Pempel, 'Japanese foreign economic policy', p. 751; Fred C. Bergsten, Thomas Horst and 
Theodore H. Moran. American Multinationals and American Interests, Washington DC. The 
Brookings Institute, 1978, p. 430. 
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and it is estimated that between 19.50 and 1 en 1 around 75 per cent of Japanese 
affiliates overseas had been established by the general trading companies.36 But 
this period also saw the beginnings of a move towards manufacturing investment 
overseas in such industries as textiles and light assembly with the aim of 
overcoming rising wage costs in Japan and trade barriers to Japanese exports in 
countries such as Taiwan and South Korea. Sony had established overseas 
production facilities in Taiwan by 1967 and in Wales by 1974. and Japan's leading 
finns in synthetic fibres, textiles, electronics, and automobiles all had at least ten 
overseas subsidiaries by 1971.37 The liberaliL1tion of foreign exchange control! in 
the early 1970's and the MOPs fear of a subsequent rise in the value of yen led the 
government to provide tax breaks for companies which invested capital oversea! 
and so reduced pressure on the yen. The 1973 Oil Shock saw a temporary 
reimposition of restrictions on overseas investment, but the structural change in the 
Japanese economy brought about by higher energy prices and a move to higher 
value and technologically intensive industries rc~sulted in the export ()f many of 
Japan's older and heavy polluting industries to Asia.:''' 
Further upward revaluations of the yen, and the emerging threat of protc<:tionhnn 
in key European and US markets, meant that Japanese corporations increased their 
investment in manufacturing in these regions from the mid· 1970's until the t'nrty 
1980's. The major rise in the value of the yen against the dollar rollowing the 
September 1985 Plua Accord had the twin effects of raising production costs in 
Japan and making assets abroad comparatively cheap to acquire. This accounts for 
the huge surge in Japanese investment after 1985 and the achievement of the 
36Aleunder K. Youn,. Th~ Sogosho,flta: Japall's MII/liIlaIJOItol 7rading 0"",-.0";,,.,. Boulder. 
Co'or.adc,. Wcsl\'ic'" Pn-ss. 1m. p. 210; 0/..11". TCflJn, Mullinal/ollali,,", JapaM,U' Sh'/": 7711' 
Political uonomy of Outward l>tt"..ttdl'lIry. Pranttlun, New .kf1l('y: Praocelon Unl' ('ouly .-r('!\!I, 
1'J79. 
37~\er Dicken, 7he changing geogruphy or Japanese rUfclgn Jlr("\:t iO\c"Im('nl'. p. 33, frnl C. 
1krg,'1tcn. ~rlcmt MultiMfionalf, p. 432-
lKoa\'id Bailey. Oeorge .tartc and Rotter Sugden, rrarunalionnlf and (iovtrnmt'nt.,: R"t't'''' 
/'olicits In Japan, Front't, &rmall~. Ihl' U"/'I'd Sftllt'J and IJ,ilain. London. Ruullcdllc. 1994. p. 
14: A. E. Sararian. MU/linalional fJlltrpri,U"" and Pllhlic Poliry. p. 273; Frcd C. Brrgllte'n, 
~rican MU/llnalionalJ. p. 433; Peler Did.en. rrhc chan1ting geography or Japuncfj( rortilt" 
direct invcstment', p. 33. 
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US$67.5 billion high of FDI in 1989. The decline of Japanese FDI in the 1990's 
can be explained by the recession and credit squeeze in Japan that set in after 1990. 
But the continued relatively high levels of FDI and rising investment in 
manufacturing in Asia can be explained by the persistence of a high yen (endaka) 
until mid-l996 and the need for Japanese corporations to relocate to low wage 
production sites. In tum, this has caused fears of the 'hollowing out' (kadoka) of 
the Japanese economy in the 1990's as manufacturing industry is transferred 
offshore. 
To summarise, it can be seen that the FDI strategy of Japanese manufacturing 
TNCs in the 1980's and 1990's has been similar to that of their US and European 
counterparts in the 1960's and 1970's. Japanese corporations have sought 
production advantages, first in being able to circumvent trade barriers, and, second, 
in being able to secure low cost manufacturing bases. The motivations behind 
Japanese corporations investment in the financial sector will be looked at in the 
section on finance. 
Direct economic power from Japanese FDI 
Japanese corporations clearly have come to possess a great weight and presence in 
production through the global expansion of their FDI in recent years. But the 
important question is whether or not this raw power has been converted into forms 
of direct or indirect power which are capable of serving the interests of the Japanese 
state's government and of constituting part of security policy. As has been 
discussed in the section on production in the previous chapter, the activities of US 
TNCs have often been viewed as increasing the direct and indirect power of their 
home state. With regard to Japan, some commentators have made the link between 
TNC activities and the power of the home state. Huber and Nester, for instance, 
tend to see Japanese FDI behaviour as the outward projection of the Japan's 
domestic economic system and thus capable of being used in the interests of the 
Japanese state. In theoretical terms, the FDI of Japanese corporations is seen to 
137 
provide the government of the Japanese state with direct power as well as indirect 
power. 
However, there is not necessarily a clear cut connection between levels of FDI 
and the international power of the Japanese state. Application to this problem of the 
factors which have been seen to limit the control of the state with regard to domestic 
industrial policy highlights the probable limits of state power over the international 
activities of Japanese corporations as well. There may be no necessary link between 
the international direct power of the state and the size of Japanese FDI as the likes 
of Huber and Nester so confidently posit. Examination of the domestic economic 
component of production may reveal that there is not such a strong connection 
between it and the international production behaviour of Japanese corporations, and 
that FDI is not simply an outward expression of the direct power of the Japanese 
state found on the domestic level. Indeed, it may be the case that the Japanese state 
derives little power through production on the domestic level, which would 
undermine further the foundations of the argument which sees Japanese industrial 
policy and state intervention as also meaning control and direct power for the 
Japanese state in the international sphere. The next step, then. is to try to elucidate 
the actual links between the domestic and international activities of Japanese firms 
and the limiting effects upon the Japanese state's control and direct power. In order 
to do so, it is first essential to layout what has been seen as the typical model of 
state control of production at the domestic level and to show its limitations and 
often occasional irrelevance with regard to the international activities of Japanese 
corporations. 
The traditional model of Japanese domestic production derives from analysis of 
the period from the 1950's to the 1980's. and tends to incorporate the assumption 
that policy on production is generated by the economic bureaucracy consisting of 
MITI. the MOF, the BOJ. and the EPA. However, the BOJ has usually been seen 
as dominated by the MOF, and the EPA by MITI. These ministries were thought to 
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interact with major industrial producers, represented by the six city bank-centred 
neo-UIibatsu of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, 
and their associated trust banks, sea and marine insurance companies, life insurance 
companies, and general trading companies. 
Control of these industrial conglomerates and production was exerted by the 
bureaucracy using a variety of types of formal and informal methods, most of 
which have been mentioned already in the earlier description of the debate on 
industrial policy. The most effective form of control was viewed as the 
manipulation by MITI and the MOP of the financial flows to the large corporations. 
The zaibatsu structure of mutual shareholding in place since the 1950's, with up to 
60 per cent of a company's stock held by other companies in the same industrial 
group, benefited member companies by insulating them from the interests of private 
shareholders. But this system also meant that the means of 'direct financing' for 
companies--the use of the money markets and the sale of bonds and equities--were 
underdeveloped, and that companies became highly reliant upon their group 
member banks for the provision of low interest loans. This produced the 
phenomenon of 'overborrowing' whereby an average 70 per cent of the capital of 
member companies consisted of loans from their group member banks. The 
phenomenon of 'overborrowing' was matched by that of 'overloan' as the city 
banks lent out a high proportion of their capital to group members.39 
Whilst this system of financing reduced the interference of private shareholders 
in the management plans of the industrial groups, it was seen also to place the 
groups under the control of the economic bureaucracy and, in tum, under the 
control of the state. This was because much of the capital to finance the 
'overborrowing' and 'overloans' of the groups companies and banks was 
ultimately procured either from government financial institutions or from private 
financial institutions under government influence. The twelve city banks secured 
their funds from three main sources: firstly from their own depositors; secondly, 
39rhomas Huber, Strategic Economy, pp. 53-4. 
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from the sixty four regional banks, which, in turn obtained a high level of funds 
from the state via the BOJ; and, thirdly from the JDB which is financed by the 
MOFs Postal Savings System (PPS). 
Most of these sources of finance have been subject to varying degrees of control 
by the economic bureaucracy. The MOF through the BOJ has legal powers over 
bank licensing, reserve rates and interest rates, and up until its abolition in 1981 
was able to use the informal tool of 'window guidance' (madoguchi shido) to set 
the interest rates of the city banks.4o The MOF also administers PPS funds, which 
are then channelled to the private sector by the JDB under the direction of MITI. 
MITI also directs other credit creating institutions for industry such as the Export-
Import Bank of Japan (founded 1950), the Medium and Small Enterprises Credit 
Fund (1953) and the Central Bank ofIndustrial Cooperatives (1956).41 The control 
of these financial institutions has been described as not just important for 
determining the size and terms of industrial finance, but also for influencing its 
strategic direction--the government's dispensation of funds from its financial 
institutions providing important indications of which sectors it favours, so 
influencing the investment behaviour of private firms. 
As discussed previously, the economic bureaucracy was also seen to have had 
control over the domestic economy and its links to the international economy 
through the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FErrCL). 
The FEFfCL was instituted under SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Powers) as a 
measure designed to protect Japan's balance of payments over the short term in the 
immediate post-war period. But the FEFfCL came to be used as a means of 
protecting Japanese domestic industry from foreign investment and competition and 
of controlling the outward investment of Japanese companies. The FEFfCL in its 
original form prohibited all foreign exchange transactions unless carried out with 
40James Home, Japan's Financial Markets: Conflict and Consensus in Policymaking, Sydney, 
London and Boston: George, Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 26; William R. NeSler, Japanese 
Industrial Targeting: The Noemercantilist Path to Economic Superpower, London, Macmillan, 
1991, p. 212. 
41 Chalmers Johnson, 'MITI and Japanese international economic policy'. p. 256. 
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MOF and state approval, and demanded that all foreign exchange gained by 
Japanese corporations from foreign trade should be held in special accounts 
designated of approved by the BOl The administration of the FEFfCL passed to 
MITI's International Trade Bureau (later International Policy Trade Bureau) in 
1952. The provisions of the law became less stringent over time. In 1952 foreign 
exchange banks were authorised limited holdings of foreign currency. In 1966 the 
same right was passed to the general trading companies, and in 1978 restrictions on 
the type of institutions able to hold foreign exchange were lifted. The amounts of 
foreign exchange that could be held with BOJ approval were also liberalised: rising 
from US$40,OOO to US$I,I00,OOO between 1964 and 1970, and in 1971 
restrictions on the amount that could be held were removed. In 1978 the BOJ 
approval system was replaced by a notification system.42 
MITI's control of foreign exchange clearly gave the state a measure of direct 
power over the commercial and investment activities of Japanese corporations, and 
it is no surprise that MITI tried to counter the effects on its power of liberalisation 
of the FEFfCL. Johnson chronicles in some detail MITI's attempts between 1962 
and 1963 to introduce the Special Promotion Law for the Promotion of Designated 
Industries (Tokutei Sangyo Shinko Rinji Sochi Roan, or Tokushinho) , which 
would have given MITI new powers over industrial financing and made 
commercial banks give special preference for financing to industries designated by 
MITI. The plans of MITI were eventually defeated by a coalition of interests from 
the banking sector, the LOP and the MOF.43 
Moreover, liberalisation of the state's financial controls continued until the 
introduction of a revised FEFfCL in 1980. The revised law of 1980 called for 
notification of the BOJ for external investments of over ¥3 million (changed to ¥lO 
million in 1984), and gave the ministry twenty days to decide approval of the 
transaction. The law also included provisions on the prevention of transactions if 
42Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 33; A. E. Safarian, Multinational Enterprises atrl 
Public Policy, p. 272. 
43Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, pp. 255-67; Kent E. Calder, Strategic 
Capitalism, p. 63. 
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they were deemed harmful to the Japanese economy or the stability of the Japanese 
and international money markets. Perhaps most notable for the discussion about 
security and production, though, was that foreign exchange transactions could be 
stopped if, 'they might disturb the faithful performance of treaties or other 
international agreements, or imperil the international peace and security, or disturb 
the maintenance of public order.' There were also some provisions in the law that 
stated the need for prior approval with regard to investments in areas like South 
Africa. The Japanese bureaucracy and state could be seen then as having retained 
some form of control over FDI and the legal ability to restrict FDI in the interests of 
security. But the wording of the provision is somewhat vague and there is little 
evidence so far that the state has actually tried to manipulate the element of 
production in this way. Safarian points out that from the introduction of the law 
until 1983 he could not find one instance of the Japanese government's refusal of a 
formal application for investment.44 
Alongside the control of industrial finance the economic bureaucracy was also 
seen to have had influence over production by a mix of instruction and guidance. 
Various exemptions from the 1947 Anti-Monopoly Law have provided MITI with 
the right to organise cartels in those industries it designates as in need of 
rationalization and restructuring. Cartels are usually temporary bodies initiated by 
MITI to coordinate activities within a single industry. MITI is also known to 
coordinate activities across groups of industries by regular meetings between its 
officials and the heads of major corporations represented on industrial 
associations.45 
It has already been mentioned how the progress of liberalisation from the 1960's 
onwards led MITI to switch to the use of informal tools of control. Some 
commentators have claimed that, despite its intangible nature, it is administrative 
guidance which has given MITI and the other economic ministries the firmest 
44A. E. Safarian, Multinational Enterprises and Public Policy, 274. 
45rhomas Huber, Strategic Economy, p. 41. 
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control over production. Administrative guidance can be defined as, 'administrative 
actions taken by administrative organs, although without legal force, that are 
intended to influence specific actions of other parties in order to reach an 
administrative aim.'46 In the case of MITI, Johnson identified its administrative 
guidance as the ability to recommend (kankoku), request (yose!), advise (jogen) 
and to mediate (chUkai), and also noted the advantages of these methods as 
immediate and free oflegal entanglements.47 Johnson and others have also pointed 
to the importance of the practice of amakudmi (literally: descent from heaven), in 
which officials from the economic bureaucracy move into top positions in the 
companies which they often formerly supervised, so strengthening the links 
between the bureaucracy and business. Johnson notes that up to 1979 three out of 
five of the presidents of the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) 
were former bureaucrats, and James Horne has shown that between 1970 and 
1980, MOF placed 192 of its former career and non-career officials in private 
financial institutions.48 
The MOF has generally been seen as the most powerful ministry politically due 
to its close links with the LDP. In 1980 there were twenty five former MOF 
officials in the House of Representatives and twenty one of these were LDP 
members. In addition, four ex-MOF officials-Ikeda Hayato, Fukuda Takeo, 6hira 
Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi--have served as prime minister in the post-war 
period. By contrast, MITI is usually seen as weak politically, with less 
representation in the Diet and providing only one prime minister in the post-war 
period: Kishi Nobusuke. But MITl's lack of political influence perhaps is made up 
for by its status as one of the top ministerial jobs that it is important for prime 
46shiono Hiroshi, Administrative guidance'. in Tsuji Kiyoaki (ed.), Public Administration in 
Japan, Tbkyb, University of Tbkyb Press, 1984, p. 204. 
47Chalmers Johnson, 'MITI and Japanese international economic policy', p. 254. 
48chalmers Johnson, 'MITI and Japanese international economic policy'. p. 258; MITI and Ihe 
JapaneseMiracle, p. 71; James Horne, Japan'sFiMnciaIMarkels, p. 206. 
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ministerial candidates to have held; the current prime minister, Hashimoto RyOtaro, 
being an example ofthis.49 
The economic bureaucracy's influence over industrial finance, combined with its 
powers of guidance and its networks of human and political relations, should argue 
for a large measure of state control over Japanese corporations and production on 
the domestic level, and that this would be carried over to control on the international 
level. Certainly, as the case of Sumitomo Metals illustrated, in the past the state's 
economic bureaucracy has had the strength to exercise very direct power over 
production. In the contemporary period there is also evidence of state power, as in 
the break-up by MITI in 1989 of a beef cartel formed without its permission and 
deemed as against the public interest.so However, whilst the model outlined above 
indicates a range of controls at the disposal of the state and possibly greater state 
control in the case of Japan than of other industrialized countries, at the same time 
the faults of the model need to be recognised and the importance needs to be 
emphasised of the limiting factors of bureaucratic conflict and the role of 
politicians, the refusal of big business to be corralled into going along with the 
Japanese state's wishes, and foreign pressures for liberalisation. 
An obvious point that needs to be made concerning bureaucratic conflict is that 
the range of actors that have been considered as within the policy-making system 
has usually been too small and needs to be expanded. The traditional emphasis 
upon MITI, the MOF, the BOJ and EPA excludes other ministerial actors that have 
been involved in control of the economy, most notably the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications (MPf), the Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of 
Construction (MOC), and the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF). The four economic ministries remain the core of the policy-making 
process, but the possible input of the other ministries must be acknowledged and 
requires further study. 
49J<ent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 76; Chalmers Johnson. MITI and Japanese 
international economic policy'. p. 258. 
5Orhomas Huber, Strategic Economy, pp. 40-1. 
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Bureaucratic conflict can be seen on several levels. Conflict within specific 
ministries has occurred as in the case of the division between MITI's International 
Trade Bureau and its other bureaus over the pace of liberalisation; the former in the 
past favouring a more open policy. and the latter favouring concentration on 
domestic industry.51 Conflict between elements of the economic bureaucracy 
usually regarded as allies is represented by the disputes between the MOF and the 
BOJ over monetary policy in the 1980's.52 Furthermore, the loosening of the ties 
between allied ministries may be marked by the reemergence of the EPA in the 
1970's as a relatively independent body after a long period of domination by 
MITI.53 
The issues of differing policy priorities and interjurisdictional disputes have 
already been touched upon in an earlier section, and these types of internal conflicts 
between the state's administrative institutions limit its ability to manage the 
economy. As Patrick and Rosovsky pointed out, MITI often has preferred to 
concentrate on industrial production, the BOJ on price stability. the MOF on 
aggregate demand and the EPA on stable growth.54 These divergent aims have 
resulted in clashes over policy and criticism by one ministry of another, as with 
MITI's more recent complaints about the MOFs slow liberatisation of finance and 
overprotectedness of the banking sector.55 Interjurisdictional disputes have 
hampered attempts to produce a coordinated economic poticy. The failure to 
establish the International Cooperation Agency in 1974, which was designed to 
coordinate Japan's fragmented aid policy. was due conflicts in authority between 
MITI, the MOF, and the organisation's original sponsor, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA). All of the ministries have fought to protect their own spheres of 
influence from encroachment by competitors. The MOF fought off successfully 
51Chalmers Johnson, MITI and Japanese international economic policy', p. 268. 
52 James Home, Japan's Fino.ncial Markets, p. 34. 
53Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 56. 
54Hugh Patrick and Patrick Rosovsky, 'Japan's economic performance: an overview,' p. 49. 
55t.eon Hollerman, Japan Disincorporated: The Economic liberalization Process, Stanford, 
California: Hooverlnstitution Press, 1988, p. 18. 
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attempts in 1955, 1963 and 1970 to remove the compilation of the budget from its 
control, and in 1996 is still engaged in a struggle to prevent the breakup of its 
powers of regulation. MITI and the MOFA formed a temporary alliance the 1970's 
to defeat plans for a new ministry for small and medium sized enterprises, and 
MITI's Tokushinh8 strategy was defeated by an MOF-FfC (Fair Trade 
Commission) coalition. In this instance, MOF was concerned about the erosion of 
its power over finance, and the FTC about contraventions of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law.56 
In all of these conflicts LDP politicians played an important role in forging a 
compromise, or tipping the balance of power in favour of one ministry or another. 
Thus, as states in the introductory section to this chapter, the role of politicians 
needs to be added as another factor complicating the picture of the state's control of 
the economy. Calder points outs a number of cases in which the input of politicians 
in economic policy-making has proved crucial, and shows that the attempts of the 
bureaucracy to influence corporations through flows of finance have been frustrated 
by an alliance between banks and the LDP.57 The influence of the zaikai financial 
world in combination with the LDP is, then, another variable in moderating the 
extent of state control over production. 
It is also possible to view new financial strength by Japanese corporations and 
pressures for economic liberalisation as further weakening the influence over it of 
the state's bureaucracy. The traditional model of control of production saw MITI 
and the MOF as able to exert influence through the dependence of corporations on 
finance often procured from government run or government regulated institutions. 
However, this model may no longer apply due to the rise in liquidity of Japanese 
corporations since the 1970's and the diversification of sources of finance available 
56chalmers Johnson, Mm and the Japanese Miracle, pp. 74-5, 258. 
57Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 140. 
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to them. In part, these changes have been brought about by rising profits and the 
internationalization of the Japanese economy.58 
The 1970's witnessed the gradual disappearance of the phenomenon of 
'overloan'. In 1970,8.7 per cent of city bank deposits consisted of BOJ loans, but 
by 1980 this ratio had fallen to 2.1 per cent, and by 1990 only 0.8 per cent of total 
bank liabilities were accounted for by BOJ 10ans.59 This also resulted in a 
subsequent reduction in the 'overborrowing' by large corporations. By 1983, 
Japanese corporations had reduced their levels of total capital procurement from 
bank loans to 29.2 per cent, compared with 74 per cent in 1974. Japanese 
corporations began to switch to the procurement of finance from bonds and stock 
convertible issues. In 1974 bond and convertible stock issues accounted for only 8 
per cent and 14 per cent respectively of capital raised by Japanese companies. But 
by 1985, these figures had risen to 32.1 per cent and 38.7 per cent. In 1985, 36.3 
per cent of funds were raised by equities, around double the level of the 1970's. 
Companies also began to increase the levels of capital procured abroad. In the early 
1970's, 1.7 per cent of capital was raised in the Euromarkets, but this increased to 
19.6 per cent by the late 1970's, and according to Nester, by 1983 nearly 43 per 
cent of capital was raised abroad.6o Part of this increase in liquidity can be 
accounted for by the 'zaitech' profits of large corporations. By the mid-1980's 
companies such as Matsushita and Toyota were often felt to act more like banks as 
they made greater profits from financial deals than from their manufacturing 
activities. 
The reduced dependence of industry and the city banks upon government 
finance is also apparent in the changing direction of JOB loans in this period. In the 
1950's and 1960's a large proportion of JOB loans were made to industry. but by 
the late 1970's JOB loans were being used increasingly to satisfy the 'ctientism' 
58J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1982, p. 138. 
59James Horne, Japan's Financial Markets, p. 36; Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p.214. 
60william R. Nester, JapaneselndustrialTargeling, p. 212; Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, 
p.214. 
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demands of groups important to the LOP's political strategy. In 1976 only 10 per 
cent of JDB loans were channelled directly to industry, whereas the remaining 90 
per cent were channelled to infrastructure related projects. Added to this, between 
1965 and 1990 62.8 per cent of government credit went to industries considered to 
be in decline, and in 1991 the largest shares of the government's PPS loans 
distributed through the Fiscal Investment Loan Plan (ALP) went to housing, small 
businesses and public companies.61 The Export-Import Bank and the JDB often 
thought to be crucial in influencing the flow of funds to industry, by this time were 
only receiving 8.2 per cent of government finance. Finally, this period also saw a 
change in the balance of financial power between the government and the city 
banks. Calder stresses that the explosion of the government's debt after 1973 meant 
that it was forced to negotiate bond obligations more on the terms of the banks.62 
This change, in combination with foreign pressure for liberalisation, gave the city 
banks greater leverage in securing more market-oriented liquidity. 
The weakening control of finance also needs to be set alongside the reminder 
that large areas of capital procurement by private industry always has been beyond 
the effective control of the bureaucracy and state. The non-bank institutions of the 
industrial groups, and, in particular, the life insurance companies, hold large 
deposits that can be used to provide their group member companies with finance. 
The independent and politically strong NTI corporation--the world's largest 
corporation in terms of market value in 1995--has long been able to issue its own 
bonds and has resisted successfully attempts by the bureaucracy to break up its 
business. Since the 1950's, the general trading companies have been able to act as 
credit creating institutions by extending credit, loan guarantees, and venture capital. 
After 1966, the general trading companies have been able to handle foreign 
61Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 105; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 1993-94, p. 55. 
62Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 214. 
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exchange and to act as promoters of FDI capital beyond the traditional purview of 
the state.63 
The issue of foreign exchange draws attention to a further area of reduced 
government influence over production and FDI. Calder argues that the FEFfCL 
may never have been as effective as some commentators claimed in determining the 
investment patterns of Japanese companies. The potential for control that the 
original law offered to the state is not in doubt, but Calder points out that until 1956 
the MITl's International Trade Bureau, which administered foreign exchange, was 
not even headed by officials from MITI, but by officials with expertise in this field 
from the MOFA who traditionally took a more liberal line towards trade and 
investment.64 Control of the International Trade Bureau passed to MITI officials in 
1956. But by 1964, the FEFfCL regime and MITl's control of it had already 
begun to weaken under the pressures of liberalisation. Hence, the period of 
effective control of foreign exchange by MITI in the service of its industrial policy 
may only have been for about eight years. The 1981 reforms of the FEFfCL, as 
already described, continued to reserve the right for the bureaucracy to halt FDI 
transactions if deemed harmful to the stability of the economy and state's security. 
The state's bureaucracy may then still possess latent power over FDI if it seeks to 
exercise it. But the general impression is one of declining control on a day-te-day 
basis, and practical difficulties in the manipulation of finance and FDI in the 
interests of the state's economic bureaucracy. 
As well as limitations on the state's formal controls, there also seem to be 
limitations on its informal controls over production. Ministries turned to 
administrative guidance to compensate for the decline of their formal powers in the 
1 eno's, but there are apparent shortcomings to the practice of amakudari. Horne's 
figures for amakudari of MOF officials show that even though 192 of them entered 
private banks between 1970 and 1980, a majority of them entered credit 
63Kent E. Calder, Strat~gic Capitalism, pp. 95, 144, 146; Alexander Young, The Sogoshosha, 
pp.58-72. 
64Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 33. 
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associations (151), mutual banks (28) and regional banks (11), but only two of 
them entered city banks or long term credit banks. Most city banks were said to 
have been reluctant to employ the former officials because they did not want the 
encumbrance of MOF officials in running the bank.65 In 1995, none of the six 
senior MOF officials reported to have followed the amakudari path entered a city 
bank.66 The general trading companies are also known to have employed few 
former officials from the economic bureaucracy and to be relatively free of LDP 
influence.67 In addition, Amakudari does not seem to have been effective with 
regard to major manufacturing companies outside the major industrial groupings, 
allowing companies such as Isuzu to ignore MITl's displeasure over the initiation 
of joint operations with General Motors in the 1970's. 
The loosening control of the state over domestic production implies reduced 
control over the international activities of Japanese corporations. Moreover, 
Japanese corporations and sectors of the Japanese economy can be identified which 
have never been subject to control by the state bureaucracy in their international 
investment activities. The general trading companies have usually moved in 
harmony with state interests but have already been identified as prominent 
international actors relatively free of state control. Calder stresses that government 
influence has also been excluded from many of the most dynamic and 
internationally active of Japanese corporate actors such as the automobile and 
electronics industries.68 In the 1960's and 1970's, the Japanese state's share of 
investment in electronics was only between 0.8 and 2.5 per cent, and many 
electronics and automobile have always been free of the ties of government 
finance.69 In addition to this, many of the corporations in these sectors have taken a 
combative attitude towards state interference over planning and investment. MITl's 
6SJames Home, Japan's Financial Markets, p. 206. 
66A.fahi Shimbun, 28 March, 1996, p. 3. 
67Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism. p. 146. 
68Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism, p. 107. 
690aniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High 
Technology, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989. p. n. 
150 
failed attempts to merge elements of the automobile industry are well documented, 
and its initial failure to recognise the potential of Sony's and to prevent its purchase 
of transistor technology from overseas is legendary.70 Thus, it is apparent that 
many of the corporations which have been responsible for the expansion of Japan's 
FDI and the globalisation of its economy in the 1980's are those very corporations 
which are most likely to be distanced from government control. If it can be 
assumed that Sony, Matsushita, Sanyo, Sharp, Toyota, Nissan and Honda are not 
readily amenable to state control then this greatly limits the direct power of the 
Japanese state through production, and casts doubt upon the model of the Japanese 
economy which sees domestic control as duplicated on the international level. It 
may be that the progression of the intemationalisation of the Japanese economy has 
now eroded the control of the Japanese bureaucracy and subsequently the state over 
production to the point where its direct power in this area has become less effective. 
If much of the structure of Japanese bureaucratic state control over production 
has weakened, then the only element left to tie the international activities of 
Japanese TNCs to the direct power of the state is the type of arguments put forward 
by Strange, Waltz and Gilpin which assume that the chief executives of TNCs in 
the final instance remain loyal to their native state. This factor is unmeasureable, 
and the argument could be made that in the case of Japan management structures 
maintain the loyalty of TNC executives to their home country. The persuasiveness 
of this type of cultural particularistic argument is perhaps, though, undermined by 
recognition of the fact that since the late 1980's many Japanese corporations have 
been forced by economic necessity, just like their Western counterparts, to relocate 
their manufacturing activities abroad even at a cost to their home country's 
economy. Management sense dictates that Japanese TNCs need to operate 
independently of state control when economic survival is at stake. 
The application of the limits of state, and in this case especially bureaucratic, 
control discovered in the debate on industrial policy reveals, therefore, similar 
70James Horne, 'The economy and the political system', in J. A. A. Stockwin (ed.>, Dynamic and 
lmmobilist Politics in Japan, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 144. 
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limits to state control over the economic power of production. The observation of 
many has been that the massive increases of Japanese FDI since the late 1970's has 
provided the Japanese state--represented by the bureaucracy--which is thought to be 
in control of the domestic economy, the same degree of control over the external 
economic activities ofJapanese firms. Indeed, based on a 1950's or 1960's model 
of the Japanese economy this would seem to be a fair observation. However, 
examination of the role of bureaucratic conflict, and the influence of politicians, big 
business and foreign pressures for liberalisation makes for hesitation in concluding 
that Japan's increased FDI can be converted into direct economic power for the 
state. On the contrary, the picture is one of weakening and disputed state control in 
the areas of economic activity thought traditionally to be under its control, and of 
large and important areas of the domestic economy and its links to the international 
economy beyond close state control. Caution is then needed when trying to decide 
how much direct power the Japanese state has derived from the increases of 
investment by Japanese corporations. The Japanese state, of course, always 
reserves the right to cut the flow of FDI in cases of a major threat to security, as 
laid down in the revised 1981 FEFfCL, but this is a drastic measure and suggests a 
restricted use of production power in the service of the Japanese state's direct 
power and security policy. All this suggests that the Japanese state when acting as a 
global civilian power would be able to draw relatively little direct power from the 
component of production, and instead that when examining the case of lapan-North 
Korea security relations in chapter five it is necessary to look mainly at Japan's 
indirect power from FDI. 
Indirect power and security from Japanese FDI 
The most significant form of power accrued to Japan due to the expansion of 
Japanese investment is likely to be indirect power. The sheer size and strategic 
importance of Japanese FDI to the economies of certain regions and industries in 
parts of the US, Europe and Asia are likely to have an indirect power impact upon 
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the recipient states. The presence of TNCs can often bring about a transformation 
or even substitution of the host states production practices. Thus, for example, the 
inward investment of Japanese corporations in the UK since the 1980's has 
brought about a change in the domestic automobile industry's supplier networks 
and union practices. This so-called 'Japanisation' of British industry is arguably the 
real power impact of Japanese investment in Britain. The Japanese TNCs' own 
direct power was revealed by the ability to negotiate the best terms for their new 
operations with regional governments by the offer of vital investment. But beyond 
this Japanese firms now have secured indirect power by the spread and gradual 
acceptance of their production practices which have often been accepted in a 
modified form as the 'rules of the game' in the automobile industry. The integrative 
effects of this represent indirect power for the firms and, to a lesser extent, for the 
Japanese state, which is seen to embody these values and from which the firms are 
seen originally to operate from. In the case of the UK and Japan, security is not an 
issue, but it is possible to see how Japanese FDI in other states which are less 
politically stable may have integrative effects which can alleviate sources of 
economic and cultural conflict; though this is a fine balance, as shown by the anti-
Japanese riots in Southeast Asia in 1974, which were a reaction to what was seen 
as alien and exploitative Japanese FDI. 
Therefore, when Japanese FDI is considered in Europe, North America, Asia 
and other regions its indirect power effects, although not easily measured in the 
FDI statistics or easily shaped consciously in the service of the state, may have the 
greatest implications for security policy and Japan's capacity to act as a global 
civilian power. Its integrative effects (or in the case of France in the early 1990's, 
its alienating and xenophobic effects) can have important results for security and 
diplomatic relations over the long term. This type of indirect economic power, 
whilst it brings security benefits to the government and population of the Japanese 
state, is by definition hard for the state to manipulate actively for its security ends, 
and requires that the state rely on the economic strength and cooperation of non-
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state actors such as TNCs and the Sogoshosha. But based on the knowledge of the 
potential security benefits of indirect economic power, the most important 
conclusion for security policy-makers is that rather than trying to manipulate FDI 
directly in the interests of the state, the most effective policy is to foster the spread 
of interdependency by further promoting the expansion of FDI free of state 
intervention and by creating the political conditions to allow FDI to flow. Hence, 
this makes it clear that when examining in chapter five the case of Japan's economic 
power with regard to North Korea, it will be important to place particular emphasis 
on judging how far the Japanese state has shown a willingness to cooperate with 
private business in order to allow indirect power in production to work for Japan's 
security interests. 
JAPANESE FINANCIAL POWER 
Size and scope of Japanese financial resources 
In the field of international politics the size and weight of Japan's capital outflows 
have been viewed as delivering power, both direct and indirect, to the Japanese 
state. This makes it imperative to outline the size and scope of Japanese financial 
power so that later on Japan's ability to influence North Korean security behaviour 
through this economic component can be assessed correctly. 
Since the 1980's Japan's net external assets have risen dramatically. In 1981, 
net external assets stood at US$11.5 billion, but by 1989 this figure had risen to 
US$293.2, giving Japan the position of the number one creditor in the world. By 
1994 Japan's external assets had risen still further to US$689 billion.71 In 1990, 
Japanese banks are estimated to have accounted for 34 percent total assets and 34 
per cent of total liabilities of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).72 
Japanese bank assets in this period were concentrated especially in the developed 
71Asahi Shimbun, 77Ie Japan Almanac 1996, Tl\lcyl\, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1995, p. 105. 
72Hamada Kl\ichi, 'Japan's prospective role in the international monetary regime', in Craig O. 
Oarby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds.>, Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?, Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 143. 
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nations. For instance, around 12 per cent of total US banking assets were held by 
Japanese banks in 1990.73 The burgeoning presence of the Japanese banks' 
activities was also shown by the buying sprees that they engaged in during the 
1980's in the financial markets of the developed nations. In 1988, Japanese banks 
purchased US$36 billion and US$46 billion worth of securities in the US and 
European markets respectively, and US$11 billion of securities in the US market 
alone.74 Bill Emmott estimates that in 1991, 32.1 per cent of all non-sterling loans 
in the UK were made by Japanese banks.75 
The size of the individual Japanese banks and securities houses active in the 
foreign markets was also taken to be representative of emerging Japanese financial 
power. Ranked by capital assets, in 1994 nine out of the ten largest banks in the 
world were Japanese, with Dai-Ichi Kangyo topping the list with total assets of 
US$520 billion. In the same year, five out of the ten largest insurance companies 
were Japanese, as were three out of the ten largest securities houses.76 The 
securities houses have seen something of a decline since the high point of the 
1980's when they were able to purchase up to 40 per cent of total sates of US 
treasury bills and to dominate the market for Eurobonds.77 But the sheer size and 
financial stability of firms such as Nomura suggests continued influence. 
The explanations for this deluge of Japanese capital outflows into the 
international financial markets during the 1980's are complex, but tend to focus on 
a combination of domestic structural changes and pressures for liberalization. One 
of the features often noted about the Japanese economy up until the end of the 
1980's was the high level of savings compared to a relatively low level of domestic 
consumption. During the high growth periods of the 1960's and 1 rno's the excess 
of savings over consumption was absorbed by the demand of Japanese 
138iI1 Emmott. Japan's Global Reach, p. 157. 
74sakamoto Katsuzo and Richard C. Conquest, 'The intemationalisation of Japanese capital,' in 
Glenn D. Hook and Michael A. Weiner (eds.), The Inlernationaiisalion oj Japan, London, 
Routledge, 1992,p. 144. 
75sill Emmott. Japan's Global Rrach, p. 145. 
76Asian Wall Street Journal, 23 October 1995, pp. 22-4. 
17SiIl Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, p. 145. 
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corporations for low interest loans for investment. This demand for savings for 
investment by Japanese corporations began to drop off with the gradual decline in 
economic growth rates in the late 1970's and their generally improved liquidity 
situation. Much of the slack in demand for savings, however, was taken up by the 
expanding government budgets of this period. But this demand for the funds 
provided by savings in tum began to be reduced with government efforts in the 
mid-1980's to restrain budget increases. Declining domestic demand for the 
continued high level of savings meant that they eventually began to flow outwards 
as portfolio investments to foreign financial markets which promised more 
attractive returns.78 
This domestic structural imbalance in the savings-consumption ration coincided 
with the trend towards greater liberalisation of finance that has already been 
described in the section on production. The removal of barriers to the movement of 
Japanese capital abroad, culminating in the 1981 revised FEFfCL was one result of 
the pressures for liberalization, as was the September 1985 Plaza Accord that raised 
the value of the yen against the dollar, so increasing the buying power of Japanese 
investors in overseas markets. The moves toward overseas investment by Japanese 
banks was further encouraged by the decision of the BIS in 1987 to set standard 
capital adequacy ratios of 8 per cent for all its member banks by 1992.79 The aim of 
the directive was to standardise to some degree the risk for investors, but this 
initially proved to be problematic for Japanese banks accustomed to operating on 
low capital adequacy ratios of 3 per cent, and made it imperative for them to 
broaden their capital bases quickly. In order to assist them in this task, the MOF 
allowed Japanese banks to count 45 per cent of unrealised stock market gains as 
part of their capita1.80 The result of this was to in effect tie the capital levels of 
Japanese banks to the value of the Tokyo stock market. At the time, the Tokyo 
?HErie Helleiner, 'Money and influence: Japanese power in the international monetary and financial 
system,' in Kathleen Newland (cd.), The International Relations 0/ Japan, Macmillan, London, 
1990, pp. 24-5. 
79Sakarnoto Katsuzo and Richard Conquest, The inlemationaIisalion of Japanese capital,' p. 133. 
SOChristopher Wood, The Bubble Economy: Japan's Extraordinary Speculative Boom 0/ the 80s 
and the Dramatic Bust 0/ the 90s, New Y orlc, The A tlantie Monthly Press, 1992, p. 25. 
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market was booming and provided the banks with easy scope to broaden their 
capital base and so to create more collateral for loans, a large proportion of which 
flowed to foreign capital markets. As long as the Tokyo stockmarket continued to 
rise, the opportunities for banks to create cheap capital seemed to be endless. 
Finally, this trend was reinforced by interest rate deregulation in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's. Japanese banks, instead of seeking to boost their profits through the 
manipulation of domestic interest rates, continued to look for more profitable 
activities in the stockmarket and abroad. 
Direct power from Japanese finance 
Having analysed in this way the trends and causes of the expansion of Japanese 
financial institutions into the world's financial markets since the 1980's, the next 
step is to consider the types of power that may accrue from this to the Japanese 
state, and their utility for Japan's security policy as a global civilian power. Nester 
again makes the connection between the financial activities of Japanese banks and 
the power of the Japanese state. Making no distinction between the Japanese state 
itself and Japanese firms, he comments with a touch of hyperbole that, 'Japan is the 
world's financial superpower, and its financial clout is mind boggling.'81 Bill 
Emmott is more cautious in his assessment, but acknowledges the existence of 
these types of views when he states that, 'the rise of Japanese investment made 
many people start worrying in the late 1980's about Japanese banks' hold on the 
financial arteries not just of the United States but also ofthe world.'82 
The growth of Japanese finance has certainly been accepted by scholars from the 
neo-realist school as signalling a shift in the global balance of power away from the 
US and, to some degree, towards Japan. In the late 1980's Gilpin argued that 
Japan's rise to the position of number one creditor nation accompanied by the US's 
assumption of the position of number one debtor nation, and the growth of the 
81 William R. Nester, Japanese Industrial Targeting, p. 207. 
828i11 Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, p. 157. 
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'Nichibei' economy, was reconfiguring the power relationship between the US and 
Japan. The Reagan administration's economic and defence policy came to be 
underwritten by Japanese capital. Japan served as the banker to US political and 
economic hegemony, supported the US military build-up, the integrity and value of 
the US dollar, and ultimately US prosperity. Gilpin views Japan's policy in this 
regard as maintaining access to its most important market in the US, but also as 
ensuring its own security by bankrolling the US's continued forward deployment 
in Asia.s3 
It is hard to doubt that the rise of Japan's position as a global creditor also has 
produced some change in the global political order as well. Moreover, the provision 
of Japanese finance to the US could certainly be seen as having aided Japanese 
security by bolstering the US's commitment to Asian security. What is less clear. 
however, is how far this financial power is direct or indirect, and how far is has 
been used consciously for the ends of the Japanese state. In discussions about US 
financial power, for instance, the sense is often that it has been used deliberately for 
the state's security. In regard to the case of Japan, examination also needs to be 
made of how far the state derives direct power from finance and the possibilities of 
its use for security policy. 
Eric Helleiner points out certain cases which have been seen as the manipUlation 
of Japanese financial institutions for the Japanese state's own purposes. One of 
these is the move by Japanese banks to continue investing heavily in the US 
markets from 1985 to 1986 even after beginning to suffer financial losses. 
Helleiner notes that Gilpin attributes this move to coercion by the Japanese 
government for these banks to remain engaged in the US in order to protect 
Japanese access to US markets and to the US security umbrella. A second example 
provided by Helleiner was the return of Japanese investors to the US money 
markets in 1988 despite a lack of obvious market incentives. Helleiner again notes 
that some commentators have seen this move by the Japanese banks as resulting 
83Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987. pp. 330,332.338. 
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from Japanese government pressure to support the stability of the dollar and hence 
the reelection chances of the pro-free trade presidential candidate George Bush. 
These examples are part of a body of thinking which considers the Japanese state as 
employing as a type of 'investment strike' tool in order to exercise direct economic 
power and to influence the behaviour of other states. 
All this would seem to add up to a plausible argument for significant direct 
economic power provided to the Japanese state through control of the international 
investment activities of private financial institutions, which could then be used by it 
as a global civilian power for security purposes. However, as with the economic 
component of production, after having built up one possible view of power it is 
necessary to begin to moderate this by making some important reservations about 
Japan's direct power in finance and the policy-making obstacles to it. First, and as 
noted by Helleiner, the two examples of politically inspired investment identified 
above also have possible market based interpretations. In the case of the believed 
intervention of the Japanese state in 1985 to 1986, it is just as easy to argue that 
Japanese firms saw a need to continue their investment over the long term and were 
willing to accept short term losses to achieve this. As for the 1988 example, 
Helleiner provides evidence that banks may very well have seen attractive 
investment opportunities in the US largely unrelated to the issue of George Bush's 
election campaign.84 
The second adjustment that needs to be made to the view of the Japanese state's 
direct financial power is the need to again separate the state from the private actors 
of the Japanese financial industry and to note increasing limits to state control over 
it. Examination of the erosion of the economic bureaucracy's control over the 
sphere of industrial finance reveals that the factors of interministerial conflict, and 
the role of politicians, big business and liberalization were all significant. These 
factors also playa role in the Japanese state's ability to manage the international 
activities of Japanese banks. The limits imposed by declining control over foreign 
84Eric Helleiner, 'Money and influence', pp. 28-31 
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exchange and rejection of anwkudari appointments from the MOF by the city 
banks have already been seen. The recent scandals involving Daiwa Bank and 
Sumitomo Trading have highlighted conflict between the economic bureaucracy and 
the banking industry. The scandals have also further weakened the MOPs image of 
infallibility, even leading to calls for the ministry's separation from the 
responsibility for banking regulation.85 The influence of the MOF over the banking 
industry has also been challenged by the emergence of the FfC as an independent 
actor critical of the MOF. The traditional view of a tight relationship between the 
MOF and the banks may not be so applicable to the contemporary period, and 
suggests that the ability of the state's bureaucracy to regulate and manipulate the 
increasingly globalised Japanese banking industry is becoming as limited as that of 
other developed states. The question of manifest power, as Helleiner points out, 
still remains, and there is possibility that as yet the Japanese state has not seen fit to 
reveal its true direct financial power.86 But even if this were so, it indicates that the 
state cannot readily manipulate finance as a direct component of economic power, 
so limiting its utility for security policy. 
Connected to state control and the utility of financial power is the question of the 
vulnerability of creditors to Japanese finance and the costs of its threatened 
withdrawal. One argument often banded around is that the Japanese banks through 
their large holdings of US treasury bills have the capacity to influence US policy by 
an implicit threat to cease buying, or to sell bills, so inducing a financial crisis for 
the US. This argument though may not be so realistic. Even assuming that 
Japanese banks could be influenced to stop buying bonds--one of the most steadily 
profitable areas of their business--for a non-market oriented motivation, the US 
would not necessarily suffer long term financial damage given its latent ability to 
finance its debt internally.87 Furthermore, in dumping US treasury bills, Japanese 
851shizawa Yasuharu, MOF: OkurasM Kenryoku to Demokurashi, Tl'lkyl'l. ChQl'l Kl'lronsha. 1995. 
pp.301-8 
86&ic Helleiner. 'Money and influence'. p.31. 
87Christopher Wood. The Bubble Economy. p. 177. 
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banks would have great difficulty in selling them on to other investors and would 
be committing virtual financial suicide. The issue of the relationship between 
creditor and debtor has been discussed in Chapter two and also surfaces in the case 
of US-Japan financial dealings. Japanese institutions finance the US debt, but any 
attempt to disrupt the US markets would have a damaging effect upon Japan's 
own. Thus, while Japanese creditors may have some influence over smaller 
debtors, in the case of their relationship with the US, an investment strike may only 
have a significant impact through a major cut off of financial flows. This policy 
might function well as a tool of financial armageddon, but it is also possible to 
argue that the careful manipUlation of finance to achieve anything other than a 
massive financial upheaval is not a realistic option. 
The fourth limitation on Japanese financial power is the need to consider the 
scope and likely long term size of capital flows. As Hamada Kflichi points out, the 
geographical range of Japanese finance extends to Europe, the US and Asia, but 
not to the socialist countries.88 This is despite these being the areas in greatest need 
of Japanese capital in the post-Cold War period, of potentially high security risk. 
and where Japanese finance is likely to have the greatest impact. In addition to 
geographical limits, there is evidence that the outflows of Japanese capital may be 
reduced over the long term, further sapping Japanese financial power. The 
domestic structural imbalance of savings over consumption. Emmott has 
contended. is likely to disappear as the Japanese popUlation ages and absorbs 
excess savings.89 This structural change, however, has been superseded in recent 
years by the effects of recession in Japan that set in after 1990. The collapse of the 
Toky8 bull market in 1990 removed at a stroke the means by which the banks had 
expanded their capital bases, and also saddled many of them with bad loans on 
property and land speCUlation. The relative drying up of capital from Japan caused 
by domestic economic problems has been compacted by the global recession and a 
88Hamada K6ichi, 'Japan's prospective role in the international monetary regime', p. 144. 
89aill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: The limits to Japan's Economic Power, New York, Random 
House, 1989. pp. 25-136. 
161 
similar collapse in property markets in such places as California and the City of 
London. In February 1992, Japanese banks were estimated to have been saddled 
with US$37 billion of bad loans, and ¥12.4 trillion of non-performing loans.9o 
Recession in Japan and bad loans has led to a shake-out of the banking industry in 
Japan, demonstrated by the collapse of secondary banks, housing loan 
corporations, and the formal announcement by major Japanese banks of losses for 
the first time. 
The effect on the Japanese financial presence overseas has been marked. 
Japanese overseas lending fell by 28.5 per cent in 1992 and by 783 per cent in 
1993.91 According to the financial journalist Christopher Wood, in 1989 Japanese 
banks held US$1l4 of total net overseas portfolio investment. but by 1990 this 
figure had fallen to US$39 billion.92 
The Japanese banking system is likely to correct itself in time. but the 
vulnerability of Japanese financial institutions that was revealed suddenly in the 
1990's is an important correction to the image of Japanese financial invincibility in 
the previous decade. Thus, Japan's direct financial power and the power of the 
Japanese state over it needs to be appraised carefully. Japanese state power over 
finance exists to some degree, but is subject to a range of limitations, is not easily 
activated, and may be contracting over the longer term. 
Indirect power from Japanese finance 
This then brings the discussion round to the subject of indirect financial power. 
While the flow of Japanese finance has abated in the 1990's, the institutions that 
established a foothold in international markets in the previous decade are likely to 
gradually strengthen their presence. True financial power may then have been 
accrued to Japan in the indirect form. Japanese banks perhaps do not set the norms 
90aill Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, p. 157; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 1993-94, p. 45. 
91BiIl Emmott, Japan's Global Reach, p. 158; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD Economic Survtys: Japan 1993-94, p. 39. 
92Christopher Wood, The Bubble Economy, p. 91. 
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of the finance through their investment activities, and appear to be slower than their 
rival US counterparts to innovate in many aspects of securities banking such as 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and the development of new financial 
instruments. However, the presence of Japanese banks and the necessity of dealing 
with them has meant that Japanese institutions have been integrated into the 
international financial community and make their influence felt by their sheer size. 
This process is clearly not irreversible, as shown by expulsion of Daiwa Bank from 
the New York markets in 1995 for the concealment of trading losses. But the 
massive size of Japan's banks and security houses does imply a new found 
Japanese indirect power in finance. The security aspects of this are hard to evaluate. 
While this indirect financial power may not be used by the Japanese state to impose 
costs or to offer positive and negative sanctions to another state, its may serve to 
integrate other states and Japan itself into the global economy and to provide 
stability. Indirect Japanese financial power may serve the same function as the 
US's of creating a stable and favourable security environment, and hence needs to 
be considered in chapter five when looking at Japan's ability to resolve the North 
Korean security problem with financial power. 
The monetary system and Japanese indirect power 
The other aspect of financial power already described in chapter two is that of the 
role of state's currency within the international monetary system. The chief fonn of 
power derived from the international monetary system is indirect power, and its 
chief security benefit is the integration of the regional and global economy through 
the promotion of trade and exchange. The increasing strength of the Japanese yen 
since the 1970's has resulted in speculation over the yen's future use as an 
international reserve currency. In particular, there is the idea of a 'yen bloc' in Asia 
as one way of establishing Japan's economic leadership in the region, bringing 
with it possible stabilising political and security effects as well. 
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The use of the yen as a reserve currency and as a currency of international trade 
is low in comparison to the dollar but has been steadily on the increase since the 
mid-1970's. In 1975, 79 per cent of international currency reserves were held in 
US dollars, and only 0.5 per cent in Japanese yen. In 1980, 70 per cent of central 
bank reserves were in dollars and two per cent in yen. By 1985, the use of the 
dollar had declined to 65 per cent and the yen had risen to five per cent, and by 
1988 the dollar accounted for around 63 per cent of central bank reserves and the 
yen around 8 per cent.93 
The use of the yen for international trade has been estimated as only two per cent 
of world totals, and it is clear that the Japanese government itself has not favoured 
the use of the yen for the country's own trade. In 1980 only 17.6 per cent of 
Japan's exports and only one per cent of its imports were denominated in yen. As 
the 1980's progressed, though, the use by Japan of the yen increased. 35 per cent 
of exports and 11 per cent of imports were in yen by 19fjJ, and these fi gures had 
increased to 37.5 per cent and 14.5 per cent respectively by 1990.94 
The comparative underuse of the yen is perhaps surprising given the position of 
Japan in the world economy, and the attracti veness of the yen as a reserve currency 
backed by the stable and low inflation domestic Japanese economy. The reasons for 
this underuse are threefold. First, Japan's largest single market in the post-war 
period has been the US which, of course, uses the dollar to denominate 
transactions. Second, a large proportion of Japan's imports consists of raw 
materials which are usually priced in dollars on the world markets. Third, the 
Japanese government also appears to have been keen to avoid the use of the yen 
based on twin economic and political rationales.95 
93William R. Nester, JapaneselndustrialTargeting, p. 242; Bill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets, p. 
195; Sakamoto Katsuzo and Richard Conquest, 'The internationaIisation of Japanese capital', p. 
146; Gy6tcn Toy6, 'Intcrnationalisation of the yen: its implications for US-Japan relations', in 
Hugh Patrick and Tacbi RyOichir6 (cds.), Japan and the United States Today: Exchange Rates, 
Macroeconomic Policies and Financial Market Innovations, p. 85. 
94Bill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets, p. 195; Hamada K6ichi, 'Japan's prospective role in tbe 
international monetary regime', p. 149. 
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The economic rationale for restricted use of the yen is linked to Japan's attempts 
since 1949 to keep the price of the yen low against the dollar. SCAP fixed the price 
of the yen at ¥360 to the dollar in 1949 and subsequent Japanese governments came 
to regard this rate as 'inviolable'.96 International pressure forced revaluations of the 
yen in 1971 (¥308 to the dollar) and in 1978 (¥176 to the dollar), but it is believed 
that the Japanese government responded to increased currency exchange 
liberalization by operating a 'dirty' float and intervening in the market to prevent 
further rises in the value of the yen against the dollar.97 In the first half of the 
1980's, the yen benefited from the Reagan administration's policy of 'benign 
neglect' towards the dollar and fell in value. However, after the September 1985 
Plaza Accord, the value of the yen has risen continually, reaching levels of around 
¥100 to the dollar by 1994, and an all-time high of ¥79 to the dollar in 1995. The 
problems of the high yen in the 1990's have demonstrated why the Japanese 
government has long sought to maintain a yen rate against the dollar. The clear aim 
in the past has been to keep the yen low in order to alleviate balance of payments 
problems, and also to enable the BOJ to keep interest rates low to promote 
economic growth. Low interest rates have the added bonus of reducing the 
attractiveness of the yen to foreign investors and thus insulate the Japanese 
economy from the shock of fluctuations in currency prices.98 The political rationale 
for avoidance of the international use of the yen can be seen as freeing Japan from 
the type of criticism that might accompany the use of the yen by its Asian 
neighbours. and fears of the recreation of a Japanese dominated Greater East Asia 
Coprosperity Sphere with a common Japanese currency. 
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, however, these economic and political 
rationales have become increasingly untenable as the progress of globalisation and 
regionalisation has led to the increased value and use of the yen. The progress of 
96r. J. Pempel, 'Japanese foreign economic policy', p. 770. 
97William R. Nester, Japanese Industrial Targeting, p. 240; T. J. PempeJ, 'Japanese foreign 
economic policy', p. 771. 
980ary R. Saxonhouse, 'The world economy and Japanese foreign policy,' in Robert ScaJapino 
(cd.), The Foreign Policy oj Modern Japan, p. 301. 
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globalisation has meant that the Japanese state perhaps is beginning to lose control 
of its currency in a way similar to other developed nations. The rise in the value of 
the yen and fall in the value of the dollar has been halted by concerted central bank 
action and the recovery in the US economy, but the suspicion of some has been that 
the yen's inexorable rise was the result of a renewed policy of benign neglect by the 
Clinton administration to squeeze Japan's exporting sectors, and a policy which the 
Japan government and its financial institutions could do little about until the US 
agreed to serious cooperative efforts to halt the dollar's slide. The US's policy of 
reducing Japanese exports through allowing a rise in the price of the yen was only 
partially successful due to the resourcefulness of Japanese corporations, but it 
demonstrate the growing inability of the Japanese government to control the price 
of the yen and the inevitable spread of its use in accordance with its rising value. 
The picture of reduced control over the yen is also reinforced by the emergence in 
the 1980's of illegal 'samurai bonds' denominated in yen but uncontrollable by the 
MOF.99 
The processes of regionalisation in East Asia are also acting to promote the 
further use of the yen. Intra-regional trade between Japan, ASEAN and the three 
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
has increased greatly since the 1980's. In 1987, around 12.5 per cent of Japan's 
trade was conducted with the Asian NIEs, and the total value of trade nearly tripled 
between 1980 and 1989. Value of trade with the ASEAN nations increased by 
about one third. This increase in intra-regional trade also meant an increase in the 
use of the yen as the medium of exchange between Japan and its trading partners. 
For instance, in 1994 around 30 per cent of imports from Southeast Asia were 
denominated in yen. The countries of the region have also increased their reliance 
upon the yen as a reserve currency and are estimated to now hold around 30 per 
cent of their central bank reserves in yen. 100 Furthermore, the proliferation of the 
99wiIliam R. Nester. Japanese Industrial Targeting. p. 231. 
l00sill Emmott. The Sun Also Sets. pp. 192. 196. 
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use of the yen is likely to continue in step with the expansion of intra-regional trade 
and calls for Japan to provide the public good of its currency to the East Asian 
region. 
The implications of the increased use of the yen for Japan's indirect power are 
unclear. On a global scale, the yen is unlikely to replace the dollar as the main 
currency, and even on the regional scale it may not assume the position of the 
dominant currency--as the Deutschmark has done in Europe--due to political 
resistance from the nations of Asia. However, even if the yen does not become 
dominant, it will continue to play an important supporting role for the dollar on 
both the regional and global levels, assisting in the process of integration and 
creation of stability. The flipside of this, though, is resistance to a yen bloc as with 
resistance in Europe on the popular level to a single European currency essentially 
based on the deutschmark. But the overall likely impact of the yen's use 
internationally, and especially in Asia, is to create stability, and to ensure Japan's 
security by the creation of a favourable security environment. 
JAPANESE TRADE POWER 
For politicians and economic analysts alike, the related issues of Japan's trade 
imbalances and trade practices have proved to be highly contentious. Since the late 
1960's and the emergence of disputes over steel and textiles, trade friction has 
become one of the dominant political issues in Japan's relationship with the US, its 
largest trading partner. The importance of trade has been demonstrated by repeated 
bilateral negotiations on the issue and the willingness of both sides to invoke the 
rhetoric of 'trade wars' if negotiations are not resolved to one of the sides' 
satisfaction. The US also has been prepared to back this rhetoric with some specific 
action, as shown by the enactment of the 1988 Trade Act and Super 301 
provisions, designed to retaliate against those states deemed to be using unfair 
trading practices such as Japan.lO 1 Trade has also often been an issue of bilateral 
101For the recent history of US-Japan trade relations: Merit E. Janow, 'Trading with an ally: 
progress and discontent in US-Japan trade relations,' in Gerald L. Curtis (cd.), The United States, 
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tension between Japan and the states of the EU, and between Japan and its trading 
partners in Asia. The anti-Japanese riots on the occasion of Prime Minister Tanaka 
Kakuei's visit to Southeast Asia in 1974 were partly a reaction to the FDI policies 
of Japanese corporations, but also to the trade policies of the Japanese government 
which were seen to encourage the export of Japanese manufactures to the region, 
but which in return only sought to import low-cost raw materials to Japan. 
Since the 1970's, the Japanese government has made efforts to deal with these 
bilateral trade issues, has moved towards the greater liberalisation of its domestic 
markets, and in the case of Southeast Asia progress has been made in correcting the 
one-sided trade flows and the accompanying political problems. Japan has made 
progress also in trade relations with the US and the EU, but still many of the 
concerns and disputes of the 1970's have carried over into the 1960's. Despite the 
formal liberalization of the Japanese market and the removal of tariff barriers to 
trade, it is still argued that non-tariff barriers have remained in place, and that these 
have been preserved either by the deliberate policy of the Japanese economic 
bureaucracy and politicians, or by a lack of a real initiative on their part to overcome 
the inertia and vested interests which have kept trade barriers in place. Given these 
types of analyses of Japan's trade practices, it has often been seen as necessary for 
Japan's trading partners to take the lead in refonning Japanese trade. Many US 
policy-makers seem to have accepted the need to apply foreign pressure, or gaiatsu, 
to push for the opening of what they see as Japan's closed markets and to facilitate 
the 'relevelling' of the playing field of trade. The Bush administration initiated 
bilateral negotiations with Japan on sectoral and structural impediments to trade an 
economic and political priority, and the Clinton administration has continued with 
this bilateral approach to trade relations. There have also been moves, although 
perhaps less effective, to exert pressure for the reform of trade practices on the 
multilatemllevel through GATT and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
Japan. and Aria, New Yark: and London, W. W. Norton and Company, 1994, pp. 53-95; Edward 
Lincoln, Japan'sUneqllall'rade, Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1990; 'Japanese trade 
and investment issues', in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (cds.), Japan's Emerging Global Role, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 133-154. 
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The problem of trade and the degree of 'fairness' of Japanese trade practices is 
an extremely complex one, and defies easy examination. The extensive literature on 
Japanese trade, often employing sophisticated economic analysis, would seem to 
confirm the complexity of the problem. But while the process of analysis is often 
complex and sophisticated, it appears that the end conclusions are not always so. 
To the uncommitted observer it can seem that much of the analysis of trade can 
approach the level of polemic. Some tracts set out an apologist position for Japan 
and shift the problems of trade on to its trading partners, while others place the 
blame for bilateral trade deficits and friction squarely at the door of Japanese 
corporations and policy-makers. Moreover, many of the arguments put forward by 
Japanese and US scholars and politicians have a sense of circularity and (perhaps 
deliberately in the case of politicians) of talking past each other and appealing to 
their respective domestic audiences. For it is clear that, as pointed out in chapter 
two, that trade is an intensely political process, and that this affects its practice on 
the level of its practitioners, regulators and analysts. 
The aim of this section is to avoid becoming entangled in the complex and not 
always productive debate over the relative 'fairness' or 'equal ness' of Japan's trade 
practices. To be sure, it is an important issue for trade negotiators and politicians. 
Instead, for the purposes of this thesis, recognition of the political importance of 
Japan's trade strengthens the argument for the need to relate the problem to the 
discussion over economic power and security policy. The trade disputes between 
the US and Japan are concerned fundamentally with the role that trade plays in 
wealth creation, the distribution of international economic and political power, and 
also in the making of security policy. Thus, the procedure and aim of the following 
section, is to outline the types of power derived by Japan from trade, the limits to 
the control of trade as a component of economic power, and the relation between 
Japanese trade power and security policy. By delineating the limits to Japan's 
power in trade, the ground will then be prepared for examining the extent of this 
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component's utility for security in the case of the North Korean security problem 
presented in chapter five. 
The size and scope of Japanese trade 
The size and patterns of Japan's trade are again suggestive of a great deal of raw 
power that could be mobilised in the interests of the state. The most obvious 
representation of Japan's trading power has been the growth of its trade and trade 
surplus. Between 1960 and 1994, the annual value of Japan's exports increased 
from US$45 billion to US$396 billion, and the annual value of Japan's imports 
rose from US$41 billion to US$275 billion. Japan's balance of trade in the same 
period changed from an annual deficit of US$400 million in 1960 to an annual 
surplus ofUS$121 billion in 1994. Japan has also grown to account for a greater 
relative share of world trade. 102 In 1972, Japan accounted for 5 per cent and 7 per 
cent of world imports and exports respectively. In 1992, Japan increased its share 
to 6 per cent of imports and 9 per cent of exports. The US's share, by comparison, 
has remained constant at around 14 per cent of world imports, and falling slightly 
to account for around 12 per cent of world exports.l 03 Therefore, Japan has not 
seen a great expansion in its share of world trade since the 1970's, but it has begun 
to rival the US in the area of exports. 
The geographical distribution of Japan's trade has also begun to change over 
time. The US still remains Japan's largest trading partner, with total levels of trade 
rising from US$.56 billion in 1980, to US$141 billion in 1989. This rise in trade 
has also been accompanied by an increase in Japan's trade surplus with the US, 
rising to an annual US$55 billion by 1994. Japan's trade surplus with the EU stood 
at US$22 billion in the same year. 104 But, as has been discussed in the section on 
finance, since the 1980's a new pattern has begun to emerge in Japanese trade, with 
l02Asahi Shimbun. The Japan Almanac /996 , p. 106. 
l03Michael W. Donnelly. 'The political economy of Japanese trade,' in Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (cds.). Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. 1..ooOOn, 
Macmillan, 1994, p. 485. 
l04Asahi Shimbun, The Japan Abnanac 1996, p. 106. 
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an increased emphasis upon trade with Asia. Between 1985 and 1994, the share of 
Japan's total trade with China, the ASEAN 4 (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia) and the NIEs grew from 24.2 per cent to 38.6 per cent, and reached a 
level where it exceeded the share of total trade with the US (29.7 per cent).1 05 By 
1989, combined dollar values of Japanese trade with China, the ASEAN 5 
(Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) and the NIEs, 
totalling US$139 billion, were nearly already equal to the US$141 billion of trade 
with the US in the same year. This growth of Japan-Asia trade has meant that to 
some extent Japan has diversified its trade away from its dependency upon the US 
market. However, given that the US is still Japan's single largest national market 
this means that it is still reliant upon a unitary state actor that can convert this 
dependency into an important political and economic bilateral issue. 
As for the composition of Japan's trade, Edward Lincoln points out that in 
comparison to other developed nations Japan's imports of manufactured products 
have been unusually low, whereas its exports of manufactured products have been 
high. This he ascribes to the Japanese government's unequal trade policies.1 06 
Japan, though, has been reliant traditionally upon high levels of imports of raw 
materials, and also has run a consistent deficit on services--totalling US$46 billion 
in 1992.107 
The importance to the Japanese economy of foreign trade is put into perspective 
by the relatively low figure of 10 per cent GNP accounted for by it. IOS Measured 
by this indicator Japanese economic growth cannot be said to be export-led. 
However, foreign trade is essential to the growth of the domestic Japanese 
economy because it enables Japan to acquire through exports the foreign currency 
with which to pay for the imports of raw materials and technology that are essential 
lOSfsOsansM Sangy6sMhen, TsfisansM HakusM, T6ky6, 6kura"M Insatsukyoku, 1995, p. 71. 
l06Edward lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade , pp. 12-38. 
l07Michael W. Donnelly, The political economy of Japanese trade,' p. 489. 
l08Michael W. Donnelly, The political economy of Japanese trade,' p. 489. 
171 
for the economy to grow smoothly. In this sense, then, foreign trade occupies a 
relatively small but crucial position in the operation of the Japanese economy. 
Direct economic power from Japanese trade 
The measures of the growth of Japanese trade described above, and the prosperity 
that it has brought to Japan, suggests major economic success in the field of trade. 
In particular, the success of Japanese trade has been seen as confirmation of the 
trade promotion policies of MITI and other elements of the economic bureaucracy. 
Organisations such as JEfRO (Japan External Trade Organisation), and the Japan 
Export-Import Bank are the most visible manifestation of what has been perceived 
as the conscious manipulation of trade by the Japanese state and MITI, with the 
purpose of expanding Japanese economic power. 
The question, though, of the Japanese state's ability or even deliberate intention 
to manipulate trade as a component of economic power has to be viewed once again 
in the light of the possible restrictions on state power that have been discussed in 
previous sections. For Japanese policy-makers, as for their US counterparts, trade 
is clearly an important political, diplomatic, and foreign policy issue. But how far 
the Japanese state can accrue any direct power to be used in the interests of the state 
and its security needs to be examined. 
The starting point for the limitations on state control of trade and trade policy is, 
once again, the problem of internal divisions within its institutions and ministerial 
conflict. As Michael Donelly points out, the Japanese state has no central 
coordinating agency with control over trade, and rather that setting out a clear 
strategic policy on trade, many of the policy decisions on trade are taken on an 'ad 
hoc' basis during negotiations with other states. The absence of a coordinating 
body encourages intra and inter-ministerial conflict over trade. The differences over 
trade policy between the ITB wing of MITI and the rest of the ministry in the 
1950's have already been touched upon, and the possibility of disputes between 
ministries is heightened by the necessity of consulting MITI, the MOF and the 
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MOFA over trade issues. l 09 Each of these ministries has a slightly different agenda 
on trade policy. The MOFA, for instance, emphasises the importance of the US 
alliance in trade negotiations, whereas MITI is more likely to emphasise commercial 
considerations. The issue of trade also brings in other elements of the bureaucracy 
such as the MFFA. The MFFA has been concerned to protect the interests of its 
own client groups from the pressures of liberalisation, with the issue of rice 
imports being the most notable instance of this. 
'Clientism' also brings in the second restraint on the state's ability to articulate a 
coherent trade strategy--the politicians. The existence of zoku, within the LDP and 
PARC (Policy Affairs Research Committee) has contributed to the protection of 
certain interest groups, and, as Gerald Curtis notes, has undermined the ability of 
the bureaucracy and Japanese leaders to respond easily to international 
pressures. I I 0 The case of agriculture and rice imports is a good example of how a 
combination of bureaucratic and political opposition could block progress on trade 
reform. The role of the politicians, then, also throws into doubt the Japanese state's 
bureaucracy without the cooperation of the politicians to control trade and the 
ability of the state to trade readily to its advantage as a tool of foreign policy. 
The other main and perhaps most importance hindrance to the Japanese state's 
control of trade has been, and is likely to continue to be, foreign pressure. In the 
immediate post-World War II period Japan's relations with the US essentially set 
the possible geographical and economic parameters of Japanese trade, to a large 
extent cutting Japan off from access to the Soviet bloc and China. It was only after 
the US's normalisation of relations with China in 1973 that the Japanese 
government and Japanese corporations were free to resume direct trade on a large 
scale with this historically important market. In the contemporary era, it is again 
foreign pressure in the guise of gaiatsu that has been seen as responsible for the 
progress of the Iiberalisation of the Japanese economy; either as a genuine force of 
l~ichael W. Donnelly. 7he political economy of Japanese trade,' p. 492. 
llOOerald L Curtis, The Japanese WayoJPolitics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988, 
pp. 114-6. 
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change that overcomes domestic opposition, or as a mix of this and the provision of 
an excuse to Japanese policy-makers to legitimise liberalisation. In one sense, 
foreign pressure is an advantage to Japan in allowing policy-makers to break the 
domestic impasse on liberalisation of trade and to push forward their own policy 
goals. But overall, the need to rely upon gaiatsu represents limits to the state's 
control of trade policy. 
Added to these limitations of conflict within the economic bureaucracy, the 
influence of politicians, and the role of foreign pressure, attention also needs to be 
given to the role of the corporations which conduct Japan's trade. It is clear that 
most corporations will favour the state's policies if they promote exports and 
restrict access to Japan's domestic markets. But beyond these broad areas of policy 
consensus there are likely to be difficulties in influencing firms to move in line with 
specific government policies on trade if they are perceived to conflict with a 
corporation's fundamental business interests. Corporations that trade abroad will be 
in harmony with the state's plans for export promotion, but will less willing to 
cooperate with state plans that interfere in profitable trading activities for political 
reasons. 
When thinking about the role of companies in limiting Japanese state control of 
trade, it is also important to note that many corporations engaged in foreign trade 
are perhaps already outside the easy control of the state's bureaucracy and political 
influence. The earlier section on production showed the relative independence from 
the state's formal controls of Japanese TNCs in the electronics and automobile 
industries. It is also worth noting that the SagashOsha general trading corporations, 
which are responsible for so much of Japanese trade, are seen as increasingly 
independent of the their own zaibatsu groupings and state pressure in the form of 
the bureaucracy. The So gosh osha have been described as the 'vanguard' of the 
Japanese economy, but they do not necessarily perform this function in the service 
of the Japanese state. Termed by Alexander Young as 'unique global trading 
institutions', the Sogoshosha accumulated sales of US$350 billion in 1982. In 
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1975, the ten largest Sogoshosha handled 56.4 per cent of Japan's total exports and 
55.6 per cent of its total imports. In the same year they also handled 53 per cent of 
exports and 55.6 per cent of imports by Japanese corporations to and from 
Southeast Asia, 56 per cent of Japanese exports to the communist bloc, and 
between 40 and 44 per cent of Japanese exports to Western Europe, North America 
and Oceania) II The Sogoshosha are involved in a range of industries, such as 
textiles, chemicals, and steel, but the core of their business is the trading of raw 
materials and the products of the Sogoshosha's industrial groups. Thus, in 1973, 
the Sogoshosha dealt with 81 per cent of Japan's metal imports, 79 per cent of the 
iron ore imports and 89 per cent of the cokeing coal imports of Japan's top six 
steel makers) 12 Backing Sogoshosha activities is a large information network, 
reputed to rival that of the US State Department, with an ability to conduct 
independently research and development, to finance trade, and to sponsor third-
party trade. I 13 
The Sogoshosha, therefore, are key actors in Japan's trade, and access to these 
corporations' information networks and trading activities would clearly be of 
benefit to the state in constructing its trade policy and in exerting control over trade. 
But as outlined in the section on production, the SogoshOsha have not usually been 
regarded as being under the dominance of the Japanese state's economic 
bureaucracy, even though they have often cooperated in state policies such as the 
sourcing of raw materials and fuels. The Sogoshosha's do owe their reformation 
and reorganisation in the post-war period to the economic policy of the Japanese 
state's bureaucracy, but they have not been overly reliant upon government 
financing, and have not been noted for accepting ex-bureaucrats through the 
amakudari system. Hence, when the picture of state control over trade is examined, 
one important proviso is that the companies most crucial to Japanese trade may in 
lllAlexander K. Young, TM Sogoshosha, pp. 4, 8, 19. 
112AlexanderK. Young, TM Sogoshosha, p. 121. 
113Alexander K. Young, The Sogoshosha, pp. 74-9; Thomas Huber, StrategiC Economy, p. 100; 
Pempel, 'Japan's foreign economic policy', pp. 735-6. 
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fact not be easily amenable to state control. The Japanese state does, of course, 
retain the ability to force its control over corporations engaged in foreign trade, but 
more subtle forms of control may have evaded the state, so limiting trade's utility as 
a component of direct economic power. Thus, when looking at the trade relations 
between Japan and North Korea in chapter five, it will be necessary to consider 
how far the state can enlist the support of Japanese trading companies in the service 
of its security policy. 
If trade is viewed as an element of direct economic power, Japan's own 
vulnerability to the costs of an interruption of trade is clear. The Japanese state's 
politicians and bureaucracy might be able to manipulate trade in certain situations 
for its security ends, and this would impact upon trading partners such as the NIEs 
for which Japan has become a key market. But conversely, even though the size of 
Japan's trade sector is relatively small compared to the overall size of its economy, 
trade plays an important role in ensuring economic growth. Thus, trade conflict 
with the US would clearly damage Japan's economy, and disputes with trading 
partners in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Oceania would affect Japan's raw 
material supplies in particular. Japan's vulnerability in trade has been reduced to 
some extent by the diversification of its markets, but it is still reliant upon the US 
market and free access to it. All this suggests that for Japan, trade has limited value 
as a means of imposing costs upon another state for security ends. 
Nevertheless, Japan has engaged in some uses of trade as a component of direct 
economic power in order to impose negative sanctions upon other states. As a 
member of COCOM (Coordinating Committee of Export Control) during the Cold 
War, Japan took steps to prevent the export of technologies to the Soviet bloc, and 
these restrictions were again strengthened after the invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. The attractiveness of COCOM for Japanese policy makers is, though, 
doubtful given that this was an essentially US-inspired regime. Moreover, the 
example of COCOM demonstrates the difficulties that Japan has had in imposing 
trade restrictions on other states even when they are backed with clear legal powers. 
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The Toshiba affair of 1988 embarrassed the Japanese government by demonstrating 
its abject failure to effectively impose trade sanctions for security ends.l 14 
Evidence suggests that Japanese policy makers instead favour the greater utility 
of positive trade sanctions for security ends. Japanese corporations were allowed to 
continue to trade with Vietnam in the 1970's and 1980's despite US disapproval 
and restrictions on its own companies. On the one hand, this has been seen as the 
toleration of trade for blatant commercial advantage, but on the other hand, the case 
can also be made that trade has been viewed by the Japanese state as a means of 
building stability in the region by extending positive sanctions. Much of this type of 
thinking may be present in Japan's policy towards China. The preference of the 
Japanese government for preserving trading links with China and not reverting to 
negative sanctions, such as the withdrawal of MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status 
often advocated by US lawmakers, is a sign that Japanese policy-makers see 
positive sanctions as more effective in moderating China's behavior and settling 
security issues over the long term. In this way, Japan's China policy can be seen as 
the use of positive sanctions and direct economic power to build indirect economic 
power and the resulting security benefits of integration and interdependency. The 
question of Japanese indirect economic power manifested in interdependency and 
multilateral trade organisations will be considered next. 
Indirect economic power and Japanese trade 
Chapter two outlined how it is possible to conceive that the setting by a state of the 
norms of international trade and the engagement of other states in them can bring 
about indirect economic power, interdependency and security. It was also outlined 
how since the end of World War II, the US has expounded the most powerful 
ideology of free trade and established indirect economic power by creating an 
environment for integration under the norms of GAIT. It could also be argued that 
114Yamamoto Takehiko, 'Keizai gaikO' in Aruga Tadashi, Uno Shigeaki, Kido Shigeru, 
Yamamoto Yoshinobu, and Watanabe Akio (eds.), Koza Kokusai Seiji 4: Nihon no GoitlJ, 
TOkyO, TOkyO University Press, 1989, pp. 171-4. 
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Japan has been responsible for establishing a counter-theory of trade which 
advocates mercantilism and a 'free ride' within the liberal international trading 
system, and that this has been adopted in Asia by the NIEs and China. But at the 
same time, the pressures on Japan for liberalisation have also begun to change its 
trading behavior. The result of this has been that Japan has worked to strengthen 
the liberal trading system, but also that there have been some indications that Japan 
could take the lead in laying down trading norms and a regional trading system in 
Asia. 
Japan is a member of a number of multilateral bodies concerned with promoting 
trade. Japan joined GATT in 1955, the IMF in 1964, the OECD in 1964, and 
APEC in 1989. In the case of GATT, most of the initial trade norms were 
established by the US and the developed states of the West. Japan's position as a 
relative 1atecomer' cast its role as a state supportive of GATT, but not one with a 
leading role in setting its agenda. Moreover, the types of domestic conflicts over 
trade policy described above have meant that Japan has not been perceived as 
having taken a decisive role in the remaking of GATT and in the creation of its 
successor the WTO during the Uruguay Round of 1986-1993. For Japan, as for 
some member states of the EU, the Uruguay round was dominated by disputes 
over agriculture. Thus, in the case of GATT, Japan may have accrued very little 
indirect economic power, and instead of cooperation, Japan's input created friction 
between it and other industrialised states. On the other hand, as Reinhard Drifte 
points out, Japan's ability to expend very little political credit and still influence the 
outcome of the negotiations is evidence of Japanese structural power. t t 5 
However, uncertainty over the degree of indirect power on the global scale of 
GATT may be compensated for by influence at the regional level. The free trade 
regime ofGATI. whilst not created by Japan, has allowed Japan's growth within 
the Asia-Pacific region as a regional and world economic power. Japan has 
assumed a position of economic leadership in Asia, and can act as the model and 
115Reinhard Drlfre, Japan's Foreign Policy in the 1990s, pp. 93-5. 
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engine of economic growth in the region. This position has made it possible for 
scholars and political leaders within the region to conceptualise a regional trading 
bloc lead by Japan. Since the 1960's a number of regional Pacific and Asian trading 
groups have been proposed and if realised would have represented considerable 
indirect power for Japan.1 16 That these groups did not come to fruition can be 
explained by Japan's obvious reluctance to sacrifice its bilateral economic and 
political relationship with the US. In the 1990's, though, Japan has again been 
expected to playa major role in the creation of a regional trading bloc) 17 Two 
competing conceptions of regionalism in Asia, EAEC (East Asia Economic Caucus) 
and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) both offer Japan a leading role in 
setting the norms of trade. EAEC, as proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir, offers Japan overall possible leadership of an exclusively East Asian 
bloc, with the likely ability to set the conditions of trade. APEC, by contrast, 
provides Japan with less scope to establish norms due to the participation of the US 
and other developed nations of the Pacific Rim, but Japan is still viewed as a key 
leader in the regionalisation process. Japan's preference for the latter form of 
regionalism again reflects the importance that is attached to the US relationship, and 
acts to restrain Japan's accumulation of indirect power by setting the norms of 
trade" 18 But the supporting role that Japan can fulfill and the continued suspicion 
by some Asian states of the US's presence in the Asian economy means that Japan 
will probably have more effect upon establishing the nOrmS of trade in APEC than 
in GATT. Furthermore. as Japanese participation in this economic region deepens 
and strengthens the trend already discussed of greater trade interdependency 
between Japan, the NIEs, ASEAN and China, so Japan's leadership role and 
indirect power will grow. The process of regionalisation is not without problems, 
the biggest of which is how to integrate China into the trading system, but Japan's 
116for a detailed history of one of these key proposaJs--PAFI' A, see Pekka Korhonen, Japtmand 
lhe Pacific Free Trade Area, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 72-156. 
117Funabashi Yl'>ichi, Ajia Taiheiy6 Fujion: APEC 10 Nihon, Tl'>kyl'>, ChOl'>kl'lronsha, 1995. 
118Lee Poh-Ping, 'Japan and the Asia-Pacific region: a Southeast Asian perspective'. in Craig O. 
Garbyand Mary Brown Bullock (eds.), Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? Ithaca, New York: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 130-1. 
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true trading power and security interests may lie in this area of indirect economic 
power. Consequently, based on this conclusion, the case study of Japan-North 
Korea relations presented in chapter five will look in depth at how Japanese indirect 
trade power can work to integrate North Korea into the emergent regional economy 
and how this can serve Japan's security purposes as a global civilian power. 
ENERGY AND JAPANESE ECONOMIC POWER 
Japan's energy dependency 
Calculated in terms of tons of oil, Japan is the world's third largest individual 
consumer of all forms of energy after the US and China, at around 4 billion tons in 
1990.119 In terms of actual oil consumed, Japan is the number three consumer after 
the US and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), at around 2.5 billion tons 
per annum in 1992, and in late 1970, Japan accounted for around 15 per cent of 
total world demand for oil.120 Japan's production of oil is negligible and it is reliant 
upon oil imports for 99.7 per cent of its supplies, with around 64 per cent of oil 
imports from the Middle East in 1981.121 This figure has been reduced since the 
early 1970's and levels of around 70 per cent, but 59 per cent of Japan's oil still 
came through the Straits of Hormuz in 1989.1 22 Oil supplies for Japan are vital, 
providing around 57 per cent of its total energy needs in 1993. Again, this figure 
has been reduced since the high levels of around 74 per cent in the mid-1970's, but 
in 1988 Japan's reliance on oil was still greater than all the other G7 nations with 
the exception ofl tal Y .t 23 
II~iyazaki Isamu, Sekai Keizai Zuselsu, T6ky6, Iwanami Shinsho, 1995, p. 123. 
12<\1iyazaki Isamu, Sekai Keizai Zuselsu, p. 125; Gerald L. Curtis, 'The Tyumcn oil 
development project and Japanese foreign policy decision-making', in Robert Scalapino, ~ 
Foreign Policy 0/ Modern Japan, p. 149. 
121 Asabi Shimbun, ~ Japan Almanac 1996, p. 163; Shigen Enerugich6hen, Sekiyll Duisan 
Enerugilc1uran, Ttlky6, TsOshOsangy&hOsakai, 1990, p. 9. 
122 Shigen Enerugich6hen, SeldyQ Daisan Enerugi /chiran, p. 9. 
123Valerie Yorke, 'Oil, the Middle East and Japan's search for security', in Akao Nobuyuki (ed.), 
Japan's £COMmie Security: Resources as a Factor in Foreign Policy, London, Gower, 1983, p. 
48;Asabi Shimbun, TheJapanAlmanacJ996, Tokyo,Asahi Shimbunsha,l995, p. 163; Shigcn 
EnerugicMhen, SeldyQ Daisan Enerugi Ichiran, p. 57. 
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Not only is Japan dependent upon foreign sources of oil, it is also dependent 
upon foreign suppliers of oil in the shape of the major transnational oil companies. 
Curtis has pointed out that in 1972, the six majors (Caltex, Esso, Mobil, Gulf, 
Shell, BP, CFP) accounted for around 60 per cent of Japan's oil supplies, with 
independent US-based companies accounting for another 12 per cent, and Japanese 
companies only around 10 per cent. 1 24 The impression of the relative weakness of 
Japanese oil companies is added to by Samuels' observation that there is no 
Japanese oil company similar to foreign rivals which is vertically integrated through 
the stages of exploration, development, refining and distribution.125 Thus, the oil 
industry is a rare instance of the domination of the Japanese market by foreign 
corporations, and Japan has been placed firmly under the 'umbrella of the majors' 
(meijanokasa). 
The situation of foreign dependency is repeated with regard to the other main 
primary energy sources of coal, gas and uranium ore.126 Coal accounted for 
around 16 per cent of Japanese energy in 1993, declining from around 20 per cent 
in 1970.127 Whilst Japan does possess domestic supplies of coal, the relatively 
high cost of mining in Japan has meant that since the 1970's around 80 per cent of 
Japan's coal has been imported. In the 1970's the major suppliers of coal to Japan 
were Australia, the USSR and China, but in line with the policy of energy supply 
diversification since the 1970's, Japan has introduced new suppliers from North 
and South America to achieve a roughly equal balance of suppliers and to avoid 
overdependence on anyone supplier. 
The diversification policy has also spurred on the development of LNG 
(Uquified Natural Gas) supplies. From a figure of around 3 per cent in 1973, the 
share of LNG in Japan's energy consumption has increased to around 11 per cent 
1240eraJd L. Curtis, 'The Tyumen oil development project', p. ISO. 
125ruchard J. Samuels, The Business O/Ihe Japanese Slate, p. 211. 
126f'or these issues, see L. A. McMahon and Stuart Harris, 'Coal development issues for Japan 
and Australia', pp. 11-96; Jonathan P. Stem, 'Natural Bas: the perfect answer to energy 
diversification', pp. 97-118; Ian Smart, 'Nuclear resources: the dilemma of interdependence', pp. 
119-144, in Abo Nobuyuld (ed.), Japan's Economic Security. 
121 Asahi Shimbun, The Japan Almanac 1996, p. 163. 
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in 1993.t 28 The distance of Japan from gas fields means that it is reliant upon sea 
shipments of LNG for its supplies.t29 Since the early 1980's Indonesia has been 
the largest supplier, but Japanese companies have also developed supplies in 
Brunei and Malaysia, and most recently with Algeria and Australia.13o 
The most ambitious energy diversification project has been the expansion by 
Japanese electricity utilities and the Japanese government of nuclear power 
generation. In 1973, nuclear power only accounted for 0.6 per cent of energy 
supplies, but this share increased to around 9 per cent by 1988, 11 per cent by 
1993, and long term plans exist to increase nuclear generation to 16.7 per cent of 
energy supplies by 2010.131 Japan is 100 per cent dependent upon imports for the 
supply of uranium ore, but this supply has been diversified away from reliance on 
the US, Canada and Australia in the 1970's to new suppliers in Africa and new 
projects in Australia. As for preprocessing of nuclear fuels, during the 1970's 
Japan was again dependent upon the US, but contracts with British Nuclear Fuels 
(BNFL) and France's COGEMA have also diversified this aspect of energy 
generation. 
Energy and Japan's direct and indirect economic power 
The overall picture of Japan's energy sector is, then, one of foreign dependence but 
also the search for diversification. The policy of diversification has been followed 
by the Japanese state and private Japanese electricity utilities as a reaction to the Oil 
Shocks of the 1970's. In 1973, OPEC cut production by 25 per cent and identified 
Japan as an unfriendly state, so threatening its oil supplies.l 32 In 1979 and 
following the Iranian revolution, the majors unilaterally decided to end oil supplies 
128Asahi Shimbun, 1M Japan Almanac 1996, p. 163. 
129J. M. W. Chapman, R. Orifte and I. T. M. Gow, Japan's Quest/or Comprehensive Security, 
London, Frances Pinter, 1983, p. 198. 
130shigcn EncrugicMhcn, SeldyQ Doisan £nerugi Ichiran , p. 210. 
13lShigen EnerugicMhen, SeldyQ Daisan Enerugi Ichiran, p. 80; Asahi Shimbun, 1M Japan 
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132Valerie Yorke, 'Oil, the Middle East and Japan's search for security', p. 52. 
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to Japan and to prioritise the US market.133 Moreover. in 1977 due to fears of 
nuclear proliferation brought about by Indian nuclear tests, Canada, with US 
support. reduced its exports of uranium. These incidents made Japanese policy· 
makers even more aware of Japan's vulnerability to energy producing countries and 
corporations, and to the US's caprice in putting its interests above those of its 
allies. Therefore, during the 1970's, an even stronger link was made in the minds 
of policy-makers between security and the component of economic power of 
energy. The conceptualisation of energy as a matter of security was shown first by 
MITl's 1978 report calling for Japan to reduce its energy dependency.l34 This was 
then followed by the 1980 Comprehensive Security Report's proposals to tackle 
Japan's energy security problems by promoting friendly ties with resource 
producing countries, by reducing energy consumption, and by moves to deal more 
on a government to government basis or producer to producer basis for energy 
supplies instead of exclusively through the majors.l 3S On the actual level of policy 
implementation, MITI and the MOFA were already engaged in programmes to 
promote closer relations with the oil producing states. Immediately after the First 
Oil Shock, the then MITI minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, made a trip to the Middle 
East to improve relations and to secure concessions for Japan from OPEC. This 
resource diplomacy, or shigen gaiktJ, was a recognition of the connection between 
energy and security. Indeed, energy security has been one of the few issues in 
which Japan has been forced to break from the US stance and to forge its own 
independent policy. Furthennore, thinking in theoretical tenns, Japanese policy in 
the area of energy can be seen as the use of economic power to insulate the state 
from costs imposed externally, and, specifically, the marshalling of direct economic 
power in defence of the state. 
133J. M. W. Chapman, R. Orifte and I. T. M. Oow, Japan's Quest/or Comprehensive Security, 
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134J. M. W. Chapman, R. Drifre and I. T. M. Oow, Japan's Quest lor Comprehensive Security, 
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135Sl'>g6anzenh~heI OurOpu, SogoanzenJwshO Senryaku, Tbkyb, Okurashl'> Insalsukyoku, 1980, 
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That the Japanese state with the guidance of the bureaucracy has succeeded to 
some degree in managing its direct economic power in the field of energy security 
is shown by the gradual fulfillment of its energy diversification policies. As has 
already been seen, Japan has managed to reduce its dependence on oil and oil 
supplies from the Middle East by around one third since the 1 gJO's. Japan also has 
reduced its reliance on OAEPC (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) from around 82 per cent of oil supplies in 1972 to 72 per cent by 
1980.136 While this still leaves Japan dependent on Middle Eastern oil, there has 
been a steady move away from dependence on oil supplies from this region, and 
this is a significant achievement given Japan's total reliance upon imported oil. 
MITI, with some input from the MOFA, can claim credit for this policy, and it is 
clear that the state has exercised some direct power in its attempts to reorganise the 
domestic oil industry and to diversify oil supplies away from the majors. Passed in 
1962, The Petroleum Industry Law gave MITI a supervisory role in the oil industry 
through its powers of licensing refinery production and finance, and allowed the 
Japanese state to claw back from the foreign majors and private Japanese firms a 
measure of control. 137 This was followed by the establishment in 1967 of the 100 
per cent government owned Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC), renamed 
the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) in 1978. The JPDC was designed to 
function not as an oil company, but more as an institution to provide funds to 
private Japanese firms. The overall objective of the JPDC was to promote the 
activities of Japanese firms in exploration, and to encourage the growth of more 
vertically integrated domestic oil companies. MITI stated at the time of the JPDC's 
establishment that the aim was for Japan to eventually acquire 30 per cent of its oil 
from 'autonomous sources'.138 Between 1967 and 1982, the JPDC initiated 79 
projects, 70 of which were overseas; and in 1973 alone the Japanese government 
136]. M. W. Chapman, R. Drifte and I. T. M. Gow, Japan's Quest/or Comprellensive Security, 
p.I99. 
137Raymond Vernon, Two Hungry Giants: The United Stales and Japan in the Quest/or Oil and 
Ores, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 94. 
1380ercild L. Curtis, 'The Tyumen oil development project', p. 151. 
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financial institutions provided US$I00 million of loans form various projects.139 
MITI policy met with some success in expanding the number of Japanese oil 
companies, as with the foundation in 1973 of the Fuyo Petroleum Development 
Corporation and the Sumitomo Petroleum Corporation.1 40 MITI also managed 
through mergers--such as that between the three companies which formed Kyodo 
Oil in 1965--to rationalise the highly fragmented oil industry.141 In addition, 
MITl's influence in reshaping the Japanese oil industry and oil energy security can 
also be seen in its increase ofthe national stockpile of oil for emergency conditions. 
In 1971 oil stockpiles amounted to only 36 days' worth of supply, but by 1980 this 
had increased to 100 days' worth.142 In the mid-1980's around 50 per cent of the 
JNOC budget was devoted to stockpiling.t43 
However, despite the seeming success of MITI in the area of oil supply 
diversification, it is also apparent that there have been limits to MITl's direct control 
of the oil industry. These limitations to MITI's direct economic power have been 
imposed by those same factors that have hampered state control over other 
components of economic power. As Samuels points out, despite knowledge of the 
pressing need for the control of oil as a strategic commodity, there is no private or 
state sector corporation in Japan which is integrated through all stages of 
production.l44 Thus, Japan lacks the type of state-owned major player in the oil 
industry that other developed nations have had or continue to possess. In Japan 
there is no corporation which fulfills the functions of France's CFR, Italy's ENI or 
Britain's formerly state-owned BP. The JNOC, as already described, relied on 
private enterprises for making investment, but has only an 8 per cent share in 
Japanese oil exploration, and lacks vertical integration. 
13~aymond Vernon, Two Hungry Giants, p. 210; Richard 1. Samuels, The Business 0/ tI,e 
JapaneseSlate, p. 210. 
1400erald L. Curtis, 'The Tyumen oil development project', p. 151. 
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MITI's failure to create an equivalent Japanese major, or wasei meija, has not 
been due to a lack of ambition or effort, but rather to a refusal by private firms to 
follow state policies which they see as contrary to their commercial interests. 
Hence, in 1961, a MITI sponsored Round Table Report laid out plans for a state-
owned company similar to Italy's ENI, which was to be involved in the import, 
refining and distribution of oil. But this plan was opposed by private Japanese oil 
firms which feared competition from the state, and by the electricity utilities which 
saw a state-owned oil company as possibly interfering in their ability to purchase 
the cheapest available oil. Before the passage of the Petroleum Industry Law in 
1962, the Keidanren forced MITI to omit from the law a provision for the 
establishment of a national oil corporation. MITI repeated its efforts to create a 
national oil corporation in 1963, 1964 and 1965, but was again defeated by 
opposition from private industry. The creation of the JPDC was made dependent 
upon the restriction of its activities to exploration and stockpiling; again the result of 
pressure from private industry. Samuels notes that it was not until 1981 that MITI 
finally gave up on its attempts to create a state-owned oil enterprise, with the 
admission that it would, 'respect the vitality of the private sector and progressively 
reduce and eliminate administrative intervention.' I 45 
The second impediment to extension of state control over the oil industry has 
been foreign pressure, and most particularly the bilateral relationship with the US. 
US majors took a large share of the Japanese market under SCAP, and this, in 
combination with the US's predominant position in the oil industry, lead early on to 
the belief of figures such as George Kennan that Japan could be controlled through 
oil supplies.l46 Although the Oil Shocks of the 1970's showed that Japan was 
prepared to diverge from US policy to secure its own interests, Kennan's belief 
was perhaps borne out by the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis during which Japan was 
145Richard J. Samuels, The Business O/Ihe Japanese Slate, pp. 198-202,204, 209, 217. 
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brought into line with the US alliance because of the issue of oil supplies. The main 
restriction on Japanese state control of the oil industry brought about by the US 
alliance, however, has been in the areas of diversification of energy supplied during 
the Cold War. Curtis points out that despite the potential attractiveness of the 
Tyumen oil project in the USSR as a new source of supply for Japan, progress was 
blocked by US reluctance to see its oil firms involved in the project, and Japan's 
need to favour the US alliance over cooperation with the Cold War adversary of the 
USSR.l47 
The picture that emerges of the oil industry is one of Japanese direct economic 
power which is capable of ensuring to some degree oil supplies in the event of 
economic cost imposed upon Japan. But at the same time, the ability of the state to 
control the domestic oil industry is limited, and Japan's relative weakness in the 
international oil industry argues that the state has not accrued sufficient direct or 
indirect power to influence the behaviour of other states by the imposition of costs. 
The fragmented picture of control observed in the case of the oil industry is also 
found in the coal industry, the domestic electricity industry and nuclear power 
generation. The policy of diversification of supply has been applied to coal also, 
and has yielded results with new sources of supply brought in from China and 
Australia. However, the control of the domestic industry has been presented by 
Samuels as another example of the frustration of bureaucratic and slate control by 
private industry. He notes the fact that unlike other industrialised nations, the coal 
industry in Japan has never been effectively rationalised or consolidated, nor have 
prices been centrally set. Indeed, Samuels states that 'the state has participated in 
the market only on the terms negotiated with and acceptable to other market 
players.'148 Alliance ties with the US have also played a role in restricting 
diversification, with projects such as the development of the Yakutsk coal fields put 
on hold by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
147Gerald L. Curtis, 1"00 Tyumen oil development project', pp. 148, 168. 
148Richard J. Samuels, The Business oflhe Japanese Slate, p. 133. 
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Private business also has restricted bureaucratic state control in the domestic 
electricity industry. All electricity utilities in Japan are privately owned, the only 
exception to this being the state-owned and MITI controlled Electric Power 
Development Corporation (EPDC), which acts only as a generator of electricity and 
not as a supplier to end users. The Japanese government did secure control of 
electricity generation during World War II, but the power industry was broken up 
into private power companies by SCAP. Samuels comments that, 'The only 
unalloyed state initiative ever to succeed in restructuring the Japanese electric 
markets occurred under the extraordinary circumstances of foreign occupation.'149 
While MITl's influence has been pervasive in the electric industry through the 
provision of finance and its regulatory role, it has not been predominant, with many 
of the large electric utilities able to raise funds in foreign markets and becoming 
increasingly independent players. The pressures for deregulation of the power 
industry since the early 1990's are also likely to remove the industry further from 
the aegis of the state. 
The nuclear power industry is one example of where the state has not been able 
to exert as great a control as it might have wished. Around 11 per cent of Japan's 
energy requirements are provided by nuclear power, and in 1987 alone the state 
provided the nuclear industry with 1.6 trillion yen in financial support. But 
according to Samuels, this provision of finance does not necessarily equate with 
strong state control. He shows that despite MITl's best efforts to gain firm control 
over the industry, the EPDC has been consistently cut out of new developments in 
the nuclear industry by the private utilities. The EPDC sought a new role in nuclear 
generation from the 1960's onwards as its original role of hydroelectric 
development began to be exhausted. MITl's efforts to provide the EPDC with the 
right to import light water and advanced thermal nuclear technology were opposed 
by the private utilities and the Science and Technology Agency (ST A), leading to a 
1982 compromise whereby the EPDe was allowed to construct one advanced 
149ruchard J. Samuels, The Business o/the Japanese State, p. 166. 
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thermal reactor in return for subsidising the construction costs of private sector 
reactors.l50 The state is still involved in nuclear energy generation and research, 
but the private electricity companies maintain their central position in the domestic 
industry and limit the state's freedom of action in this area. Moreover, added to the 
obstacles of private business limiting the control of the Japanese state over the 
nuclear industry, its long-term plans are also under pressure from pressure groups 
in the general public which object to what Michael Donnelly has called Japan's 
'nuclear quest' on environmental grounds. 151 
The direct power that Japan has derived from the component of energy is varied. 
On the one hand, the Japanese state and, in particular, MITI, have implemented 
plans to improve Japan's energy security through the diversification of supply. 
This indicates that the state's bureaucracy has a measure of direct power when 
dealing with threats to security that disrupt the economy. However, the external 
projection of direct power is limited compared to other developed nations. Japan's 
ability to use the component of energy in a time of crisis to help resol ve a dispute is 
perhaps limited by its weak control of resource extraction and supply, especially in 
the case of the key commodity of oil. 
The indirect power of Japan in energy is hard to evaluate, but again may be 
limited by the generally weak structural position of Japan in world energy markets. 
Despite being a major consumer similar to the US, its low production of energy 
resources and dependence on other countries means that the ability to set the 'rules 
of the game' and establish the environment of action for others is doubtful. The one 
area, however, where Japan may acquire indirect power is in energy related 
technology and nuclear generation technology. Success in the development of 
alternative energy forms and environmentally clean energy could provide Japan 
with indirect power. This could be further strengthened by Japan's technical lead in 
nuclear generation if it succeeds in the development of a viable means of nuclear 
l50ruchard J. Samuels, The Business ofl~ Japanese State, pp. 245-51. 
15 1 Michael W. Donnelly, 'Japan's nuclear energy quest' in Gerald L Curtis (ed.), Japan's Foreign 
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fusion. In addition, Japanese oil companies, although not dominant globally, have 
played an important role in joint ventures to developing the energy resources of 
neighbouring Asian countries such as China and Indonesia.152 The export to other 
energy-hungry countries in Asia of energy development and nuclear technologies 
created to Japanese standards would be an advance in interdependency and a 
significant form of indirect power.t53 Thus, the case study on Japan-North Korea 
relations in chapter five will devote attention to the ways in which Japan has, 
through the device of KEDQ, used energy as a component of economic power in an 
attempt to halt North Korea's threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
economic collapse. 
COMMUNICATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND JAPANESE POWER 
Communications 
As chapter two explained, states may acquire direct and indirect power due to their 
influence over the construction and running of transport and communication 
systems. It has been seen that it is easiest for states to acquire direct power over 
transport systems because they can exercise governmental powers to halt or allow 
the free passage of economic activity in their own territory. Japan is clearly no 
exception to this, and as an island state has demonstrated an ability since the Edo 
period to close its borders and to halt sea traffic. In the contemporary era it retains 
also the capacity to halt air traffic. However, at the same time as the Japanese state 
is able to use direct power to offer these types of negative sanctions, it is also clear 
that there are limitations to this power. As an island state, Japan cannot readily deny 
access to other countries without hurting its own economic well-being, and the 
absence of contiguous land borders and its isolated geographical position means 
152Robert Taylor, GreaterChinaandJapan: Prospects/or an Economic Partnership in East Asia. 
London. Routledge, 1996, pp. 66-68. 
153Kent E. Calder has argued, for instance, that Japan should take a leading role in promoting 
joint energy projects in Asia to avoid competition for increasingly scarce energy sources and to 
contribute to peace in the region. Kent E. Calder, 'Asia's empty gas tank', Foreign Affairs, vol. 
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that Japan's sealing of its borders may only have a limited impact on other 
countries' economic activity. In addition, the ability to use direct economic power 
to offer positive sanctions, such as the opening up of new transport routes, will 
necessarily be limited by Japan's geographical isolation. But, even allowing for the 
impact of geographical factors on the direct economic power to be derived from 
transport systems, it may be that Japan's further development as a hub for air 
transport with the construction of new international airports, such as Kansai 
International Airport, will make geographical barriers less of a factor. In turn, 
Japan's role as an air and sea entrepot to Asia will also provide it with a form of 
indirect economic power as it promotes integration between Asia and other regions. 
How far Japan can play this role, though, will be determined by competition with 
other regional transport centres, Singapore and Hong Kong being the most notable 
examples. 
In the area of telecommunications and technology development Japan is a world 
leader alongside the US.l54 Again the provision of public goods 
telecommunications technologies to other states by Japan is likely to bring it both 
direct and indirect power benefits. Japanese telecommunications companies as yet 
do not seem to be global players, but the sheer size of companies such as NTT 
argues for a power potential, and Japan is the certainly predominant in the 
development of telecommunications technology in Asia. 
Knowledge 
The degree of indirect power derived by Japan from the flow of knowledge along 
physical transport and telecommunications systems is hard to evaluate; as is Japan's 
indirect power in other areas of the knowledge structure, such as culture and 
ideology. The US is traditionally thought to have been the state which derives the 
greatest indirect power and security benefits from cultural hegemony. Added to the 
154David C. Mowery, 'Japanese technology and g)obal influence', in Danny Unger and Paul 
Blackburn (cds.), Japan's E.'merging Global Role, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienncr, 1993, p. 
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high degree of confidence in the spread of its own culture as promoting what are 
seen as the universal values of democracy, human rights, and liberal business 
practices, the US is also viewed as having an advantage over other states in the 
acquisition of 'soft power' due to its rapid development of communications 
systems like the Internet and the use of English to disseminate knowledge. In 
contrast, Japan has been less certain of the universal applicability of its culture in 
the post-War period, and has been seen to be held back in the spread of its cultural 
power by language barriers, and, when compared to the US, the slow adoption of 
new information technologies. All ofthis is probably true, and as Drifte points out, 
much of the state-sponsored Japanese cultural diplomacy has been devised as a 
'damage limitation' exercise to insulate Japan from international criticism, rather 
than as a policy to seek to compete actively with other states for cultural 
recognition. But, as Drifte also points out, Japan has still managed to secure a 
measure of cultural power, partly due to the deliberate policies of the Japanese 
state, and partly due to the intrinsic attractiveness of Japanese culture which has 
been brought to other countries in conjunction with the development of Japanese 
economic power,l55 The growth of interest in Japanese lifestyles, and high and 
popular culture, has been strong in both the West and in Asia. The attraction of 
Japanese culture is shown by the fact that despite government efforts in South 
Korea to suppress Japanese comic books, literature and films, these symbols of 
Japanese culture have continued to be in demand. 
Again some caution is needed in evaluating how culture translates into the type 
of power that will benefit Japanese security. Japan has certainly not achieved any 
type of Gramscian hegemony, and Drifte notes that: 
imitating Japanese fashion or eating raw fish in restaurants does not make 
people automatically feel more positive towards Japan, as the high number of 
Japanese restaurants in Korea and the low level of appreciation of Japan may 
prove,156 
155Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Foreign Policy in the 1990's, pp. 145-8. 
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But at the very least, the diffusion of Japanese culture to other countries in Asia 
suggests that Japan may have obtained a degree of 'soft' and thus indirect 
economic power, with some benefits for promoting a peaceful environment and 
security. As a result, it will be necessary to consider Japan's power in knowledge 
and communications when looking at the case study of Japan-North Korea 
economic and security relations in chapter five. 
JAPANESE AID POWER 
Aid has been shown in chapter two to be the component of economic power most 
easily manipulated by governments. In the case of Japan it is clear that aid has long 
had an overt political and security purpose. This strongly suggests that it will form 
a major part of Japan's direct economic power portfolio and any attempts that Japan 
may make as a global civilian to use economic power for security purposes. This 
next section will then consider the degree of direct economic power accruing to 
• 
Japan from aid in preparation for testing the model of global civilian power against 
the security problem of North Korea in chapter five. 
Size and scope of Japanese aid 
The Japanese state has been a provider of aid on a modest scale to Asia since the 
1950's, beginning with war reparations to such nations as the Philippines, Burma 
and Indonesia. This was then followed by participation in technical aid programmes 
under the Colombo Plan which Japan joined in 1954, and which is seen as the start 
of Japan's Official Assistance (ODA) activities. Japan made its first yen loan to 
India in 1958 as part of a World Bank consortium, and in 1961 Japan joined as a 
founding member the Development Assistance Group (DAC) of the OECD. The 
same year saw Japan's establishment of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
(OEeF) formally under the control of the EPA. In 1963 Japan began two-step 
loans, in 1968 commodity loans, and in 1969 general grant aid. In 1974 the Japan 
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International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established under the organisational 
control ofthe MOFA.157 
However, despite this history of ODA activities in Asia, it was not until the mid 
to late 1970's that Japan began to emerge as a major provider of aid on a global 
scale. This process was set in motion by the twin shocks of the Oil Crisis of 1973 
and the anti-Japanese riots that accompanied Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit 
to Southeast Asia in 1974. The Oil Crisis resulted in immediate pledges of aid by 
Japan to the Middle East in order to help secure oil supplies. The anti-Japanese riots 
resulted in the 1977 'Fukuda Doctrine' enunciated by the then prime Minster 
Fukuda Takeo, which was designed to improve Japan-Southeast Asia relations, 
and which then lead to the 1978 First Medium Term Target of ODA plan. Under 
this plan, Japan pledged to double its annual aid disbursements, and between 1977 
and 1980 Japanese ODA increased from an annual level of US$I.42 billion to 
US$3.30 bilIion.1 58 The 1978 plan was then followed by Prime Minister Suzuki 
Zenko's announcement in 1980 of the Second Medium Term Target of ODA. This 
plan was to run from 1981 to 1985 and aimed to double aid disbursements to a total 
of US$21.4 billion during the five year period. Due to currency fluctuations the 
target was only 86.4 per cent fulfilled, but still Japan managed to disburse a total of 
US$18.1 billion in aid, and by 1985 was providing US$3.80 billion annually. The 
Third Medium Term Target of ODA unveiled in 1985 proposed to double again 
Japanese aid, to a total of US$40 billion between 1986 and 1992. The strength of 
the yen made this target highly achievable, and in 1987 the target date for doubling 
was brought forward to 1990. The aim was for a total disbursement in 1990 of 
157Robert M. Orr, The Emergence 0/ Japan's Foreign Aid Power, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1990, pp. 53-4; Susan Pharr, 'Japanese aid in the new world order', in Craig O. 
Garby and Mary Brown BuJlock (cds.), Japan: A New Kind 0/ Superpower?, p. 160; Inada JOji, 
rraigai enjo', in Aruga Tadashi el al. (cds.). Koza Kowai Seiji 4: Nihon no GaikO. p. 183. 
lS8For details of this plan: Igarashi Takeshi. Nihon no ODA to Kokusai ChitsujuII, Tl'lkyl'l, 
Nihon Kokusai Mondai KenkyQjo, 1990, p. 239; Dennis T. Yasutomo. The Manner o/Giving: 
Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. Lexington. Massachusettsrroronto: Lexington Books, 
1986. pp. 2-3; David Arase. Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid. 
Boulder. Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995. p. 69. 
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US$7.6 billion, but actual result exceeded this, reaching US$9.6 billion.159 The 
1988 Fourth Medium Target of ODA plan followed Prime Minister Takeshita 
Noboru's 'International Cooperation Initiative' announced in the same year, which 
set out to increase ODA disbursements to a total of US$50 billion between 1988 
and 1992. Again, fluctuations in the value of the yen made complete fulfillment of 
the plan difficult, but the target was nearly achieved by 1992, and in that year 
annual disbursements had risen to US$11.5 billion.1 6o In 1993, a further Fifth 
Medium Target Plan of ODA was announced, aiming to distribute a total of US$70-
75 billion in aid between 1993 and 1997.161 
This expansion of Japanese aid since the 1970's through medium term plans 
was matched in the 1980's by the introduction of 'capital recycling plans'. These 
were designed to help alleviate Third World debt by 'recycling' accumulated private 
and public capital through the agency of the OECF, the Japan Export-Import Bank 
and multilateral institutions. In September 1986, the then Finance Minister, 
Miyazawa Kiichi, revealed a US$lO billion 'recycling' package, which included a 
¥60 billion to the Japan Fund in the World Bank; a US$2.6 billion contribution to 
the World Bank soft loans facility; a US$1.3 billion contribution to the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB); and a US$3.6 billion loan to the IMF. In May 1987, 
Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro added a further US$20 billion loan plan, with 
US$8 billion earmarked in contributions to the World Bank, the ADB and the Inter-
American Development Bank; US$9 billion in loans through the OECF, the Japan 
Export-Import Bank, and through Japanese banks in cooperation with the World 
Bank and IMF. In addition, there were to be US$3 billion of untied loans by the 
Japan Export-Import Bank and commercial banks. I 62 
159 Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, London and 
New York, Routledge, 1993, p. 104. 
160Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 238; Igarashi Takeshi, Nihon no ODA 10 
Kokusai Chilsujun. pp. 240-1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan's ODA 1991, Tl'lkyl'l, 
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161Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1994, Tl'lkyl'l, Association for the Promotion of 
International Cooperation, 1995, pp. 251-3. 
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Table 9: Annual Japanese ODA disbursement totals (US$: million) 
Year Amount %increa<;e % GNP 
1961 221 52.4 0.20 
1962 168 -23.9 0.15 
1963 140 -16.6 0.20 
1964 116 -17.1 0.15 
1965 244 110.3 0.28 
1966 285 16.8 0.28 
1967 391 37.2 0.32 
1968 356 -8.9 0.25 
1969 436 22.5 0.26 
1970 458 5.0 0.23 
1971 511 11.6 0.23 
1972 611 19.6 0.21 
1973 1,011 65.5 0.25 
1974 1,126 11.4 0.25 
1975 1,148 1.9 0.23 
1976 1,105 -3.7 0.20 
Ign 1,424 28.9 0.21 
1978 2,215 55.5 0.23 
1979 2,638 19.1 0.26 
1980 3,304 25.3 0.31 
1981 3,171 4.0 0.27 
1982 3,0"..3 4.7 0.28 
1983 3,761 24.4 0.32 
1984 4,319 14.8 0.34 
1985 3,797 -12.1 0.29 
1986 5,634 48.4 0.29 
1987 7,454 32.3 0.31 
1988 9,134 22.5 0.32 
1989 8,965 -1.9 0.31 
1990 9,069 1.2 0.31 
1991 10,952 20.8 0.32 
1992 11,151 1.8 0.30 
1993 11 ,259 1.0 0.26 
1994 13,239 18.1 0.29 
1995 13,854 4.6 0.29 
Sources: Alan Rix, Japan's Economic Aid: Policy Making and Politics, London, 
Croom Helm, 1980, p. 32; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1991, p. 62; 
Japan's ODA 1994, p. 18, Tokyo, Association for the Promotion of International 
Cooperation, 1991, 1994; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga Kuni no Seifu 
Kaihatsu Enjo ODA Hakusho 1995-96, Tokya, Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin 
Kyokai, 1995, pp. 7, 21. 
In July 1987, Prime Minister Uno Sosuke set out a further US$65 billion 
recycling package to run from 1987 to 1992. This comprised US$23.5 billion in 
contributions by the Japan Export-Import Bank; US$12.5 billion of loans by the 
OECF; and US$29 billion of outlays and loans by pri vate banks and the Japanese 
government to the World Bank and the IMF. Alan Rix reports that as of 1990, the 
Japan Export-Import Bank and the OECP had committed or spent 60-70 per cent 
and 93 per cent of their targets respecti vely .163 
163Alan Rix,Japan'sForeignAidChalknge, p. 122. 
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The first and most obvious point concerning changes in Japanese aid in the 
period after the mid-1970's, is the huge expansion in its quantity. Annual 
disbursements of aid were raised from US$1.42 billion in 1977 to US$I1.26 
billion in 1993. The result ofthis was that by 1989 Japan had surpassed the US to 
become the world's leading donor of aid. The US regained the top position in the 
DAC ranking in 1990, but Japan again became top donor in 1991, and has 
remained so since.164 Moreover, Japan has not sought to inflate its aid figures by 
including disbursements traditionally regarded as outside the definition of aDA, 
whereas the US, for instance, included US$1.8 billion of military debt forgiveness 
within its aDA totals in 1991.165 Japan would also seem to have some capacity to 
increase further its lead in the aDA totals as it still only donates 0.2 per cent of 
GNP to aDA, compared to the DAC average of 0.29 per cent, and Japan's aDA 
contribution in 1993 of US$89.6 per capita ranks at number 18 out of the DAC 
countries.1 66 
Japan is likely to consolidate further its hold on the number one ranking in ODA 
contributions, and the pride of the MaFA in Japan's aid achievements is shown by 
its 1994 aDA report's proclamation of Japan's move from 'recipient to top donor.' 
The rise in the quantity of Japanese aid has also meant that Japan has now acquired 
the image of an aDA great power (Enjo Taikoku) capable of wielding direct 
economic power. 
To some extent this impression of direct power derived from the sheer quantity 
of Japanese aid has been reinforced by the quality of Japanese aid. In the past, 
Japan has often been criticised for what is seen as the low quality of its aid and an 
overemphasis upon aid to recipients intended to benefit Japan's own commercial 
interests and economic power. Japan is seen to have avoided grant aid, which 
carries no obligation for repayment, in favour of tied aid on loans and aid with a 
grant element which carries an obligation to buy goods and services from Japan as 
164Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1994, p. 28. 
165susan Pharr, 'Japanese aid in the new world order', p. 162. 
l~inistry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1994, p. 28. 
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the donor country.1 67 The share of outright grants in Japan's total ODA in 1993 
was comparatively low at 42.6 per cent. ranking Japan as number 20 out of the 22 
DAC countries, with a DAC average of 77.5 per cent Also the grant element within 
ODA disbursement was low at 77.6 per cent, compared with a DAC average of 
89.9 per cent, ranking Japan again as number 20 out of 22.1 68 
With regard to tied aid there has been a marked improvement in Japan's 
performance compared to other developed nations. In 1972 only 283 per cent of 
total ODA (including grants and loans) was untied at the commitment stage, but by 
1991 this figure had risen to 833 per cent.l69 Since 1989, Japan has been able to 
claim that 100 per cent of loans are untied, compared with the US figure of SO.7 
per cent in 1988.170 But critics of Japanese aid policy point out that while loans are 
dejure untied, they are still in de/acto terms tied. Japan's reliance on making ODA 
on a 'request basis' (yosei shugi) from recipient countries means that Japanese 
companies have tended in practice to have a large role in promoting aid projects to 
the recipient country and in preparing the project for presentation to the relevant 
Japanese aid agency.171 This close involvement in the initiation of aid projects by 
Japanese corporations has often resulted in their being awarded the aid contract, 
thus effectively tying aid to the purchase of Japanese goods and services. 
However, as Rix points out. the greater transparency in the bidding process has 
reduced the share of Japanese contracts in loan projects from 67 per cent in 1986 to 
27 per cent in 1991.172 Grant aid remains partly tied because the contractor and 
travel services must be Japanese, but goods and construction services can be 
handled by non-Japanese companies. 
Japanese ODA has also changed its geographical spread since the 1970's. In 
1963,98.7 per cent of Japanese aid was directed to Asia (with around 93.0 per cent 
167 Alan Rir., Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 108. 
168Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA /994, pp. 14-5. 
169Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA. /994, p. 28. 
170Alan Rir., Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 109~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 
/994, p. 153. 
171Susan Pharr, 'Japanese aid in the new world order', pp. 171·2. 
172Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 110. 
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of this figure in Southeast Asia).l73 This figure was still high at 98.2 per cent in 
1970, but by the 1980's had been reduced to around 60 per cent, and 573 per cent 
by 1993. The main concentration of Japanese aid has remained in Asia, but other 
areas have also begun to receive substantial shares of Japan's ODA. The Middle 
East increased its share in the mid-1970's, reaching a high of 12.4 per cent of 
Japan's ODA in 1977. It then fell back to around two to three per cent in the mid-
1980's, climbed to 20 per cent immediately after the Gulf War in 1991, but once 
again fell back, to around six to eight per cent in the 1990's. Africa's share of 
Japanese aDA has increased between the 1970's and 1990's, has fluctuated 
between 9 and 19 per cent, and stood at 11.8 per cent in 1994. Likewise, Latin 
America's share has risen to around 10 per cent, and was 8.6 per cent in 1994.174 
Despite some diversification of Japan's aid distribution by geographical region, 
the concentration, as has been seen, has remained in Asia, and within this region 
Japanese aid has favoured traditionally Southeast Asia. Indonesia has frequently 
been the top recipient of Japanese aid, and Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia 
have consistently appeared in the list of top ten recipients of Japanese aid. Japan 
provided its first yen loan to China in 1979, and by 1982 China had displaced 
Indonesia as the number one recipient of Japanese aid. Indonesia regained its top 
position in the late 1980's and early 1990's, but in 1993 and 1994 China once 
again displaced Indonesia. China and Indonesia together accounted for over 25 per 
cent of Japan's total ODA commitments in 1988. 
Japan's heavy concentration upon the distribution of aid to certain states, and 
Asian states in particular, has meant that Japan has become the top donor to them, 
and that they have become dependent on Japan for the majority of their aid. Table 
10 illustrates the dependency of Asian state upon Japanese aid, and by 1992 Japan 
had become the top donor to 29 states worldwide, including China, Indonesia, the 
173Alan Rix, Japan's Economic Aid: Policy Making and Politics,London, Croon Helm, 1908, p. 
34. 
174lgarashi Takeshi, Nihon no ODA 10 Kokusai Chilsujun, pp. 251-54; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan's ODA 1994, p. 18. 
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Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, India, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Nigeria 
and Kenya. Furthermore, the New Asian Industries Development (AID) Plan and 
the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund, launched in 19fr7 and 1988 respe~tively, 
promise to further increase the dependency of Asian countries upon Japan by the 
use of its aid to integrate vertically the economies of the region into Japan's own 
and to establish a regional division of labour.l75 
Table 10: Trends in regional distribution of Japan's bilateral ODA (percent) 
Asia Middle East Africa Latin America Other regions 
1973 88.0 1.4 2.4 4.6 3.6 
1975 75.0 10.6 6.9 5.6 1.9 
1980 70.5 10.4 11.4 6.0 1.7 
1985 67.7 7.9 9.9 6.2 8.3 
1990 59.3 10.2 11.4 8.1 11.0 
1991 51.0 20.4 10.3 9.5 8.8 
1992 65.1 4.3 10.1 9.1 11.4 
1993 59.5 6.4 11.8 9.0 13.3 
1994 57.3 7.8 11.8 8.6 14.6 
1995 54.4 6.8 12.6 10.8 15.3 
Sources: Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid alUl Japanese 
Foreign Policy, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986. p. 83; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's ODA 1991, p. 62; Japan's ODA 1994, pp. 
18, lOS, Tokyo: Association for the Promotion ofIntemational Cooperation, 1991. 
1994; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo ODA 
Hakusho 1995-96. Tokyo, Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin Kyokai, 1995, pp. 9. 27. 
Japanese aid and multilateral institutions 
Japan's expansion of aid at the bilateral level would seem, then, to have increased 
the size and geographical spread of its influence, and this has also been matched by 
Japan's aid efforts through multilateral institutions. Japan is a member of a number 
of multilateral institutions concerned with the provision of aid. Amongst these 
institutions are the World Bank and IMF (joined by Japan in 1952); the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) (joined 1976); the African Development Fund 
(joined 1983); theADB (joined 1966); and various UN agencies (joined 1956). In 
1986-87, Japan was the largest contributor out of the DAC countries to multilateral 
aid institutions, providing around 21.6 per cent of their budget, compared to 21.1 
175J)avidArase,Buying Power, p. 203. 
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per cent for the US.l76 Japan, as already described, has also used its capital 
recycling plans to channel funds into multilateral institutions, with US$8 billion for 
the World Bank, IADB and ADB in 1987, and US$29 billion for the World Bank 
and IMF in 1989. In the case of the World Bank, though, Japan's financial 
contributions do not appear to be commensurate with greater influence in the 
institution's aDA decision-making process. Japan's voting share, although it has 
been upgraded, has remained lower than that of the US. Japan does not possess a 
veto right similar to the US, and Japanese companies are said to receive only 1 per 
cent of the contracts given out by the World Bank. As for the UN, Japan in 1995 
was the second largest contributor the UN's budget after the US at around 14 per 
cent. But the total share of Japan's aDA to UN agencies is lower than the US, 
Gennany, France and Russia, signalling for one observer a lower level of influence 
in the UN compared to other developed nations. l77 
On the other hand, Japan's influence in the ADB has been seen as much greater, 
even to the extent that some commentators in the past have viewed the ADB as a 
tool of Japanese economic policy used to 'cripple' those Asian economies in 
competition with Japan.l78 Japan has clearly been an influential participant in the 
ADB since being involved in its foundation in 1966. At this time, Japan pledged to 
provide a third of the ADB's funds, but in practice has contributed nearly half of its 
funds, as in 1989 and 1993 when Japan's share of ADB funds was 47 per cent and 
50 per cent respectively.l79 Japan also has created its own special fund within the 
ADB since 1980 to recycle US$I00 million of capital. 180 In the case of the ADB, 
monetary contributions have been matched by a more equal share for Japan of 
influence over the aid decision making process. In 1977, Japan received 16.7 per 
176Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power, p. 99. 
177Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power, p. 100. 
178Jon Halliday and Gavin McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today: Coprosperity in Grealer 
Ea.rl Asia, New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1973, p. 50. 
179Ming Wan, 'Japan and the Asian Development Bank', Pacific Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4, Winter 
1995-96, p. 513. 
1800ennis T. Yasutomo, 'Japan and the Asian Development Bank: multilateral aid policy in 
transition', in Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr Jr. (cds.), Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and 
Policy in a New Era, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1993, p. 310; Michael Haas, 'Asian 
Development Bank',lnlernalionalOrganizalion, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 1974, pp. 281-96. 
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cent of the voting rights in the ADB with this figure falling to 13.5 per cent by the 
end of 1993. But Japan still remains the biggest individual voter ahead of the US. 
In addition, since its foundation the ADB president has always been Japanese; 
nominated by the Japanese government and usually a former bureaucrat. I 8 I A large 
number of the ADB's personnel are Japanese nationals, many of which are former 
members of the MOF and the BOJ or seconded from the Japan Export-Import 
Bank, the OECF and JICA. In 1989, around 10 per cent of the ADB's staff of 600 
were Japanese, with the US supplying a comparable figure.t 82 Japan is also seen 
as becoming increasingly assertive in the ADB in its dealings with the US, and 
Dennis Yasutomo notes that despite the ADB's charter, 'MDB's (multilateral 
development banks) are in truth, political institutions with explicit or implicit 
political agendas.'183 Consequently, while the ADB may not be quite as firmly 
under the influence of the Japanese state as some have argued, Ming Wan states 
that Japan has come to exercise 'silent' but acknowledged leadership, and 
Yasutomo contends that the ADB can, 'serve as a foreign policy tool in the pursuit 
of Japanese diplomatic interests.'184 
In terms of most quantifiable indicators Japan's aid power seems to be very 
considerable. The increase in the quantity of Japanese aid has placed it above the 
US for the first time in a ranking of power. The quality of Japanese aid is also 
suggestive of a dependency power relationship between Japan and the recipients of 
its ODA. Japanese aid on the bilateral level and multilateral levels is strong 
especially in Asia. Given the existence of this raw aid power, the question is, has 
Japan been able to convert this aid into direct economic power and use it effectively 
in support of its security policy'? The next task is to examine Japan's aid policy and 
the history of its connection with security policy. 
181Alan Ri'K.. Japan's Economic Aid, pp. 128-9. 
182Dennis T. Ya.~utomo. 'Japan and the Asian Development Bank', pp. 318, 320,322. 
183Dennis T. Yasutomo. 'Japan and the Asian Development Bank', p. 316. 
184Ming Wan, 'Japan and the Asian Development Bank', p. 519; Dennis T. Yasutomo, 'Japan and 
the Asian Development Bank', p. 318. 
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Japanese aid policy and direct economic power 
Scholarship on Japanese aDA has disagreed over the extent to which Japanese 
aDA has been used for commercial as opposed to political gains. From the early 
1950's until the mid-1970's, Japan's aDA was viewed predominantly as a means 
of pursuing economic growth, with only limited attention to political 
considerations. Hasegawa Sukehiro writing in the 1970's, for instance, 
acknowledged the use of aDA to ensure Japanese international ascendancy and 
national interests or kokueki. Hence, aid could be viewed as a tool to smooth 
relations between states, but still the chief form of kokueki promotion was seen as 
national economic development and aid was not overtly political.18S By the 1980's, 
and following a shift in Japanese government policy, scholars such as Yasutomo 
began to identify a political and diplomatic motivation behind Japan's aid. This type 
of view has persisted to varying degrees into the 1990's, but has been challenged 
most recently by David Arase who argues that the main emphasis of Japanese aid 
remains economic and that the heyday of aid as a political tool has passed. For 
Arase, Japanese aDA is more an integral part of Japan's economic rather than 
di plomatic policy.186 
The academic debate has not been helped by the lack on the part of the Japanese 
government of a clearly expressed aid philosophy. Yasutomo has pointed to the 
vagueness of the conceptual link in official Japanese thought between aid and 
security in the 1980's.l87 Alan Rix notes that even though the 1992 ODA Charter, 
or ODA TaikfJ, includes security related guidelines on aid policy, the connection is 
still far from clear cut. 188 However, at the same time, it is arguable that despite the 
problem of the lack of a clear aid philosophy, it is something of a false argument to 
make a distinction between aid as economic policy and aid as security policy. One 
of the overall aims of this dissertation is to point out the often false division 
185fiasegawaSukehiro, Japanese Foreign AidandPraclice, New York, Praeger, 1975, pp. 7,144. 
1860avid Arnse, Buying Power, pp. 6-7, 107-10, 209. 
187Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving, pp. 19-40. 
188Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 37. 
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between economics and security, and to assert that the two are often inextricably 
related. Arase's arguments perhaps miss the point. For whether or not the aid is 
intended for commercial or diplomatic ends, in the final outcome the provision of 
aid and the economic change that it may bring about are likely to have effects upon 
security. As Yasutomo indicates, in practice most aid is 'mixed' in nature, and is 
initiated for a variety of motives.l 89 Indeed the Japanese MOFA made this clear in 
1981 when it stated that: 
Japan's ODA is intended to help the developing countries in the self-help 
efforts for economic development, in pursuit of the people's welfare. We 
believe such assistance is conducive to enhanced political, economic, and 
social resiliency of the developing countries, and in the long run 
contributes to world peace and stability.l90 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Japan has utilised aid in 
the service of security policy either in an overt or more subtle fashion. This policy 
can be divided into four stages of development since the 1960's. 
The first stage can be described as the use by the Japanese state of aid in order to 
underpin the general strategy of the US in North and Southeast Asia in the mid and 
late 1960's. The Vietnam War highlighted the limitations of US power and 
compelled successive US administrations to seek assistance from Japan for those 
states that the US saw as essential to stability in the region. In response to US 
pressure, Japan provided ¥54 billion in aid to Taiwan in 1965, and US$300 million 
in grant aid and US$200 million worth of yen aid to South Korea in 1967.191 
Following the Johnson-Sat8 communique of 1967, the Japanese Prime Minister 
Sato Eisaku pledged ODA in order to 'contribute to regional peace and security.'192 
In 1969, the Nixon-Sat8 communique reiterated plans to provide aid to South 
Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The 1973 Nixon-Tanaka communiqu6 
1890ennis T. Yasutomo, The Mantrer o/Giving, p. 115. 
190Cited in: Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner o/Giving, p. 1. 
191Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergenceo/Japan's Foreign Aid Power, p. 109. 
192Arase, Buying Power, p. 55. 
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committed Japan to increase aDA to Indo-China, and especially South Vietnam and 
Laos, in order to support the US's strategy in the region.193 
The second stage ofthe development of the use aid for security purposes was in 
support of Japan's 'resource diplomacy' in the mid-1970's, and for the 
improvement of relations with Southeast Asia following the anti-Japanese riots of 
1974. Hence, in December 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka despatched a mission to 
the Middle East with promises of a US$3 billion aid package, with US$1 billion of 
aid for both Iran and Iraq.194 The 1977 Fukuda Doctrine pledged US$1 billion in 
assistance for ASEAN and produced subsequently the First Medium Target of 
aDA plan. 195 
The third stage came in the late 1970's and early 1980's and had been termed 
'strategic aid' by Yasutomo. This term was not one used by the MaFA and other 
ministries, but in this period aid acquired a more openly strategic nature in the 
rhetoric of the Japanese government and in its practical application.t96 The 
deteriorating security situation brought about by the invasion of Cambodia by 
Vietnam in 1978 and of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, increased US 
pressure on Japan for greater burden sharing, or katagawari, in security matters. In 
1983 the US Commission on Security and Economic Assistance recognised 
Japanese aid as a contribution to security. and the increasing attachment on a 
conceptual level of a security function to aid in some policy-making circles was 
shown by the 1980 Comprehensive Security Report. This urged Japan to expand 
its aDA to around 0.26 per cent of GNP and accepted its uses as a diplomatic tool 
for non-military purposes.l97 However, as Yasutomo demonstrates. even though 
aid was accepted as connected to security, it was not integrated fully into the other 
193Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergetlce oj Japan's Foreign Aid Power. p. 110. 
194Robert M. Orr Jr., 'Japanese foreign aid: over a barrel in the Middle East'. in Bruce M. Koppel 
and Robert M. Orr Jr. (OOs.), Japan's Foreign Aid, p. 292. 
1950ennis T. Yasutomo, 'Why aid? Japan as an "aid great power"'. Pacific Affairs, vol. 162, no. 
4, Winter 1989-90. p. 493. 
196Inada JOji. 'Japan's aid diplomacy: economic, political or strategic?' in Kathleen Newland (cd.), 
The International Relations oj Japan, London. Macmillan. 1990, p. 104. 
1970avidArase,Buying Power, p. 218~ S6g&nzcnhoshl> GurOpu, Sogoan .. enhosIW Se"ryaku, p. 
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elements of security policy, and was still seen within the context of the North-
South problem.l98 
Nevertheless, the increasingly open acceptance of aid as a component of security 
policy was demonstrated by Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi's declaration that 
Japanese aDA would be provided to 'countries bordering area of conflict' (funstJ 
shuhenkoku), and his successor, Suzuki Zenko's 1980 statement that ODA would 
be used for the 'maintenance of peace and stability in the world'. with particular 
emphasis upon the Persian Gulf. Southeast Asia and China. As a result, Japan 
increased its ODA to two of the US's main regional allies: Thailand and South 
Korea. Japan also increased aid to Turkey and Pakistan. close to the Afghanistan 
conflict; to Jamaica. perceived by the US as an important bulwark against the 
spread of communism in the Caribbean; and to the countries close to the Horn of 
Africa (Somalia. Sudan, Kenya and Oman), in order to check Soviet influence in 
the region. Furthermore. after 1979 Japan began to provide aid to China, with the 
design of strengthening the position of pragmatists in their modernisation 
programme and of bolstering China's position against the USSR.199 
This period also saw the increased willingness of the Japanese state to use aid as 
a negative sanction of direct economic power. Japan ceased aid to Afghanistan after 
the Soviet invasion in 1979, and in 1978 froze loan aid to Vietnam. continuing to 
extend only humanitarian aid (although loan aid was resumed in 1992).200 These 
bilateral sanctions were also enforced at the multilateral level. The ADB also cut off 
aid to Vietnam and Cambodia in 1978, and to China after the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989.201 
The fourth stage in the development of Japan's aid policy in connection with 
security began in the early 1990's, and can be viewed as the articulation of a more 
coherent aid philosophy, often with specific diplomatic and foreign policy 
198Dennis T. Yasutomo. The Man~r o/Giving. p. 28. 
199rnada JOji. 'Japan's aid diplomacy'. pp. 1m, 108. 
200Jnada JOji. 'Stick or carrot? Japanese aid policy and Vietnam'. in Bruce M. Koppel and Robert 
M Orr Jr. (eds.). Japan's Foreign Aid. p. 115. 
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objectives put forward by the MOFA. By 1994, the MOFA, at least, has come to 
describe ODA as, 'one of the most important instruments of foreign policy and 
international contribution,' available to Japan as, 'a peace loving nation.'202 
Yasutomo notes that aid has become increasingly accepted as a tool of non-military 
power, and Inada JOichi sees aid as a new tool for the diplomacy of peace.203 
The April 1991 aid guidelines announced by the then Prime Minister Kaifu 
Toshiki were in part a reaction to the failure of Japan's disbursement of aid during 
the Gulf War to achieve recognition as a genuine contribution to the multinational 
and Western alliance. The guidelines attempted to set out a clearer link between 
Japanese aid and security. Included within the guidelines were provisions that 
would make it necessary to consider prior to the disbursement of aid: l)trends in 
the military spending and the import and export of weapons by the recipient 
country; 2) trends in the development and production of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction; 3) the efforts made by the recipient country towards 
democratisation and market-oriented economic reform; and. 4) human rights issues 
in the recipientcountry.204 Measures designed to prohibit the diversion of aid by a 
recipient country had already been set out in an April 1978 resolution of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, which stated that it was 
necessary 'to take aU precautions not to carry out external economic assistance of a 
sort that will be applied toward military use or that will promote international 
conflict.'205 But the 1991 guidelines were a more specific statement of aid 
principles and these were strengthened by their incorporation into the June 1992 
ODA charter. 
In the late 1980's and early 1990's. the principles of the aDA Charter have been 
put into practice to some degree by the Japanese government. Following the 
military coup in Myanmar in 1988, the Japanese government cut off (although 
202Dennis T. Yasutomo. The Manner of Giving. p. 49. 
203Dennis T. Yasutomo. 'Why aid?'. p. 502; IDada, 'Japan's aid diplomacy'. p. 118. 
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somewhat reluctantly) all aid except debt relief contributions to that state.206 Japan 
also ceased aid to Haiti after the 1991 coup, and applied pressure on Pakistan over 
its nuclear programme and accession to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) by 
intimating that it might link aid to progress on this issue.207 In 1995, Japan also cut 
off its limited grant aid to China in protest at its decision to continue with nuclear 
and missile testing. Moreover, as the case study in chapter five will demonstrate, 
since 1990 the Japanese government has withheld from North Korea potentially 
billions of dollars in aid involved in normalisation negotiations due to concerns 
about that country's nuclear programme. 
However, Japan can still be seen as reluctant to use aid as a negative sanction. 
Critics note that Japan took little action against Indonesia over its known violation 
of human rights in East Timor in 1991.208 Moreover, the cut off of grant aid to 
China in 1995 still leaves Japan's large loan programme to China intact, and Japan 
suspended its yen loans to China for only one year following Tiananmen 
Square.209 Commercial considerations and the problem of energy dependency are 
part of the explanation for Japan's reluctance to use the 'stick' of aid in its foreign 
and security policy. But a parallel explanation may also be that Japanese policy-
makers hold the view that the forging of economic links between Japan and other 
states, and a policy of economic engagement, especially in the case of China, is the 
best guarantee of security and of moderating other states' behaviour. Hence, the 
direct economic power of aid is used more to provide positive sanctions and to 
establish the conditions for indirect economic power and the deepening of mutual 
dependency. 
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The overall picture of the development of Japanese aid policy shows the use of 
aid to fulfill a number of functions for security. Aid has been used by the Japanese 
state as an instrument to improve the general security environment and so to prevent 
the occurrence of conflict. But in the event of a conflict, aid has also been used as a 
negative sanction to impose costs on states that are considered threats to security as 
in the case of Vietnam, Cambodia and China. Aid also serves as a positive sanction 
to remove the sources of conflict, as in the case of Indonesia, Thailand, and again 
China. Aid can, therefore, be seen as a mUltipurpose tool of direct economic 
power, and the Japanese state's most developed component of economic power 
both in conceptual and practical terms. Combined with the quantity, quality, and 
global geographical spread of Japanese aid, it should be possible to argue that aid 
provides great direct economic power and the basis for a viable security policy. 
However, as with all the other components of economic power, the problems of 
the use of aid by the Japan state need to be investigated, and evidence suggests that 
it is subject to many of the same limitations, namely: bureaucratic conflict and the 
input of the politicians in the policy-making process, and the role of non-state 
actors in the policy-making process including business interests, foreign pressure 
and private interest groups. 
Quite clearly aid policy is not exempted from the types of bureaucratic conflict 
seen in the areas of production, finance, trade and energy. The bureaucracy is seen 
as having a large measure of autonomy in designing aid policy, but within the 
bureaucracy there are tensions which distort the policy-making process, and which 
then limit the state's flexibility of control over aid. The aid policy-making process is 
highly fragmented and potentially spread across the jurisdictions of sixteen separate 
ministries. In most cases, though, the responsibility for aid policy is devolved to 
the three ministries of the MOFA, the MOF and MITI, and to one agency, the 
EPA.210 Coordination of overall policy is made through periodic meetings between 
the ministries, and the implementation of the actual aid programmes is carried out 
2100avid Arase, Buying Power, p. 171. 
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by the agencies (tokushu hojin) of JICA and the OECF. JICA is formally under the 
control of the MOFA, and in general deals with social infrastructure and grant aid 
projects. The OECF is formally under the control of the MOF and deals with 
economic infrastructure projects and loan aid. In reality, the MOFA does not 
possess the necessary expertise to manage all of JICA's projects with its own 
personnel and so has become reliant upon shukko or transferees from other 
ministries. Moreover, the JICA budget is controlled by the MOF, with the end 
result that JICA is cut up between the jurisdictions of different ministries. In the 
case of the OECF, the budget is again controlled by the MOF, as are its key official 
positions.211 
The effect of the splitting of jurisdictions and responsibilities between ministries 
is magnified further by the different interests of the ministries and competition 
between them for influence. ODA and defence were the two items in government 
budgets in the 1980's that continued to increase, and this led ministries not usually 
associated with aid programmes to try to secure a share of the expanding aid 
budget. One example of this was the Ministry of Health and Welfare's creation in 
1989 of an Office of International Cooperation on Health Matters.212 In many 
instances, the aid philosophy of the various ministries also differs, making 
coordination between them even more difficult. Since the 1960's, the MOFA, 
through its Economic Cooperation Bureau, has advocated the importance of aid for 
international cooperation. This stance has been conditioned by the MOFA's 
position as the 'window' on aid requests from both recipients states and the US. 
Hence, since the 1970's the MOFA has taken the lead in redefining aid in terms of 
security policy. 
In contrast to this, the economic bureaucracy, represented by the MOF and 
MITI, have tended to emphasise the potential benefits of the provision of aid to the 
Japanese economy. But there is a division of opinion between these ministries, 
21lDavidArase,Buying Power, pp. 179,183,188. 
212Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power, p. 21. 
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with the MOF seeking cost effectiveness in aid programmes and opposed to aid to 
what it sees as already developed states such as South Korea and Singapore. MITI, 
on the other hand, has preferred to stress the importance of securing overseas 
markets and has favoured tied aid because of the potential benefits for Japanese 
industry.213 
The result of this institutional and conceptual split in aid policy between 
ministries has been to frustrate efforts to create a central aid agency. Proposals 
since the 1960's for such an agency have been defeated successively, and the 
creation of JICA generated considerable intenninisterial conflict only settled by the 
intervention ofthe LDP.214 There have been moves to reform the aid system since 
the early 1990's, but Arase argues that the division of jurisdictions means that it is 
nearly impossible to change the process of aid administration.215 As Alan Rix has 
pointed out since the 1970's, Japan's system of aid has been highly decentralised, 
cumbersome and uncoordinated compared to that of other developed nations, and 
thus limits 'Japan's ability to undertake international initiatives.'216 
Two other limiting factors over the control of aid that need to be noted are the 
role of politicians and the role of big business. As has been seen, the bureaucracy 
has secured a large measure of autonomy in the aid process, but it is also the case 
that politicians have often played a key role in breaking the impasse between the 
ministries over aid policy .217 The LDP's PARe and to some extent the opposition 
parties have also been seen as playing a role in overseeing the administration of aid 
and correcting possible bureaucratic excesses. The policy of yoseishugi also means 
that corporations have an important role in affecting the direction of aid, and groups 
such as the Keidanren are known to have had a decisive influence over the policy-
2l3Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence 0/ Japan's Foreign Aid Power, pp. 31-6, Dennis T. 
Y 8Sutomo, The Manner 0/ Giving, pp. 68-9. 
214David Arase, Buying Power, p. 161; Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid, pp. 49-77. 
21SoavidArase,Buying Power, p. 171. 
216Alan Rix, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy: Domestic Constraints and Recent Cluznges, Australia-
Japan Economic Relations Research Project Research P'dper no. 58, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1979, pp. 9-10; 'Japan's foreign aid policy: a capacity for leadership?' 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 62, no. 4, Winter 1989-90, p. 463. • 
217 Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid, pp. 49-77. 
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making process. However, the feeling of some commentators such as Rix, though, 
is that as the transparency of the aid process increases, so will the influence of 
private companies upon it decline. 
Foreign pressure has also been a key factor in shaping Japan's aid policy. US 
pressure on Japan has resulted in increases in aid to countries such as Vietnam and 
Cambodia in the 1960's, and to Turkey and Pakistan in the 1980's. Indeed. it is 
US pressure which has allowed the MOFA to move to an increasingly security and 
foreign policy oriented conception of aid in opposition to the other ministries, by 
using alliance obligations to legitimise strategic aid. Clearly, as in the case of aid to 
the Middle East in the 1970's and to China in the 1990's, Japan has also the ability 
to move more independently of the US. but in general the US relationship is likely 
to playa constraining role upon Japanese bilateral aid policy. On the multilateral 
level, Japan also has to consider foreign interests and US opinion. The US remains 
the most powerful actor in the majority of multilateral development banks, and even 
in the ADB the US has staff members equal to Japan, and considerable restraining 
influence. Moreover, Japan cannot act too independently within the ADB, or it 
risks provoking accusations by other Asian members of Japanese domination. 
Added to these hindrances to Japanese direct power in aid are a set of other 
limits which look likely to become increasingly important in the 1990's. The first of 
these is the growing strength of public opinion concerned with ODA. Unlike many 
other developed nations, the Japanese public as yet does not seem to have 
encountered 'aid fatigue', and remains broadly supportive of increases in Japanese 
aid. In addition, the government has encouraged the growth of NGO's (Non-
Government Organisations) to handle types of aid projects too small for its agencies 
to deal with, and has facilitated their funding by the establishment in 1991 of the 
International Volunteer Postal Savings Scheme. But the increasing awareness of 
aid policy by the public also brings new restrictions upon the freedom of the 
government to design ODA policy to suit its own needs. Rix contends that, 'Public 
pressure is encircling aid administrators on three fronts,' of heightened public 
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awareness, intense public scrutiny of problems in the aid process, and greater 
public involvement through NGO's.218 Under these conditions, the Japanese state 
may find it even harder to conceptualise and implement an aid policy which 
emphasises security interests if this is seen to diverge from publicly accepted values 
of foreign policy in areas such as human rights. 
A second emergent restriction on Japanese aid policy is the simple question of 
the existence of long term financial resources to fund this component of economic 
power, The expansion of Japan's aDA has been made possible by capital surpluses 
and the high value of the yen. However, currency fluctuations may make future aid 
programmes more difficult to plan and implement and the capital surpluses may be 
drying up. If Bill Emmott's predictions prove correct, the increased consumption 
levels in the Japanese economy will reduce funds for recycling and for aid 
programmes. The current recession and budget difficulties of the Japanese 
government may be a portend of things to come, and the 1993 level of ODA as 
0.26 per cent of GNP may become harder to maintain or increase over the long 
term. In the 1990's the aDA budget has continued to increase, but at slower rates 
than in the previous decade. Financial hardship and budgetary constraints, then, 
could have a depleting effect upon this most important of the components of 
economic power. 
The final question concerning the limits of Japanese aid power is its overall 
effectiveness. The dependency of a number of Asian nations on Japan suggests the 
acquisition of power and influence by Japan. But it is also apparent that there are 
limitations to Japan's hold over these states. China, for instance, seems willing to 
forgo Japanese aid if acceptance of it means that it has to alter its policies, and is 
capable of seeking aid from other sources. China's vulnerability to reductions and 
even increases of Japanese aid is questionable. Furthermore, even if Japan were to 
cut off aid to certain Asian countries this action may not have the desired political 
effects and would lose for Japan at a stroke the goodwill built up over time. Hence, 
218Alan Rix, Japan's Foreign Aid Challenge, p. 71. 
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this may explain Japan's reluctance to totally sever the aid relationship with 
Myanmar even though its government has continued to suppress the pro-democracy 
movement in ways that can be interpreted as contravening the ODA Taiko. 
If aid cut-offs and negative sanctions are not necessarily effective, then offers of 
positive sanctions can also have undesirable effects. Japan's offer of US$4 billion 
of aid to the front-line states of the Gulf States in 1990 bought comparatively little 
political influence or commercial advantages for Japanese companies. Hence, the 
size of an aid disbursement may be of little relevance in certain circumstances, such 
as after the outbreak of a major conflict, and have even less effect unless backed by 
long term plans for economic cooperation and development. In this sense, Japan's 
aid policy when intended to deepen interdependence may be more effective for 
security purposes than the simple use of aid as a short term positive or negative 
sanction. Aid needs to be used in conjunction with the other economic components 
of power to be most effective. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter, in preparation for the case study in chapters four to six, has applied to 
Japan the model of economic power first developed in chapter two in order to 
assess its credentials as a global civilian power. The chapter began by examining 
the policy-making system in Japan and concluded that the Japanese state is neither a 
unitary nor the sole actor in economic security. To discover the limits to the ability 
of the Japanese state to mobilise economic power and create a security policy based 
upon it, it is necessary to consider the role not only the state actors of the 
bureaucracy and political parties, but also their interaction with the business 
community and foreign pressures. Thus, this conclusion will help to explain the 
limits of Japan's role as a global civilian power when the case study of Japan-North 
Korea relations is researched in chapters five and six. 
Examination of each of the components of Japanese economic power reveals 
that, whilst they suggest great 'raw' economic power, the extent to which they can 
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be shaped by the Japanese state to serve its security interests faces varying 
limitations. Conflict within the state between the bureaucracy and political parties in 
part accounts for these limitations, and a further sets of restraints is imposed by the 
penetration of the Japanese policy-making system by business and foreign actors. 
As a result, the type and extent of power that the Japanese state derives from each 
of the components of economic power differs, and Japan's 'power portfolio' as a 
global civilian power is summarised in Table 11. 
Table 11: Japan's economic 'power portfolio' as a global civilian power 
Component of economic Degree of indirect power Degree of direct power 
power accruing to Japan accruing to Japan 
Production 
Finance 
Tn¥1e 
Energy 
Communications 
Aid 
High Low 
High Medium 
High Medium 
Medium Medium 
Medium Medium 
Medium High 
For some components, as in the case of aid, the level of direct power is high, for 
others, such as production, the level of direct power is low. Conversely, the low 
level of direct power derived from components such as production indicates the 
possibility of a high degree of indirect power accruing to the Japanese state with 
high correspondingly high benefits for security. For the state to tap into these 
security benefits it needs a form of alliance with big business, either explicitly by 
using the state's direct economic power from other components to further the 
indirect power accrued from the overseas expansion of Japanese FDI. or implicitly 
by creating the political conditions which allow Japanese FDI to flow outwards. 
Hence, the best way for the global civilian power to articulate its security policy is 
to ensure a complementary mix of direct and indirect power working across all the 
components of economic power. 
This detailed investigation of Japan's economic power has now opened the way 
for the empirical testing of the capacity of Japan to act as a global civilian power 
when confronted by a specific security problem, and hence its contribution to post-
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Cold War security based on economic power. The next chapter will begin the 
presentation of the dissertation case study concerned with Japan-North Korea 
security relations in the 1990's. It will set out to demonstrate that North Korea is 
the type of post-Cold War security problem that demands a solution involving 
economic power, and as such is one that offers the chance for Japan to act as a 
global civilian power. 
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